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ABSTRACT
The introduction of technology-based tools into developing countries is 
usually impeded by a number of potential problems. The problems 
become murkier when the context of the issue, such as external debt 
management, where technology is to be used, does not have a 
standard textbook of rules and procedures to follow.
The principle problems encountered during the course of our research 
for this thesis hinged the issue of possible inapplicability of information 
technology (IT), especially information and decision support systems 
(l/DSS). This is also the case for other tools and techniques built and 
used by developed countries in the developing world. The great deal 
of difference in the context of use; content of the systems; and the 
attitudes of the parties involved in the process forms the basis for our 
argument.
The research was intended to draw on the lessons learned by the 
Cabinet Information and Decision Support Center (IDSC) during the 
introduction l/DSS for improving the decision making process in 
developing countries. Moreover, the research intended to tackle the 
issue of using l/DSS in a totally new context, other than for very 
structured purposes such as manufacturing and the like, and a 
challenging environment such as those in developing countries where 
difficulties of implementation and use are more in context, content and 
cultural issues than technological ones. The research would then show 
implications, identify problems and challenges and try to develop 
generalizations and recommendations.
The research, since its initial phases, had to consider the forces of 
centralization versus decentralization and the organizational structure 
of decision making especially at the top level. Other issues such as 
l/DSS project planning and implementation; organizational dynamics 
and the research at the organizational level related to national policy;
and technical information systems development were taken into 
consideration.
This experience could be viewed as a documentation phase where 
the Egyptian Cabinet IDSC and the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) 
together have built, implemented and sustained state-of-the-art l/DSS 
in the process of establishing a powerful Egyptian debt management 
office. The analysis of these experiences displays many lessons for the 
implementation of sophisticated systems under conditions of extreme 
difficulty. It offers insight into a number of problems that concern 
designers, implementors, users, and researchers in l/DSS use in 
managing development planning and socio-economic change 
especially in developing countries. It also delves into important aspects 
related to project planning and implementation, organizational 
dynamics and the effective use of accurate, timely and relevant 
information in development planning.
We conclude this thesis with an analytical framework that gives 
detailed methods and guidelines for future implementation of similar 
programs in developing countries that might wish to benefit from the 
experience of the Cabinet of Egypt IDSC.
PREFACE
Working for the Cabinet, Information and Decision Support Center 
(IDSC) since almost its inception (April 1986) and the broad exposure to 
Information Technology (IT) related issues, problems and challenges 
triggered my desire to pursue postgraduate research studies in aspects 
of information technology in developing economies. Finishing my MBA 
in 1988 at the American University in Cairo (AUC) and working as a 
teaching assistant for the Information Systems (IS) Department also 
contributed to my curiosity in pursuing further studies in the field of 
information technology.
In 1988 I was promoted to head the Cabinet IDSC chairman’s Planning 
and Control Department which basically filters everything to and/or 
from the Chairman of the Advisory Board of IDSC. By virtue of the 
position, daily contacts were developed with various IDSC projects 
managers in addition to my becoming more familiar with the issues and 
problems facing the developers and the users of IT in Egypt in the 
various sectors and on different organizational levels. Moreover, the 
base building phase of IDSC attracted such top experts in the field of 
l/DSS as Jay Nanimaker, Paul Gray, Ralph Sprague, Joyce Elam and 
others with whom I was directly assigned to work. The nature of my 
assignment was closely aligned with their process of learning about 
decision making in the Egyptian culture and also in transferring l/DSS 
know-how to the IDSC staff. Furthermore, I was fortunate to work 
directly with the chairman who, at the same time, was the professor I 
assisted at AUC, and to assist him in producing a number of research 
papers1 written by him in coordination with several co-authors about
i
•  El-Sherif, H., "Building Crisis Management Strategic Support Systems for the 
Egyptian Cabinet", RVB Research Papers, 10, June 1990.
• El-Sherif, H., "Managing Institutionalization of Strategic Decision Support for the 
Egyptian Cabinet", Interfaces. 20,1, January-February 1990.
IDSC as a unique experience in developing countries. I also attended a 
number of worldwide symposia and seminars such as ICIS, IFROS, TIMS 
and others where the Egyptian experience was presented and took 
part in even preparation.
By October 1992, I was provided with the opportunity to pursue further 
research in information systems. At that time, the topic of external debt 
management was at the top of my priority of interests. This was due to 
the major developments achieved in this arena by the Egyptian 
government during the Paris Club negotiations of 1987 and 1991 as a 
result of the debt management and economic monitoring (DM&EM) 
program developed and implemented by IDSC and the CBE2.
Discussing with IDSC’s chairman of the board3 and with the program
manager the possibility of covering this development and 
implementation as a research topic, they both agreed and shared with 
me the importance of studying the impacts of the DM&EM program 
specifically and its implications on l/DSS research and applications in 
general.
Working in the Cabinet IDSC provided me with the opportunity, the 
support and the facilities needed to embark on a full-fledged 
investigation of the initiation, development and implementation of the 
DM&EM program. Moreover, access to the decision and policy makers 
as well as the ease in communicating with the various parties involved 
in the program encouraged me to proceed with the research.
• El-Sherif, H., "Managing Large Information & Decision Support Systems Projects", 
IFORS, 1988, pp 130-144.
• El-Sherif, H. and El-Sawy, O., "Issue-based Decision Support Systems for the Cabinet 
of Egypt", MIS Quarterly, 12, December 1988.
2 Though I was working for IDSC, I did not work directly with the DM&EM program.
3 Though the Chairman of IDSC wrote a number of times about his studies and
observations in developing and implementing l/DSS in Egypt, he was very much 
interested in the result of our work due to the fact that it is one of few indepth studies 
conducted for one of IDSC main programs.
xiv
Over the last 5 years, since I started this research, the DM&EM program 
has changed significantly in extent, size and achievements. The quality 
and quantity of its deliverables and services has surpassed the 
expectations projected in the project document. Moreover, the 
development of its new phases, its expansion both horizontally, into 
new sectors such as capital markets, and vertically into the 
management of internal debt (public and private), for example, has 
represented a great challenge to tracking its advances.
Questions like, What triggered the DM&EM idea? Who initiated, 
promoted and supported the idea? Who was the champion? What 
were the problems and challenges and how were they transformed 
into opportunities? What were the requirements and numerous other 
questions that represented the main objective of this research aimed at 
identifying the role played by IT at the economic development level in 
Egypt and attempting to generalize the experience so as to make it 
transferrable to other developing countries.
Above all, the issue of development, use and applicability of IT in 
developing countries was of great interest to me. Like many other 
developing countries, Egypt was faced with many challenges including 
the use of the latest IT in its rush for developmental capability. This thesis 
will present and analyze the realization process experienced by the 
Government of Egypt (GOE) as it began to appreciate the importance 
of l/DSS in its emerging attempts to manage its refined socio-economic 
developmental planning process. The focus of attention will be on the 
process of adopting, adapting and diffusing l/DSS in leveraging and 
supporting top policy and decision makers’ decision making process, 
especially in critical policy and planning issues such as external debt 
management.
In other words, the objectives of this research could be expressed as 
follows:
xv
• First, evaluate and present different debt management tools, 
techniques and models and the its applicability to different contexts. 
Identify the factors affecting the choice of a certain model or a 
combination of models and the implications of each. The review will 
include documentation for the Egyptian experience and the 
attempt made toward realizing a comprehensive external debt 
management function;
• Second, explore the cycle of IT transfer, localization and adaptation 
in the context of application with a special emphasis on state-of-the- 
art DSS which is a vital tool nowadays in the process of supporting 
top policy and decision makers;
• Third, inquire into and elicitate facts concerning the process of 
strategic decision making, structure of power and policy formulation 
at the Cabinet level in addition to assessing the role played by IDSC 
in mobilizing various resources to employ, adapt, adopt and diffuse 
various state-of-the-art technologies in the Egyptian context;
• Fourth, perform an in depth analysis and appraisal for the debt 
management and economic monitoring program to identify the 
direct and indirect impacts on various sectoral dimensions such as 
economic, social and political. In addition, study and measure the 
degree of contextual fit of the project as a dominant com ponent in 
the overall structural adjustment programs. Moreover, examine the 
change in Egyptian negotiation power with creditors before and 
after the inception of the project; and
• Fifth, thoroughly analyze selected debt bilateral/multilateral 
negotiation cases, either for debt forgiveness or rescheduling, to 
include identifying detailed scenarios, spelling out different policy 
issues, and assessing various outcomes.
xvi
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CHAPTER I 
The Debt Problem & Egypt
A. Introduction 
7. Problem Definition
The build-up of external debt by developing countries has been going 
on for a long time. It has been one of their strategy’s cornerstones for 
economic and social development since the 1950's. For a number of 
reasons, however, the orderly process of borrowing for development 
got out of hand during the last 15-20 years which has led to the 
eruption of the debt crisis leading to serious implications in the world's 
financial systems. Nowadays, the world economic and financial 
systems are at stake. Debtors are facing a very difficult time in fulfilling 
their obligations, while creditors find it more risky to be involved with 
countries and institutions which are not capable of even servicing their 
debt. Developing countries’ external debt amounted to US$ 1.6 trillion 
in 1993 and has increased yearly by about US$ 110 billion1.
Developing countries resort to foreign financing to foster internal growth 
and to increase the resources available for investment. But before 
receiving foreign funds, plans must be made for how to repay them, 
and the limits such debt will impose on future economic policy must be 
considered. Investment projects financed with foreign debt should 
yield enough foreign currency to cover the servicing of the debt. In 
theory, therefore, debt management involves knowing the level of the 
debt, keeping it within the desired limits, and obtaining the best 
available terms for it. In reality, debt management is very different. First 
of all, public foreign debt has been used mainly to create (or maintain) 
fiscal deficits, caused not by greater public investment, but by higher
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public current consumption or, in some cases, grandiose and 
unprofitable investments. Second, the volume of foreign debt incurred 
by a given country has been independent of the size of its current 
account deficit plus net foreign direct investment. The reason is that 
separate forces, detailed below, determine all three elements:
• The volume of debf in every period is mostly determined in the 
money market. It is a function of differential net borrowing costs as 
well as expectations regarding exchange and interest rates;
• The current account is determined in the goods and services market 
and varies according to domestic and foreign demand as well as 
the competitiveness of exports and imports for goods and services; 
and
• Net foreign direct investment depends mainly on the development 
of a real sector(s) of the economy (The World Bank 1990).
In most cases, the volume of foreign debt has been greater than the 
current account deficit plus net foreign direct investment, leading to a 
deficit. To hide this deficit, governments have preferred either to force 
the public sector or to encourage the private sector to obtain 
additional foreign financing. But these higher reserves, from an 
unnecessarily large foreign debt, have proved unprofitable. The cost 
of borrowing has been much greater than the return on the reserves 
because markets have generally exhibited a normal upward-sloping 
yield curve, with higher yield on debt of longer maturities, reserves have 
tended to be invested in short-term securities with lower returns. The 
result has been a serious debt-servicing problem, the “debt crisis” , 
attributable in most countries largely to the absence of debt 
management.
1 Debt Managem ent and the Developing Countries, UNDP, July 1994.
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Debt management should take place at two levels: the macro- 
economic and the administrative level. Macro-economic 
management is the most important since the management of the 
economy as a whole is the main factor in determining the volume of 
foreign debt. When more borrowing can no longer cover debt 
servicing, there are only two alternatives. One is to create a larger 
surplus in the trade and service accounts by reducing expenditures 
relative to output. The other alternative is normally to create a fiscal 
surplus. The reason behind this is that in developing countries most 
foreign debt is owed by the public sector while most foreign assets are 
held by the private sector (partly because private foreign investment 
has been a way of generating external income and evading 
exchange controls and taxes by not repatriating the principal). The 
debt-service problem is, therefore, more a fiscal issue than one related 
to the balance of payments. Turning fiscal deficits into fiscal surpluses 
could be called macro-economic debt management (The World Bank 
1990).
B. Egypt 
7. The Country
Egypt is one of a number of Middle Eastern countries which share 
Arabic as their common language and hold similar natural resources 
such as oil and natural gas. It was the cradle of an ancient civilization 
dating back to 3000 BC. Even today some of the symbols of its rich 
history, arts and crafts attract tens of thousands of tourists every year. 
With a population of about 61 million, Egypt is the most populous 
country in the Middle East region. Its population is growing at a rate of
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2.3 percent annually. According to Howard Handy2, Egypt’s growth
rate will reach 5% in the year 1997 and is expected to grow gradually 
to reach 7% by the end of this century. Egypt has a land area of 
386,600 square meters of which a large part is desert. Its extent of 
urbanization is 43 percent with three large cities: Cairo, Giza and 
Alexandria3. Cairo, the capital of Egypt, is a large metropolis where
buildings of French and English architecture stand next to modern 
skyscrapers. Cairo’s 12 million inhabitants constitute nearly 20 percent 
of the total population.
Egypt has four basic sources of foreign exchange earnings. They are 
almost equally divided between tourism, oil, Suez Canal earnings and 
remittances of Egyptians working abroad, mainly in the Arab Gulf 
counfries.
Egypt, like many other developing countries, is trying to expand its 
industrial base and modernize itself technologically. It is liberalizing its 
economy and has engaged in a massive privatization program 
targeting 392 large public sector organizations since the beginning of 
the 1990s. The gross domestic product (GDP) of Egypt in 1996 was 45 
billion US dollars, with a growth rate of 4.9 percent4. The inflation rate
has dropped to 7.2 % and the deficit in the national budget has 
reached 1.3 % of the GDP leading to a surplus in the balance of 
payment (BOP). Additionally, external debts service payment has 
reached 13.6 % of total export earnings5.
2 President of the Word Bank task force in Egypt and the Middle East - Interview by
Yasser Sobhi for Al Ahram newspaper - The national newspaper of Egypt - Cairo, 
Egypt, 3 February 1997.
3 Source: CAPMAS, Egypt, October 1996.
4 Egypt's Economic Bulletin, The Cabinet IDSC, Cairo, May 1997.
5 Dr. Youssef Botrous Ghali, Cabinet Minister for Economic Affairs and member of the
High Level Economic Committee (HLEC) and the Egyptian economic negotiation 
team  to the WB and the IMF, Al Ahram Newspaper, Cairo, 17 May 1997.
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Agriculture accounts for 17 percent of the gross domestic product and 
industry accounts for 50 percent. The per capita gross national product 
is US$ 1,200 dollars per year. Egypt has a large service sector mainly 
built around tourism and transportation. Its major exports are human 
resource capacities, petroleum products, cotton and leather products; 
its major imports are food, machinery and vehicles. Its currency, the 
Egyptian Pound, has been stable towards major currencies during 
recent years.
Egypt has a highly centralized government with a Cabinet headed by 
a Prime Minister and consisting of a deputy Prime Minister, 28 ministers 
and the governor of the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE). The Cabinet has 
four main committees the members of which are different ministers 
each according to his specialization and area of work. These 
committees are the High Level Strategy Committee for Economic and 
Financial Affairs (HLEC); Production and Services Committee; Social 
Services Committee; and Legislative Affairs Committee. The Prime 
Minister coordinates the work of the ministries and policy is made in 
conjunction with the Supreme Court and the President.
The country is administered in provincial units, or governorates, through 
the office of the governor, an official of great power locally whom the 
Prime Minister, in his capacity as head of the governors’ council, 
appoints.
On the econom ic side, Egypt was faced with a sharply deteriorating 
economy due to its involvement in a number of wars over a long 
period of time (1956 - 1973). This involvement led to a very weak 
economy mainly dependent on unhealthy external borrowing. In the 
coming chapters of this thesis, we will discuss such problems, the 
reasons behind them and how the problems were solved using 
information technology (IT) tools and techniques. Despite these 
setbacks, during previous years, the Egyptian economy has been
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realizing major positive changes that have repositioned Egypt in the 
world economy. The “ positive” surplus in balance of payment 
amounted to 1.2 billion US dollars for the year 1996; the deficit in the 
balance of trade is expected to reach 14% of GDP backed-up by a 
huge surplus of other sources of foreign currency. Moreover, Egypt’s 
performance in fiscal reform was outstanding to the degree that the 
deficit in the national budget was reduced to 0.08% com pared to the 
anticipated figure of 11% as indicated by World Bank (WB) experts. One 
of the major reasons behind this reduction is the decreased amount of 
debt service payment as a result of the Paris Club6 reduction of external
debt. This reduction also reflects the gradual restructuring of 
governmental expenditures towards funnelling most of the funds fo 
service, health, and education sectors of the economy. Furthermore, 
the fiscal restructuring allowed the reduction of the inflation rate to only 
6.2% this year; it is expected in the upcoming years that the 
governmental deficit will change to surplus with the continuation of 
such fiscal measures.
World Bank officials appraised the privatization problems in Egypt with 
22 major companies being privatized. This move resulted in returns that 
are equivalent to 1.5% of the GDP, most of which will be directed to 
pay the internal debts of public sector companies to banks. The other 
portion will be directed to compensate the labor force that might have 
been harmed by such privatization undertakings. Additionally, these
6 The Paris Club is the institution responsible about coordinating Creditors/Debtors
country relationship especially when a debtor country faces difficulties in paying 
back its debt. In this situation, it is the Paris Club role to call upon the debtor country 
and its creditors and arrange for the necessary agreements (payment, re-schedulling, 
forgiveness,..etc.) to take place. It is also the Paris Club role to follow-up on the 
execution of such agreement and make sure that the debtor country is meeting its 
obligations. It is also the authority of the Paris Club, in case a debtor country fail to 
meet its obligations, to declare a  debtor country state of bankruptcy and take the 
necessary measure to guarantee the payback of creditors through different means 
(such as, debt-equity swaps, debt conversions, ...etc). In 1987, Egypt was called by 
the Paris Club to meet with its creditors due to the heavy debt situation and the 
difficulties it was facing in servicing its debts.
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officials have confirmed that service of internal debts is expected to 
decrease to 50% of the GDP during the coming year, which will 
certainly result in further reduction in the BOP deficit. The WB appraised 
the growth in the Egyptian stock market and pointed out that its prices 
don ’t seem extraordinarily high and that the price index in particular is 
still at a reasonable level (El Sherif 1996).
2. Information Technology in Egypt
IT was introduced in to Egypt in the 1960s. The evolution of IT in Egypt 
can be seen in three phases.
The first phase started in the early 1960s and lasted until the early 1970s 
and the industrial boom in various sectors of the economy. 
Computerization was an essential tool targeted by the government to 
fulfil its socio-economic plans. Though it was deemed important, it 
encountered major cultural and social problems as well as a resistance 
to change from senior government officials that remained unsolved at 
that time and constituted major barriers to the proper implementation 
of com puter use and diffusion (Kamel 1994).
In the early 1960s, less than ten years after the introduction of the first 
commercial computer in the west, a number of developing countries 
such as Egypt and India, started to introduce and use IT, mainly 
computers, in different sectors of the economy (Lind 1986). Egypt was 
the first country in the Middle East to acquire a computer, when, in 
1961, Alexandria University installed an IBM mainframe Model 1620. A 
few months later, the Institute of National Planning acquired the 
second mainframe computer in Egypt, also an IBM 1620. Next, the 
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) 
followed by installing an International Computer Limited (ICL) 
mainframe Model, 1904. The ICL computer was relatively advanced 
com pared to the first two computers but it was large and needed a 
large room to accom m odate it. In 1969, Al-Ahram Management and
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Computer Center (AMAC), the first of its kind in Egypt or any other Arab 
country, was established (Kamel 1994). While the IBM computer at 
Alexandria University's Faculty of Engineering was used to introduce 
students and professors to this new technology, the computers of the 
National Planning Institute and CAPMAS were used for tabulation, 
accounting, stock control and financial systems. The computer at 
AMAC was installed to upgrade and computerize Al-Ahram 
newspaper’s internal work structures. It was also intended to undertake 
computer applications for other institutions as a com puter service 
bureau for corporations which could not afford to purchase their own 
computers or who did not have the qualified personnel to operate 
them effectively (Kamel 1994).
The diffusion of computers in this phase was monitored and regulated 
by the government. It represented a type of monopoly that was 
primarily meant to realize organizational performance and to support 
various sectors in the economy through the use of various IT tools and 
techniques in reaching a certain level of efficiency within the large 
government organizations. Until the 1970s, there were no local privately 
owned computer companies in Egypt. This was not only due to massive 
nationalization policies but also to the fact that, at that time, they were 
too expensive, too large and not yet perceived as necessary (Kamel 
1994). During the 1960s, there were branches of three computer 
companies in Egypt: International Business Machines (IBM),
International Computer Limited (ICL), and National Cash Registers, 
(NCR).
The IT second phase cam e with the economic “open-door" policy 
during 1974-75, in conjunction with the massive drop in prices of mini­
computers worldwide. This phase was characterized by using 
computers for increased effectiveness after realizing organizational 
performance and efficiency during the first phase. It witnessed the
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establishment in Egypt ot a large number of representative offices of 
most international IT corporations. Consequently, Egypt took on the 
image of the Middle East information center. Egypt’s highly qualified 
technicians, prospective computer users and the surge in incomes that 
accom panied the oil boom in the late 1970s fostered this. 
Consequently, in the second half of the 1970s, the value of the 
information technology market in Egypt was within the range of US 20 
to 30 million dollars (Kamel 1994). By the early 1980s, personal 
computers becam e accessible to more individuals, universities, schools, 
research centers and private firms. Personal computers becom e more 
and more popular in Egypt in the 1980s, the dramatic increase 
seemingly attributable to the localization (Arabization and adaptation 
of programs to local context) of software applications. The majority of 
users in Egypt and other Arab countries prefer to work on Arabic-based 
applications. As a result, a new business sector consisting of software 
companies was formed to provide a variety of IT-related services.
The second phase of computing lasted until the mid-1980s and 
witnessed the spread of computer companies in Egypt and the 
orientation and marketing of their IT sen/ices including training and 
human resources development, systems development and 
maintenance, as well as information systems evaluation and 
assessment. The role of IT during that phase was primarily intended to 
provide management support with regard to decision making and 
improving effectiveness (Kamel 1994).
Phase three started in 1985 and represented a shift in the perception 
and use of IT in Egypt. The Egyptian market was liberalized, leading to a 
vast increase in the number of multinationals, vendors and local 
software houses in the market. IT has been perceived as a re­
positioning tool for organizations in an ever-growing competitive 
market where almost all decision resource allocation functions are
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complex and directly affect the competitiveness status and position of 
a company.
In 1981, a presidential decree was signed stipulating that all 
government entities, including public sector organizations, should 
establish computer centers on their premises to improve their 
productivity. Over a  short period of time, computer centers were 
established in most ministries and public sector companies. The decree 
represented the initial embarkation of the Government of Egypt (GOE) 
on a national program for the establishment and development of an 
informatics, electronic communications industry.
Phase three witnessed the involvement of a new customer in the 
market with new ideas, strategies and plans, namely, the government. 
It re-defined the role of IT within the context of socio-economic 
development planning believing in its enormous impact in such areas. 
From its side, the GOE has been striving to implement a nation - wide 
strategy to support the realization of its targeted socio-economic 
development objectives. By mid-1985, the Cabinet Information 
Decision Support Center (IDSC) had been established as a “ think tank” 
a ttached to the body of the Cabinet. It adopted a far-reaching supply- 
push strategy to improve Egypt’s managerial and technological 
infrastructure. Its strategic objective was the introduction, adaptation, 
adoption, use and diffusion of information technology at all levels of 
the government starting with the Cabinet, its high level committees, all 
ministries, governorates, and government organizations. To fulfill these 
objectives, the strategy implemented by the government included the 
following:
• development infrastructure for informatics and decision support,
• supporting and developing the software service industry, and
• development of a high-tech industrial base in the areas of 
electronics, computers and communications.
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Consequently, within the broader and intensive national plan for 
administrative and technological development, IDSC realized the 
importance of establishing a comprehensive national information 
master plan which spelled out the government's development 
requirements. This plan was translated into implementing 450 sizable 
informatics projects and programs. It aimed at leveraging and 
supporting decision making, and increasing productivity in a number of 
economic, social, managerial and technological domains that are 
vitally important for Egypt. The common objectives of the programs 
included:
• First, to develop information and decision support systems 
for the Cabinet and top policy makers in Egypt.
• Second, to support the establishment of decision support 
systems/centers in different ministries and make more 
efficient and effective use of the available information 
resources.
• Third, to initiate, encourage and support informatics 
projects that could accelerate managerial and 
technological development of Egyptian ministries, sectors 
and governorates.
•  Fourth, to participate in international cooperation activities 
in the areas of information and decision support.
However, with the spread of computer use and the proper orientation 
provided for decision markers, other important end-users in various 
sectors becam e primary users of computers in Egypt. For example, in 
1992 petroleum companies accounted for 15%, banks 18%, public 
sectors & government 18%, private sector 17%, universities 12%, hotels 
10%, and hospitals 10% of total computer use7. It is estimated that Egypt
7 CAPMAS, 1992.
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has achieved only 10 percent of its computerization potential by 
installing approximately 156,000 computers in the public sector, 
government agencies and offices, as well as in the private sector. The 
demand for microcomputers is expected to grow at an average of 
20% a year.
Encouraging IT introduction and diffusion, the government has recently 
encouraged imports through imposing only 5% customs duty on 
hardware and software, reduced from 30% custom during September 
1997. As a result, a sizable increase in the IT market was realized and 
increased from 25 dealers and about 70 sub-dealers and retail outlets 
in 1985 to over 1,080 international brands, 320 dealers, about 4,500 sub­
dealers and over 650 training centers in 1997s. As is the trend in most
developing countries, government and public sector institutions are by 
far the largest purchasers (estimated at 38%).
Furthermore, In 1993, a national decree was initiated by the Cabinet 
IDSC and implemented by the Ministry of Justice to support software 
copyright laws and prevent software piracy and illegal importation. The 
current computer market in Egypt is estimated to be around 150 million 
dollars, and is expected to grow to US 230 million dollars in the year 
2000.
Consequently, the information technology industry in Egypt has 
witnessed major developmental leaps since the mid-1980s. A number 
of its components such as electronics, hardware and software have 
been gaining wider attention from both the business sector and the 
political arena. This has resulted in the development and 
implementation of a set of procedures that were established to boost 
information technology with its various components. However, the size 
of the overall information technology industry indicates that it is far from
8 CAPMAS, 1997.
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being well-grounded and well-established as a strong production 
outlet contributing to the national economy.
3. The D eb t P roblem
Egypt is just one of many countries that has been challenged with a 
growing debt management problem impeding its economic 
development. It accum ulated a government foreign debt of US$ 33 
billion during the 70's and 80's, much needed funding to rebuild its 
economy and modernize the country after adopting the long-awaited 
Middle East Peace Agreement; the figure reached US$ 44 billion by 
1990. Egypt at that time, was considered among the world's top five 
debtors in relation to the GDP. Furthermore, if fully serviced, the interest 
and repayment of principle would have consumed more than half of 
the country's export revenues.
In addition, since the mid-1980s the Egyptian economy has been 
experiencing a growing scarcity of foreign exchange resulting from 
sharply deteriorating external conditions. The difficult balance of 
payment situation of recent years has caused Egypt to assume a 
rapidly increasing external debt burden. It is estimated that debt 
service in 1985 was over 25 percent of Egypt’s total export earnings.
To ensure that Egypt's international credit worthiness is maintained, 
external debt needs to be carefully managed. This requires not only 
that debt service obligations are paid on time but also that new debt is 
contracted on terms and in amounts which are com patible with 
Egypt's payback capability. Proposed new borrowing needs to be 
analyzed in the light of existing obligations before being approved. 
Policy makers, therefore, require information on the debt service 
profiles of existing debt; disbursement projections for committed but un­
disbursed funds; available sources of financing and terms; and 
immediate payments obligations.
Prior to 1986, debt management was divided among a variety of
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offices in the Egyptian government including the CBE, Ministry of 
Planning, Ministry of International Cooperation, Ministry of Finance, 
Economy, Defense and others. The Central Bank approved and 
monitored suppliers’ and buyers’ credit and short term borrowing by 
the public sector. The Ministry of Planning and International 
Cooperation negotiated most project-related loans to the central 
government and was responsible for monitoring the use of loans. These 
loans were primarily from bilateral and multilateral sources and were 
frequently multi-sectoral in nature. The Ministry of Finance was 
responsible for issuing payment orders for all external loans paid from 
the central government budget and computing the corresponding 
Egyptian pounds. The Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade was 
responsible for formulating the foreign exchange budget, including the 
anticipated level of disbursements and debt sen/ice in respect to 
external obligations. Finally, the Ministry of Defense was responsible for 
negotiating external loans and monitoring debt service obligations in 
respect to military programs. Each entity kept records for its own 
purposes with little or no awareness of the need for regular exchange 
of information or of the overall debt picture. Though this seems to 
depict the system as very organized and well-structured, the reality was 
that this was a very theoretical setup and there was no real central 
coordination point where actual debt management functions were 
performed.
Within the Central Bank, external debt data arising from the operations 
of the entities mentioned above was collected in several operational 
departments. This information was mainly centralized in the Loans and 
External Debt Department (LEDD) in the Central Bank in files and 
registers maintained manually. Though computer systems had been 
present for a long time, they were only used as a store for information 
being received from various sources. Surprisingly, information was
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printed out of the computer, manipulations were performed manually, 
and results were punched back into the computer if the system 
allowed. This manual process was very slow, inaccurate, and very 
inflexible to any changes required by decision makers. This body of 
information could not be made use of conveniently in order to forecast 
external payment obligations, when, for example, exchange rates and 
international interest rates varied frequently and the manual system 
lacked flexibility to accom m odate it. Similarly, flexible aggregation of 
external debt data, which was required for balance of payment 
analyses and foreign exchange budgeting, was cumbersome and 
time-consuming. Consequently, the type of comprehensive debt 
reports, so vital to economic planners and policy makers, were not 
available or were too late to support a decision at the critical time 
(Hassan, 1994).
In response to the need for immediate improvement, the situation was 
properly analyzed and simple immediate solutions were 
recommended:
1. Increased control and monitoring of external debt operations and 
improvements in the approval and disbursement process;
2. Centralization of the data base on the external debt of the country 
in the LEDD and its computerization; and Better flow of regular 
reports on external debt operations to the several agencies involved 
in formulating and implementing policy in this area.
By 1985, the GOE had formulated a comprehensive reform program 
aimed at rationalization of debt utilization and reduction of the debt 
burden. An inter-institutional framework was formulated and a number 
of projects were initiated as part of a global structural adjustment 
program. It included liberalization of the economy and a 
comprehensive structural adjustment plan. Continuous consultations 
and discussions with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank
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and other lenders took place in order to help mobilize the needed 
resources to close the external resource gap.
Successful management of fhe resource gap is at the crossroads of 
economic recovery. In addition to the implementation of sound 
macro-economic policies to affect favorably key variables in the 
external trade accounts, improved balance of payments performance 
is also dependent on strengthening external debt management. In 
recent years, factor services (interest payment) and principal debt 
repayment have grown in proportion to other items. Although the 
country's general stock of debt cannot be modified except in a 
program of debt rescheduling, external liabilities management can 
help achieve, over time, a net debt reduction through better targeting 
of net borrowing for productive purposes, debt conversions (debt 
swaps) and risk management mechanisms.
Our research will consider the structural adjustment program covering 
debt management function re-creation for the GOE. The aim in 
studying the Debt Management and Economic Monitoring (DM&EM) 
program is to assess the impact of using information and decision 
support systems9 (l/DSS) capabilities in helping to solve a chronic
problem faced by many developing countries.
C. Thesis outline
This research addresses the problem of external debt management in 
developing countries. It explores how Information and decision support 
systems could be used to help solving such chronic problem. It will 
focus on assessing the im pact of development, implementation, and 
use of timely and accurate information systems for supporting the 
decision making process of top policy and decision makers involved 
the management of external debt. It we study whether the success of
9 Defined in Chapter III, P.60
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a debt management program is heavily dependent on a robust debt 
management system or not.
The research approach is to assess such impact by exhaustively 
studying two organizations that stand at the forefront of integrating the 
Egyptian debt management system (presented in details in chapter V). 
Those two organizations are: the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE), which has 
the primary responsible for the country's debt functions, and the 
Cabinet Information and Decision Support Center. The latter has acted 
as a state of the art IT “ think tank" attached to the Cabinet and has 
focused on major strategic socio-economic developmental objectives. 
In 1986, both organizations began the process of developing a fully- 
fledged l/DSS for external debt monitoring. The system was designed 
jointly by IDSC and CBE and solely managed by CBE trained staff. The 
system now contains a database of some 4,500 loans from a large 
number of creditors representing about 15,000 schedules. The 
database was a necessary prerequisite to permitting the development 
and institutionalization of an effective external debt management 
function. In 1985, several challenges and problems were apparent 
including;
• Poor and fragmented manual data management systems for 
loans and their disbursements;
• Lack of coordination among institutions at the national level 
regarding loan utilization and debt repayment;
• Poor integrity of debt information;
• Conflicts between international creditors and national institutions;
• Acute shortages in supply of reasonable terms for new loans;
• Over-utilization by some sectors of loans, and under-utilization of 
others;
• Absence of managerial systems for monitoring and control of debt 
repayments; and finally,
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• Effective management of current and future debt portfolios. 
According to the Cabinet IDSC chairman "some of the difficult 
challenges viewed in the mid-80's were overcome by 1988. A fully 
comprehensive database and an information system was built for 
Egyptian debt, and linked to all key users around the debt reform 
program. Inter-ministerial coordination was enhanced significantly. 
Problems with international and multi-national creditors shifted from 
questioning the data and information to more objective dialogue of 
how reform could actually be achieved. In 1988, Egypt realized 
another challenge, namely the importance of building and 
institutionalizing debt management capabilities and organization within 
the central bank to help develop not only new borrowing strategies, 
but also to identify optimum debt portfolios. Models for generation of 
the selected optimum portfolios from the current ones were explored. 
They included the consideration and combination of new debt issues, 
while taking into consideration existing debt and swaps of both new 
and existing debt issues. Models were developed for integrating the 
client views, sometimes consisting of several scenarios, thus generating 
a set of transactions which form the basis for the borrowing strategy for 
the subsequent period until the next optimization. One of the goals 
was to minimize the overall future burden. In May 1991, the 
Government of Egypt succeeded in reducing the debt by 50% through 
a phased implementation approach, over a four years period, starting 
with 15% reduction during the first phase. The debt management 
program team formed the “ back room" (kitchen as they describe it) 
supporting the Paris Club negotiations with various creditors. The savings 
for the Egyptian economy have amounted to more than US$ 10 billion. 
The team developed DSSs, which resulted in what was perceived as a 
national achievem ent." (El Sherif, 1996)
The proposed research explores and studies the impact of information
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technology and especially information and decision support systems, 
and tries to assess social, economic and managerial implications, in 
supporting top debt management policy and decision makers in a 
national context. IT will highlight the roles and responsibilities of the key 
players involved in addition to the changes in organizational structure / 
dynamics that resulted from the implementation of this system, if any. 
The goal of this research is to construct an analytical framework that 
compares and contrasts the different debt management systems, their 
prerequisites, and dimensional impacts with a view toward applying 
the findings to other countries depending on their specific conditions. It 
is hoped that this thesis will demonstrate a replicable experience, 
which can be practically applied to help in solving one of the 1990's 
chronic challenges for developing countries. A thorough analysis of our 
observations and finds will be presented in chapter VI.
D. Thesis Divisions
The research conducted on the DM&EM program with its ideas, phases 
and findings will be presented in three parts. The common focus of the 
investigation carried across the different chapters will be directed 
towards studying the main theme of the thesis: the impact of 
Information/Decision Support Systems (l/DSS) in debt management in 
developing countries, especially with the Egyptian experience.
Part 1 is divided into three chapters. Chapter I discusses the debt 
problem and Egypt and provides historical background on the 
evolution of the debt problem in Egypt with its various phases and uses 
among private and public sector organizations. It also reflects the 
status of information technology in Egypt coupled with the emergence 
of a need to introduce state-of-the art IT tools and techniques, not only 
to diffuse the use of IT but also to use the best relevant technology to 
boost the socio-economic development programs through the 
rationalization of the decision making process. Chapter II describes the
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theoretical foundations of external debt and debt management 
challenges together with decision making and decision support 
systems research. It provides the research method, techniques, data 
collection methods, research plan and the conduct of the research. 
Chapter III covers the theoretical foundation of our thesis including 
decision making, information and decision support systems and debt 
management evolution and debt management systems available 
worldwide.
Part 2 consists of Chapters IV, V & VI covering the period before and 
after implementation of the DM&EM program. Chapter IV covers 
strategic decision making with respect to its information and decision 
support requirements and the decision making process a t the Cabinet 
of Egypt level. It also discuses the debt acquisition (borrowing) process 
used by the GOE before DM&EM program realization. Based on this 
historical background, the chapter touches on the establishment of the 
Cabinet IDSC including its mission and objectives, management 
approach and challenges faced. Chapter V covers the GOE 
experience in implementing large l/DSS programs dealing with 
leveraging and supporting decision making, mainly at the strategic 
level, in solving Egypt’s chronic debt problem. It covers, in depth, the 
program, the Egyptian debt management office, and the debt 
management system used, in addition to the program challenges 
faced and the lessons learned. Chapter VI presents the program’s 
im pact and gains on both the national and the international sides.
Part 3 contains the last two chapters, VII & VIII. Chapter VII covers our 
proposed accelerated approach to l/DSS debt management 
executive framework implementation. This approach reflects the result 
of our empirical research, and our contribution to the field of l/DSS in 
debt management. The last chapter reviews the research findings and 
includes an analysis of DM&EM program implementation phases and
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generalizations of the research findings as deduced from the 
development and implementation of large information and decision 
support systems in a developing country. Finally, future research 
opportunities that relate to the use of l/DSS in unconventional settings 
such as those documented in the literature are discussed.
E. Conclusion
The debt problem in developing countries is reported to be one of most 
severe crises in the 90’s for almost all developing countries. Egypt’s 
external debt amounted to US$ 1.6 trillion in 1993 and is increasing 
yearly by about US$ 110 billion. This increase has taken place in the 
context of dramatic changes in IT since the mid-1980s. These changes 
are reflected in the use and diffusion of various IT tools and techniques 
in most public and private sector organizations.
Being a developing country, Egypt was severely hurt by the debt 
problem in its attempt to re-build its economy after a number of wars. It 
was also faced with the challenges of introducing and diffusing IT in 
order to encourage the country to use state of the art information 
technology thereby assisting in the realization of socio-economic 
development and growth. This massive introduction of information 
technology was coupled with major government commitment and a 
comprehensive build-up of an information culture nation-wide that was 
carried out by the government and disseminated into various 
organizations both at the central and local levels.
The IT culture was introduced through a number of channels such as:
• the formulation of government regulations and policies for import 
of software, hardware and telecommunications components;
• the promotion of training and professional development within IT 
related areas;
• the development of educational curricula for different school and
university levels; and
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• the establishment of an information infrastructure to support the 
country’s development objectives.
During the last twelve years (since 1985), the GOE has embarked on a 
nation-wide economic reform program. The basis of this program was a 
comprehensive debt management function that made use of wide 
diffusion of information technology within the various sectors of the 
economy.
This thesis will begin with the historical background of the external debt 
problem and the dissemination of information technology in Egypt. This 
background will then be used as a base for the forthcoming parts of 
the thesis which cover the experience of the Egyptian government in 
using l/DSS in supporting and leveraging the decision making process 
especially at the top strategic level. The research will focus on the 
current implementation of information technology applications in 
various ministries, the CBE, government offices and other related 
institutions concerned with the debt management function in Egypt.
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CHAPTER I I  
Theoretical Foundation & Research Methods
A. Introduction
Chapter II of this thesis covers our research methods and the 
theoretical foundations for the research. It describes how our research 
was influenced by information systems literature, especially the 
theoretical foundations of decision support systems. It will discuss the 
reasons for which they were developed, which significantly differ from 
those for which they were implemented. While decision support systems 
were initially developed for corporate operations focusing on profit- 
related activities and market trends, in this thesis they are used as tools 
for government support in strategic decision making for socio­
econom ic and development planning purposes in public 
administration (Kamel, 1994) and economic reform activities.
Our research findings and generalizations were deeply influenced by 
the programs, projects, applications, lessons learned and the 
experience gained by the Cabinet IDSC. It is also affected by the 
research and practical experience of our colleagues, Dr. Hisham El 
Sherif and Dr. Sherif Kamel, whose work was influenced by a number of 
theories, mainly Critical Social Theory, Phenomenology and Human 
Activity Theory.
Our research used a comprehensive empirical evidence gathering 
techniques and methods such as questionnaires, interviews, likert scale, 
analysis of official documents, ..etc. Such research methodology was 
chosen to satisfy the following: -
1. Yielding maximum information possible (due to the lack of 
documentation on debt management and debt management 
systems, sensitivity of the topic, and the difficulty of finding/meeting 
debt management decision makers;
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2. Ability to cross-check the gathered information (by asking the same 
interview questions but a likert scale or questionnaire);
3. Ability to generate both qualitative and quantitative information; 
and
4. Ability to preciously describe situations and record changes and 
observations.
This chapter will detail the research plan, which will lead to the 
analyses of the findings and the development of generalizations and 
conclusions in later chapters.
This research was meant to be useful for future l/DSS researchs and 
applications conducted in developing countries specially those related 
to information handling and the design and delivery of decision 
support systems for development. It will try to provide useful guidelines 
for future development and implementation of large information and 
decision support system applications in the context of developing 
countries. It is also meant to be useful in the context and implications of 
fufure phases of the DM&EM program.
Finally, this chapter includes a survey of the literature on debt 
management practices and debt management systems currently 
available and in use. It also includes a survey of information systems 
development and implementation with focus on decision support 
systems and their use in various contexts.
B. Theoretical Foundation
7. D ecis ion  M a k in g  a n d  D ecis ion  Support Systems
One theory affecting our research was the decision making theory as a 
framework for decision support systems research developed by 
numerous scholars. Perhaps no other management topic has received 
as much attention as management and organizational decision 
making. In classical decision making theories of what managers do,
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decision making is often seen as the center of managerial activities, 
something that engages most of the time of managers (Kamel, 1994). 
There exist several organizational /  institutional levels that correspond to 
the different types of decisions made in organizations. Using Anthony's 
categories, decision-making activity in an organization can be divided 
into three types: strategic, management control (tactical), and 
operational control (Kamel, 1994).
Strategic decision making is concerned with objectives, resources, and 
policies of the organization. Tactical decision-making (management 
controlj is principally concerned with how efficiently and effectively 
resources are utilized and how well operational units are performing. 
Operational control involves making decisions about carrying out the 
specific tasks set forth by strategic planners and management. While 
studying the DM&EM program, the research was partially inspired by 
the decision-making theory since this program represents a new form 
of decision support-based organization in a developing country such 
as Egypt.
The research was affected by the topologies of human problem 
solving characterizing each level. Decisions are usually classified as 
either programmed or non-programmed (Gray, 1987). Elsewhere in 
the literature, these decisions are referred to as structured and 
unstructured; we will use the latter terms here. Unstructured decisions 
are those in which the decision-maker must provide judgment, 
evaluation and insight into the problem definition. They are novel, 
important, and non-routine, and there is no well-understood nor 
agreed-upon procedure for making them. Structured decisions, in 
contrast, are repetitive, routine, and involve a definite procedure for 
handling them so that they do not have to be treated each time as if 
they are new (Gorry and Scott-Morton, 1971).
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According to Simon, there are four different stages in decision making: 
intelligence, design, choice, and implementation (Table ll-l). 
Intelligence involves identifying the problems occurring in the 
organization: why, where, and with what effects. This broad set of 
information-gathering activities is required to inform managers how 
well the organization is performing and where problems exist. 
Traditional Management Information Systems (MIS) that deliver a wide 
variety of detailed information can be useful especially if they are built 
to report exceptions (with the added ability to call up text and 
additional detailed information).
TABLE II -1
Stages in Decision Making, 
Information Requirements, and Examples1
Stage o f D ecis ion  
M a k in g
In fo rm a tion
R equ irem ent
E xam p le
1. Intelligence2 Exception reporting MIS
2. Design Simulation prototype DSS
3. Choice 'What-if simulation DSS; large
models
4. Implementation Graphics, charts, Microcomputer
decision aids, & mainframe
Gantt charts, etc.
The second phase of decision making involves designing numerous 
possible solutions to the problems. This activity may require more
1 Gorry and Scott Morton, 1971.
2 Includes problem definition, please see figure 11-1.
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intelligence to decide if a particular solution is appropriate. Here more 
carefully specified and directed information activities and capabilities 
focused on specific designs are required. Simple DSS systems running 
on smaller computers (PCs) are usually preferred because they 
operate on simple models, can be developed quickly, and can be 
operated with a limited data set.
The third stage involves choosing among alternatives. Here a manager 
can use information tools that can calculate and keep track of the 
consequences, costs, and opportunities provided by each alternative 
designed in stage 2. A larger DSS system is required because of the 
need to develop more extensive data on a variety of alternatives and 
the complexity of the analytic models needed to account for all of the 
consequences.
The last stage in decision making is implementation. Here managers 
can use a reporting system that delivers routine reports on the progress 
of a specific solution, some of the difficulties that arise, resource 
constraints, and possible best actions to choose from. Support systems 
can range from very highly complex MIS systems to much smaller 
systems and project planning software operating on microcomputers. 
Table ll-l illustrates the stages of decision making, the general types of 
information required, and a specific example of an information system 
corresponding to each stage. In general, stages of decision making do 
nof necessarily follow a linear path from intelligence, to design, choice, 
and implementation. At any point in the decision-making process it 
may be necessary to loop back to a previous stage (Figure ll-l). For 
instance, one can often com e up with several designs but one may still 
not be certain whether a specific design meets the requirements for 
the particular problem.
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IntelligenceIs there a problem?
DesginWhat are the alternatives?
Feedback
ChoiceWhich should you choose?
Is the choice working? Implementation
Figure II - 1
The Decision Making Process3
Decision support systems foundation and methodologies are mainly 
concerned with these two typologies of decision making, one based 
on levels in the organization and the other on the nature of human 
problem solving, which have been combined to form a decision 
support typology (Gorry and Scott-Morton, 1971). Theoretically, 
operational control personnel deal with fairly well-structured problems. 
In contrast, strategic planners deal with highly un-structured problems. 
Nevertheless, our research has tackled the inter-connectivity between
3 Gorry and Scott-Morton, 1971.
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the different level of the organization and has addressed both the 
structured and unstructured problems contained therein.
These systems were also interactive, that is, designed to help end users 
utilize data and models in order to discuss and make decisions (not 
solve) concerning semi-structured and unstructured problems (Keen, 
1976; Henderson and Schilling, 1985).
A typical DSS has three components: a database, a model base, and 
a software system to integrate components and communicate with the 
user (Sprague and Carlson, 1982) (Figure 11-2).
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^  Statistical 
|  Models
^  Strategic 
55 Plans
Operationai
Models
'/////////yyyyyyyyyy.
Finance ^
Marketing ^
Production ^
Corporate
MIS
DBMS MBMS
DGMS
Software
system
USER
Figure 11-2
DSS Components4
KEY: DBMS = Database management system 
MBMS = Model base management system 
DGMS = Dialogue generation and management software
The research was highly influenced by the above DSS architecture and 
was focused on testing its contextual fitting with the DM&EM program. 
Moreover, a considerable part of the research was spent in
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understanding the relationships between DSS and the organization's 
existing Transaction Processing Systems (TPS) and MIS.
In the literature, most DSSs are linked closely to existing corporate 
information flows. More commonly, however, DSS are isolated from 
major organizational information systems. DSS tend to be stand alone 
systems, developed by end-user divisions or groups not under central 
information systems control (Hogue, 1985).
While early DSS were aimed at senior management, current users of 
DSS are found at middle-management levels (they could be the 
support staff or assistants to senior management). A well-designed DSS 
can be used at many levels of the organization. Since most decisions 
are made collectively, decisions must be coordinated with several 
groups before being finalized, regardless of organizational model used. 
Our research focused on large organizations where decision making is 
inherently a group process, and DSS can be designed to facilitate 
group decision making. An organization-wide DSS should permit 
different groups, using different assumptions, to analyze the same 
problem and com e up with interesting, unique answers (Henderson 
and Schilling, 1985).
The approach used in researching the DM&EM program for the 
Egyptian government in particular and the other nation-wide DSS 
projects, implemented by the Cabinet IDSC, benefited significantly 
from the emergence of micro-computers in the 1980s and desktop 
workstations in the late 1980s. Through the emergence of this 
technology, early DSS theories were realized. With the new information 
architecture, it is at least technically possible to provide end users with 
access to very large databases, analytic models, and user-friendly 
interfaces. In addition, the technical possibility now exists to provide 
decision support to groups and entire organizations. These technical
4 Sprague and Carlson, 1982.
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advances revolutionized end-user expectations. Batch reports put out 
by MIS departments simply could not match the appeal of interactive 
terminals under user control analyzing corporate data with the aid of 
powerful statistical models.
Though there are a number of different types of DSS that have 
emerged, (explained at more length in Chapter III) the focus of our 
research is on issue-based DSS5, which has been used successfully in a
number of projects and programs by the Egyptian Cabinet IDSC (El 
Sherif and El Sawy, 1988).
Decisions on a number of organizational issues are prerequisite to 
developing a DSS; certain questions must be answered. Questions like, 
who will take responsibility for the development and guidance of DSS? 
Should DSS be developed in fragmented stages, in one department 
after another, or for the organization as a whole? What is the 
justification for an organizational approach? The answers to these 
questions guided the process of our research in defining necessary 
roles and responsibilities and directed the research accordingly to 
achieve maximum benefit.
The initiative for most DSS development has come from users. This 
method may be called an ad-hoc approach. A more practical, but 
uncommon, strategy is to develop a DSS group within the organization 
that reports directly to senior management. This group is given the 
m andate to develop a corporate-wide DSS, establish priorities for 
applications, and ensure cooperation among users and with the MIS 
group. When a decision is made to support a particular DSS effort, a 
task force composed of DSS, MIS, and management specialists is
5 A new approach for viewing DSS functionality developed by El Sawy & El Sherif. They
challenge the conventional views of DSS and introduce an "issue based" 
m anagem ent method for the design and delivery of l/DSS. The distinctive features of 
this approach include a focus on issues rather than decisions, a distinction between  
information support services, prototyping the management of delivery as well as
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created to design and implement the system. Such a theoretical 
foundation was very beneficial in understanding the position of the 
Cabinet IDSC in serving its users and, more importantly, in interfacing 
with other related institutions and influence groups. This corporate 
approach requires senior management involvement and resources in 
the form of visibility, legitimacy, and funding (Sanders and Courtney, 
1985; Meador and Keen, 1984; King and Rodriguez, 1981). The third and 
final organizational arrangement for DSS is the grouping of it within the 
information system or data processing department. This approach has 
the advantage of creating a skilled core group capab le  of 
understanding the technology and data resources of the organization. 
It can coordinate organizational efforts, save resources, and permit the 
orderly development of DSS tools and report generators. The drawback 
of this approach is that DSS may never escape the information system 
department. It may be perceived as a data processing group and 
may not be able to encourage DSS development in user areas. This 
approach influenced our research in understanding how the Cabinet 
IDSC acts as a “ think tank” to the Cabinet. The IDSC injected this ability 
in its well-institutionalized programs by enabling them to be mini-IDSCs 
to their users.
Finally, by the late 1980s, DSS development efforts to assist individual 
decision making were extended to groups and entire organizations. 
During the course of our research, the following leading DSSswere 
studied to gain familiarization with their usage and functions and to 
determine their characteristics versus straight MIS functions. We 
discovered that a considerable number of the major financial / 
econom ic DSSs were being used by corporations and not countries 
and /  or governments (Table 11-2).
design, and a dynamic tracking back-end. (for more details see El Sherif & El Sawy, 
1988)
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Table 11-2
Examples of DSS Systems and Their Use*
American Airlines 
American Petrofina 
Central and Southwest 
Corporation 
Champlin Petroleum 
First United Bank Corporation 
Frito-Lay, Inc.
General Dynamics 
Gifford-Hill and Company 
Lear Petroleum 
Mercantile Texas 
Corporation 
National Gypsum 
Southern Railway 
Texas-New Mexico Power 
Texas Oil and Gas 
Corporation 
Texas Utilities Company 
The LTV Corporation
The Western Company 
Zale Corporation
Price and route selection 
Corporate planning and forecasting 
Corporate planning and forecasting
Corporate planning and forecasting
Investment evaluation
Price, advertising, and promotion
selection
Price evaluation
Corporate planning and forecasting 
Evaluation of potential drilling sites 
Corporate planning and forecasting
Corporate planning and forecasting 
Train dispatching and routing 
Corporate planning and forecasting 
Corporate planning and forecasting
Corporate planning and forecasting 
Terms of sale of downtown office 
tower
Corporate planning and forecasting 
Evaluation of potential store sites
2. E xterna l D eb t
After World War II numerous less-developed countries started 
industrialization programs which contributed to the achievement of 
rapid sustained growth of income. Although industrialization meant a 
continuous reduction of the import propensity of their economies, 
growth also implies that the level of imports tended to exceed that of 
exports. This gap was covered by external indebtedness.
Unlike national accounts and balance of payments concepts, 
compilers and analysts have never agreed about external debt. Also,
6 JackT. Hogue, 1985.
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the different definitions employed by international organizations and 
other compilers and users of data indicate that no single concept is 
appropriate for all uses.
The four major concepts adopted when trying to define external debt 
were originally established and developed by four organizations. They 
had been involved in the field of debt statistics and data collecting for 
many years before external debt emerged in the early 1980s as a topic 
of major international importance in its own right.
These organizations are:
• The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) whose members include 
the world ’s major central banks involved in debt statistics largely 
because of the monetary authorities’ concern about the 
commercial banks’ involvement in international lending.
• The International Monetary Fund (IMF) which is an organization with 
worldwide membership covering both developed and developing 
countries. A large part of its task is ensuring the effective operation of 
the international monetary system and providing financial support 
and advice to countries with balance of payment difficulties.
• The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) which is an organization that is composed of the main 
market - economy industrial countries whose interest in debt arises 
from its activities in the field of international financial co-operation 
especially with developing countries.
• The World Bank (WB), with a world-wide membership of both 
industrial and developing countries. This entity collects and uses debt 
statistics for operational and analytical purposes related to its 
function as the main international development organization. It is 
unique in receiving primary information on the long-term external
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debt of developing countries in the form of loan-by-loan data 
reported by its borrowing members.
According to the WB, a government budget is in-balance when 
spending equals revenues, in surplus when revenue exceeds spending 
and in deficit when spending exceeds revenue. Government debt is a 
result of borrowing. Therefore, the term “debt" implies liability 
represented by a financial instrument or other formal equivalent.
This research has been very much affected by the WB, IMF, The United 
Nation Center for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and others' 
concepts and definitions of external debt institutions that supply 
financial and technical assistance to developing countries. It has taken 
into consideration more detailed concerns, which were presented in a 
recent paper by UNCTAD staff members7. First is the definition of
"external debt" itself which has caused numerous problems. 
Collectively, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the (IMF), the 
(OECD) and the (IBRD) have agreed to a basic and acceptable 
definition which is as follows:
"Gross external debt is the amount, at any given time, of 
disbursed and outstanding contractual liabilities of residents in 
a country to non-residents to repay principal, with or without 
interest, or to pay interest, with or without principal"8.
Second is the time for this definition to be fully implemented and fully 
institutionalized by indebted countries. Meanwhile, most developing 
countries have a core of public and publicly guaranteed debt that 
has, for a long time, been reported every six months to the World Bank 
and which is mostly of a medium or a long-term nature. This core debt 
is of concern to the Ministry of Finance of a country because it requires 
government fiscal resources for debt servicing. It is also of concern to
7 Debt data are published annually by the World Bank in its World Debt Tables.
8 IBRD, IMF, BIS and OECD, External Debt, 1988.
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the country's central bank because of its claims on foreign exchange 
earnings. In addition, the central bank must worry about the non­
guaranteed external debt of the private sector as well as other liabilities 
such as remittances of returns on direct foreign investment, leasing 
contracts, short-term trade credits and interbank lines, etc. A 
comprehensive management system for external debt must comprise 
all these components; a complete system for public debt must include 
domestic debt as well (UNDP 1989).
The World Bank translates this into the following formula:
Total External Debt = public & publicly guaranteed debt + private non­
guaranteed debt + use of IMF credit + short term debt.
The primary use of debt statistics is to analyze the debt sen/icing 
capacity and to analyze the economic prospects including external 
financing constraints of a developing country. Certain macroeconomic 
aggregates are provided in World Bank tables in order to generate 
what are called “ ratios” or “ indicators” that should assess the external 
situation of a developing country. These ratios also offer different 
measures of the cost of or capacity for, servicing debt in terms of the 
foreign exchange or output foregone. Some of these macroeconomic 
aggregates and key debt indicators are defined in Appendix l-A at the 
end of this thesis.
According to these key indicators, WB classifies indebted countries into 
four types:
1. Severely indebted low-income countries (SILIC).
2. Severely indebted middle-income countries (SIMIC).
3. Moderately indebted low-income countries (MILIC).
4. Moderately indebted middle-income countries (MIMIC).
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This research is centered on the major concepts adopted by the IMF 
and the World Bank when defining external debt. The reason behind 
this is that the focal point of our research, i.e., the Egyptian debt 
management program, followed principals espoused by these two 
well-known financial institutions, as is the case for a number of 
developing countries. Egypt’s debt management program is highly 
affected by the operation of the international monetary systems in 
collecting and using debt statistics for operational and analytical 
purposes. It is also affected by the role played by institutions such as the 
World Bank and the IMF in providing financial support and advice to 
countries in balance of payment difficulties.
3. D eb t M a n a g e m e n t
Neither external debt nor debt management have a clear, accepted 
definition or a known textbook approach. Debt management functions 
are usually grouped according to their relationship to the external debt 
process. Thus the policy, regulatory, accounting and operational 
functions are all unique to the external debt administration, whereas 
the other supporting functions are part of the government's general 
administration (Mehran 1985):
1. Policy: The policy function of external debt management 
determines national debt policies and strategies in a 
cooperative effort by all agencies responsible for the economic 
management of a country. It thus sets sustainable levels of 
external debt as part of an over-all economic strategy in 
conjunction with macro-economic planning, particularly as 
regards financing the budget, the investment program and the 
balance of payment;
2. Regulatory: The regulatory function sets the rules of the game 
for the operating units in debt management and limits and 
coordinates their roles. It must also supervise their work and
37
Theoretical Foundation & Research Plan Chapter II
correct deviations from the rules. This is achieved through legal 
and administrative arrangements that ensure the recording and 
subsequent monitoring of all external debt;
3. Accounting: The accounting function breaks down each loan 
contract into the debt servicing obligations assumed by the 
borrower and sets up an effective payment mechanism. In 
many countries there is need to include in the last two functions' 
mechanisms for the monitoring project execution as well as the 
withdrawal and use of loan funds;
4. Operational: The operational function develops plans that 
accommodates and adopts strategies for the short-and 
medium-term approach to sources of funds and for the 
handling of the debt portfolio, particularly for countries that 
participate in the international financial markets. This is a highly 
demanding function: in terms of trained staff, equipment for 
information and calculation, speed of decision-making, etc. 
Important sub-functions here are :
• watching and projecting currency and interest movements;
• following the development and application of new financial 
instruments including debt conversion techniques;
• analyzing various options open to a debtor in its search for 
the least costly forms of borrowing;
• conducting portfolio management to hedge various risks or 
further reduce costs; and
• negotiating loan contracts and other agreements with the 
lenders.
Given the additional legal expertise required for loan 
negotiations and for re-negotiations of debt packages, 
negotiating may well be regarded as a separate function;
38
Theoretical Foundation & Research Plan Chapter II
5. Supporting: The supporting functions are resourcing, which 
supplies the debt management units with staff, consultants, 
equipment for calculation and information, training 
opportunities, etc.
6. Auditing : The auditing function tracks operational activities and 
checks them for accuracy and economy; and
7. Statistical/analytical: The statistical /  analytical function keeps 
all parts of the debt management system abreast of current 
affairs. Thus it ensures a degree of harmony of views, and 
provides politicians, the media and the public at large with a 
basis that forms consensus on how best external debt should be 
treated.
Viewed in this way, the external debt management operation of a 
country is normally a highly complex mechanism involving many 
functions, which are interrelated and interdependent; without good 
debt data, portfolio management becomes impossible (Mehran 1985). 
To understand how effective debt management is defined and what 
appropriate and functional debt management system to use, it was a 
basic necessity for our research to verify that there is no textbook model 
for either a prescribed debt management system or organizations that 
host it or perform the debt management function itself. The following 
comments by several UNCTAD experts9 were used as a base during the
research process:
"External debt management and, in particular, the structure 
(units which perform functions related to debt management), 
differ from country to country. They are being shaped by 
historical precedent, constitutional division of responsibility 
between various tiers of governments, the internal
9 Presented at the seminar on debt management and financing techniques in 
collaboration in UNDP regional project RAS/85/015, Pattaya, Thailand, August, 1985.
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organization of the government itself, the importance of 
external debt in overall economic management, the relative 
importance of particular types of credits within the overall 
debt structure, and also the regulatory function of external 
debt management.”
"Debt management differs in the degree of control exercised 
by authorities, the strictness of the regulatory environment, 
and the nature of the reporting system instituted for external 
debt operations, which may be mandatory or voluntary, and 
which may require prior authorization for incurring external 
obligations or only export reporting. They also differ in their 
treatment of private sector versus non-financial domestic 
instruments."
C. The Research
The theoretical foundation for this thesis was a survey of the literature 
(Decision making and decision support systems; External debt 
management; and Debt management systems). A number of debt 
management research aspects that relate to the DM&EM program 
(Organizational change/dynamics, im pact of introducing l/DSS, 
contextual and cultural problems, etc.), different decision making 
theories and several practical experiences where studied (such as 
Mexico and Turkey).
The research covers in depth the establishment of the DM&EM program 
and records its success, failure and problems faced throughout its 
different phases. The focus of this research is to assess the im pact of 
using l/DSS in a national context (i.e. debt management) that has 
different culture and management/organizational behavior (i.e. a 
developing country). Moreover, the research will be searching for 
evidence proving whether the DM&EM program improved the debt
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management situation in Egypt, especially as regards negotiations with 
international financial institutions and other creditors, or not. The 
research investigates the human factor with focus on the DM&EM 
program staff as the implementors and the decision markers as the 
users of this technology. It examines our assumption that people 
receiving proper orientation to a technology (and supported by the 
proper work environment requirements) can radically change their 
productivity rates. This research presents interpretations of the actions of 
key people in this program (i.e., builders, implementors, and users of the 
DM&EM program). Continuous interaction and brainstorming sessions 
between the systems' builders, implementors and users had a direct 
impact on the changes in systems' requirements, design and delivery. 
In this regard, the research conducted focused more on the changes 
introduced to the decision making process, the localization of 
technology and the effects of the use of information technology given 
the local context. The research method used multiple case studies 
focusing on the decision making process through-out the introduction 
and diffusion of information technology in the different debt 
management agencies concerned, mainly HLEC, CBE and some 
ministries, and this technology’s economic implications. The technical 
systems used were considered as means to an end.
Finally, the research and empirical work accomplished for this thesis 
was influenced by the theories and philosophies used and practiced in 
implementing a number of the medium to large size DSS projects and 
program in the Egyptian Cabinet IDSC. Also, we have based some 
findings of our research on the work developed by our colleagues Dr. 
Hisham El Sherif and Dr. Sherif Kamel who have studied similar 
programs. Their work in studying the nature of the strategic decision 
making process, the challenges associated with the process of decision 
making in turbulent /  ill-structured environments and the characteristics
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associated with different level decision makers have contributed much 
to our research.
Research Plan
This research examines the Egyptian DM&EM program with the 
background of this theoretical perspective. It necessitated covering all 
the factors, conditions and related aspects affecting the introduction, 
adaptation, adoption and diffusion of information technology into a 
developing country like Egypt in order to assess and examine the 
research proposed hypothesis. It had to cover both political and 
technical personnel. From the DM&EM program user angle, the 
research focused mainly on HLEC members and especially the 
ministers who are directly involved in shaping the debt management 
policies and the Economic Reform Program. On the technical and 
implementation side (people involved in the DM&EM development 
and implementation), we used evidence from three directors, eight 
developers, and ten loan specialists from the CBE, Ministry of 
International Cooperation and the Ministry of Finance. Finally, we 
assessed the human infrastructure, managerial and technical support 
staff from the Cabinet IDSC.
The research had to take into account all the concerned parties in the 
different organizations originally involved in the debt management 
process in Egypt as well as the new group (HLEC) established to take 
control of this process. The reason behind this was to be able to discuss 
the DM&EM program with all its dependent and independent factors 
and to analyze how it has managed to introduce the tools and 
techniques of information technology to such a diverse community.
Our research focus has been executive level debt management 
(covering policy, regulatory and resourcing functions) rather than 
operational level debt management (covering recording, analytical
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functions known as passive management and operating, controlling 
[active management] functions)10 (UNCTAD, 1988).
The research focuses on the last nine years of DM&EM program 
implementation and used the approach of case studies and field 
surveys (Chapters V & VI). After a review of the material, our focus was 
attracted to the DM&EM program as the main foundation for the 
rehabilitation of Egypt as a promising emerging economy in the Middle 
East. Extensive research on the DM&EM's mission, objectives, related 
goals, beneficiaries, phases, outcome and future plan has been 
included. We located documentation on the status of debt 
management before the inception of the program. Ten high-ranking 
officials were interviewed concerning the functions of the Loans and 
External Debt Department of the CBE before the program was initiated. 
In addition, a full study of documentation and an extensive interview 
of personnel who were involved in the two Paris Club negotiation 
rounds (1987 /  1991) were conducted.
The fieldwork was conducted over the ten-month period from July 1993 
to May 1994.
7. R esearch M e th o d
We agree with Benbasat (1984), Bonoma (1985), and Yin (1984) that 
there is no standard definition of a “case study” , however it involves at 
least employing multiple methods of data collection. In our opinion 
however, the case study approach was not sound research tool for 
attempting to understand all aspects of the DM&EM Program. Beside 
factors stated above (P. 22) the following reasons justify our point of 
view:
• Data needed to be collected by multiple means such as interviews 
with key political figures and individuals responsible for the DM&EM 
Program. Questionnaires with the DM&EM program staff and
10 Explained in more depth in Chapter III.
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analysis of the DM&EM Program documents needed also to be 
used.
• The research highly needs the how and why questions, i.e., questions 
that demonstrate qualitative performance, achievements and 
implications and frequency questions that focus on quantitative 
analysis.
• The research, based on the set of empirical research evidence 
techniques used, was mainly directed at the exploration, 
classification and hypothesis development phases of the l/DSS 
knowledge building process. Moreover, the used approach allowed 
for both hypothesis development and hypothesis testing.
• The integration of multiple data collection techniques allowed for 
description, theory building and testing. Consequently, they yielded 
more general research results and allowed for cross-case analysis.
• The research findings depended heavily on the researcher's ability 
to integrate various aspects of the research such as the role of the 
debt management decision maker, his management style, the 
structure of responsibilities, and the impact of the DM&EM program.
• The used research method offers the advantage of control over 
time and effort for the researcher to complete the research. 
Controlling the interview time and the survey questionnaire relevant 
to each decision-maker was very much dependent on the 
importance of what variables needed to be tested and findings to 
be verified and explored.
• The research identified the unit of analysis. Therefore, the researcher 
examined the research questions to be addressed and considered 
what generalizations could be drawn from the research findings.
2. R esearch Plan
The research plan was divided into an exploratory phase and a
research phase. In each of these phases, preparatory work, literature
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survey, development and conduct of fieldwork, case studies, analysis 
of findings and the development of generalizations and conclusions 
were performed. The initial stage was a thorough review of the existing 
literature in an attem pt to link it to the DM&EM program.
The main review of the literature took a period of 11 months during 
which time extensive research took place covering the fields of debt 
management; information systems; and decision support systems, 
operational research and management science. Our sources of 
research were books, journals, magazines, newspapers, conference 
papers and proceedings. Because the areas of debt management 
and information technology are rapidly developing, we focused on the 
time span 1980 - 1995 in selecting our sources. These sources were 
located mainly at the libraries of (i) the London School of Economics 
and Political Science; (ii) the Cabinet IDSC; (iii) the American University 
in Cairo; (iv) the British Council; (v) the UNCTAD, Cairo; and (vi) the 
American Cultural Center.
Through the research in debt management, a number of ideas 
crystallized, thereby affecting the conduct of case studies as well as 
the analysis of the research findings. Issues related to l/DSS transfer to 
developing countries with their problems and challenges; adaptation, 
adoption and diffusion of appropriate technology; strategic decision 
making process; and management organizational level versus 
management behavior were best tackled by studying the DM&EM 
program through the detailed research process conducted.
In the mid-1980’s, international monetary and financial institutions, 
realizing how severe the debt problem was, not only for the debtor 
countries but for the creditor countries as well, started to offer 
assistance11 (financial and technical) to indebted countries to help
them overcome debt.
11 A matrix of suppliers of technical assistance is attached in Appendix lll-B.
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There were a number of similarities between other debtor countries’ 
experiences and the Egyptian experience (DM&EM program) mainly in 
the areas of technological infrastructure build-up, information 
infrastructure build-up, information infrastructure development, and the 
problems faced in data collection, compilation and processing. 
However, there were also a number of differences that are highlighted 
in the research and are relative to the continuous participation of both 
the HLEC and creditors from one side (as users) and program 
management from the other side (as builders and implementers). The 
catalytic role played by the Cabinet IDSC, the continuous upgrading of 
the training and human resources development programs, and the 
development of different incentives schemes to improve organizational 
performance and staff satisfaction was a new dimension not covered 
by other countries’ experiences.
The use of information technology and its impact on an organization 
are often affected by social and economical constraints (Straub and 
Wetherbe 1989; Kamel 1994). In Egypt, debt management was a 
homeless function where debt acquisition was carried out 
spontaneously by different organizations without any kind of central 
coordination or even proper debt-acquisition feasibility studies. This 
research defines information systems as having an effect on the 
distribution of power by virtue of their impact on information, a vital 
political source (Waema and Walsham 1990), and in addressing proper 
roles and responsibilities of the parties involved in the decision making 
process.
Strategic decision making in developing countries is usually 
characterized by operating in a turbulent and dynamic environment (El 
Sherif 1990). As a result, one focus of the research is on the role played 
by the DM&EM program in adapting to possible changes in user 
requirements as well as changes occurring in the technology. This
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relates to how flexible systems were built with changeable software 
applications, portability of the system across different platforms, and 
flexibility in the design allowing possible expansion in scope and 
components both vertically and horizontally. The research will show 
how the DM&EM program accom m odated the changes that occurred 
since its early development phases in terms of information systems by 
forecasting the horizon through proper planning and design (Land 
1982; Kamel 1994). It will also demonstrate how the build-up of robust 
DM&EM sub-programs has helped the program adapt to the changing 
circumstances in the environment and changing needs of the users.
The development and implementation of the DM&EM program was 
studied in light of a development strategy that prototypes the 
implementation processes as part of the design and delivery of the 
system (Alavi 1984). Also, empirical research shows that when 
prototyping and interactive design are used in building l/DSS, user 
satisfaction, attitudes and perceptions are more favorable (Benbasat 
and Nault 1990). The research has shown that continuous interaction 
between the roles in decision support systems that include the user, his 
assistant, the system builder and the technical supporter have had 
positive impacts on their design and use (Sprague 1980). As a result, the 
research shows how the initiation phases of the DM&EM program, 
started in the Cabinet IDSC and later developed in the CBE, 
represented the pilot phase. Later experiences, accum ulated during 
implementation, affected subsequent phases of the program in terms 
of more appropriate addressing and satisfaction for user needs.
The DM&EM program l/DSS-based network, coupled with major 
strategic economic issues, creates opportunities among various debt 
management responsible institutions to effectively contribute in the 
base building of the entire Egyptian economic reform program.
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Following the same philosophy in design, delivery and implementation 
of various l/DSS projects and programs, it was important to review the 
existing documentation on the experience of the Cabinet IDSC. The 
IDSC introduced some major informatics projects in various fields 
addressing different socio-economic aspects in Egypt. The review 
started in 1992 and continued through 1994 with a continuous track on 
new developments of new projects. The general review was followed 
by a focused study of the different aspects of the DM&EM program.
The research was meant to test the hypothesis: The im pact of l/DSS in 
debt management -  the Egyptian experience. Further, it has 
com pared them with the results of the practices of the various DM&EM 
program functions and impact areas. The second stage focused on 
conducting some field work through covering the different phases of 
the DM&EM program as well as its users and builders. The support of the 
Cabinet IDSC management was very important for successfully 
completing such field work.
The analysis of the research findings lasted for a period of 10 months 
(May 1994 to March 1995). It included issues related to DM&EM 
program planning versus implementation such as:
• Political and economic problems faced;
• Changes in roles and responsibilities;
• Re-definition of processes and procedures;
• Challenges of resistance to change;
• l/DSS design, implementation and institutionalization 
challenges; and
• Technical infrastructure build-up with all its financial and 
administrative requirements.
The next stage following directly from analysis of the research findings 
was arriving at generalizations and conclusions based on the research 
findings; to articulate the research contribution in the domain of l/DSS;
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and to identify future research opportunities in the development and 
implementation of l/DSS in different organizational settings.
3. C o n d u c t o f  th e  Research
Our research methodology mainly depended on multiple cases studies 
addressing different levels of decision makers (i.e., strategic, tactical, 
and operational) covering multi-dimensional aspects and interests 
(program users and builders at different levels) in order to extensively 
study the experience of the DM&EM program. The research 
investigated l/DSS introduction and implementation and the crucial 
need for the introduction of radical economic reform. Coupled with 
that, it has also studied the introduction of the debt management 
function.
Both aspects of l/DSS and debt management have had mutual effects 
on the implementation of the DM&EM program. In other words, the 
main aspects covered by the research included the role of the DM&EM 
program in utilizing l/DSS in economic development reform and 
planning at the country level and its implications on the design and 
delivery process of l/DSS in such areas.
Furthermore, the research studied a number of information system 
research aspects that relate to project planning and implementation, 
organizational dynamics and l/DSS design, build-up, implementation, 
and delivery in developing economies.
The field research lasted from July, 1993 until May, 1994. Separately, a 
number of field studies, sometimes at the same institution or with the 
interviewee) were conducted throughout 1994 and 1995. The reasons 
behind this were to inquire about and/or clarify a specific aspect or to 
focus more on specific issues and changes that had occurred 
throughout the phases of the program. Testing of these changes on 
DM&EM program performance took on an important role during this 
phase.
49
Theoretical Foundation & Research Plan Chapter II
The research method used combined both qualitative and quantitative 
techniques (Duchon and Kaplan 1988) to introduce both testability and 
context into the research (Maxwell, et al 1986). Different kinds of data 
were collected by different methods such as interviews12, observations, 
surveys13 and extrapolation from different documentation available. 
The data was collected from different sources such as the Cabinet, 
CBE, different ministries and international sources.
As discussed above, the aim of the field research was to examine the 
strategic level of debt management decision-makers (the users); their 
assistants (the supporters); and the DM&EM program management (the 
builders). Ten people were interviewed: the Prime Minister; the Deputy 
Prime Minister and Governor of the CBE; three Ministers; the DM&EM 
program Director at the CBE; the DM&EM National Program Director at 
the IDSC; the IDSC Executive Manager; and the IDSC DSS Department 
Director.
The interviews (see Appendix ll-A) targeted individuals at various levels 
as well as the different functions (i.e., the users, supporters, and the 
builders). The essence of the interviews was to absorb as w ide a range 
of qualitative information, viewpoints and comments as we could. The 
survey questionnaire the four point Lickert scale exhibited in Appendix 
ll-B, was presented to most of our targeted groups in trying to 
complement our research quantitatively.
Addressing different management levels and functions necessitated 
that we develop more than one set of interview questions and different 
questionnaires. The questions for both the interviews and the 
questionnaire were revised more than one once to allow the 
interviewees to express their views freely and honestly by selecting from 
multiple answers.
12 A mix of open-ended, semi-structured and structured interviews to best fit the 
requirement of the research and the different nature of the interviewees.
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Both the interviews and the questionnaire were meant to test different 
qualitative and quantitative aspects. Issues such as: How should the 
im pact of the DM&EM program be measured?; How and /  or to what 
extent did the DM&EM program make a difference in the decision 
making capabilities of top policy and decision makers in Egypt?; To 
what degree did the DM&EM program meet its stated mission, 
objectives, and level of satisfaction for its targeted users?; What are the 
critical factors that led to the success of the DM&EM program?; and 
What future plans and activities are expected to be carried out by the 
DM&EM program?
The observations and remarks made and conclusions drawn were 
based on continuous interaction with DM&EM program users and 
management time well spent for the purposes of research. However, a 
number of difficulties and challenges were encountered in trying to 
schedule appointments with high ranking officials; meetings were 
delayed, postponed or even canceled. Very short periods of time were 
allowed for us to grasp what was being said and fulfill the requirement 
of the interview. Follow-up on promised documents and /  or needed 
clarifications was not easy. The building of trust with all member of this 
focus group was very important due to the sensitivity of the subject.14 
Extrapolation from the DM&EM program documents was done to 
identify the literature available and to analyze the issues related to the 
challenges and opportunities of l/DSS implementation. This was 
com pared with the varying roles and management style of the 
decision-makers, structure of responsibility and DM&EM program
13 Surveys were developed to analyze comments and views of different interviewees.
14 The position that we have ourselves in, documenting the successful Egyptian
experience in debt management and assisting in defining the future of the DM&EM 
program, was very helpful in building this trust. It is worth mentioning also that, being a 
senior member of the Cabinet IDSC and a familiar face to many of the interviewees 
helped immensely. Much credit should be given to IDSC top m anagement in helping 
us in this process.
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deliverables. Moreover, the selection criteria for these extrapolations 
considered the provision of cases from various sectors in the economy. 
Case studies were meant to support understanding the process under 
research and demonstrating casual effects within a natural setting 
through the ability to provide a large amount of data. The goals of the 
researcher and the nature of the research topic influenced the 
selection of the research strategy.
D. Conclusion
Our work for this thesis is meant to address the origins and 
unconventional aspects of l/DSS research in supporting national level 
econom ic development. It aims at providing a scholarly view on its 
findings on both l/DSS and debt management institution development. 
It is our intention that this research and its findings be useful to scholars, 
researcher and practitioners studying similar chronic problems and /  or 
implementing comparable national programs. This research was meant 
to provide a process for symptoms identification, ways to go about 
implementation, expected implications and benefits of a program 
similar to DM&EM.
At the l/DSS debt management theoretical level, the research reflects 
how l/DSS capabilities could be used in supporting top policy and 
decision making at the country level; l/DSS has many implications for 
socio-economic and development planning as well. At the practical 
level, the research allows practitioners of l/DSS (i.e., users, supporters 
and builders) large informatics programs, to study the implications of 
introducing l/DSS at the national level in developing economies.
The research has covered a considerable number of multi-level (i.e., 
strategic, tactical, and operational) and multi-function (i.e., top policy 
and decision makers, ministers, technical and financial) groups who 
have been either users, influencers, builders or watchers of the DM&EM
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program throughout the last nine years. It is meant to provide an in- 
depth study of the problem, its reasons and causes, and how to deal 
with it, in addition to other countries’ experiences in dealing with similar 
situations. Moreover, the research is aimed at a review of most of the 
debt management practices applied and the debt management 
systems used to include the advantages and disadvantages of each. 
Our focus is on how the DM&EM program has made use of numerous 
world-wide experiences in formulating its mandate and executing its 
plans in order to help improve the decision making process and 
radically tackle a chronic and severe problem.
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CHAPTER III 
Theoretical Background
Decision Making, Decision Support Systems and Debt Management
A. Decision Making
7. In tro d u c tio n
Decision making theory refers to different levels, types and stages of 
decision making. The process ifself is different at the individual and 
organizational decision making levels which in turn involves a number 
of different models. As mentioned before, levels of institutional decision 
making are divided into three types: strategic, management control 
(tactical), and operational control.
In less-developed management practices, decision making is merely a 
struggle between a decision maker’s position and his management 
behavior. Questions such as: Does this really affect the sharpness and 
efficiency of making the right decision at the right time? Do decision­
makers have a clear perception of the metaphor strategic, tactical 
and operations management levels? Do they perceive any inter­
relatedness and effects of one layer on another? Do they believe that 
people belonging to one management layer perform functions in 
other layers or not? Many question such as these un-answered for 
researchers to explore and draw the proper model to frame them.
The decision-making process depends on a topology of human 
problem solving. Decisions are classified by being either programmed 
or non-programmed (El Sherif and El Sawy, 1988). Elsewhere in the 
literature, these decisions are referred to as structured and 
unstructured; we will use the latter forms here. Most of the time the 
former type of decision making (i.e., unstructured) is more difficult to 
perform, needs high management intellectuality, and requires more of 
decision makers’ creativity. The unstructured decision making process is
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usually more complex but we do not know if it requires different types 
or more complex decision support tools.
2. O rg a n iza tio n a l M ode ls  o f D ecis ion M a k in g
When focusing on organizational models of decision making, it is useful 
to think of them in relation to rational individual decision making. 
Organizations can be thought of as having singular goals, controlled 
by unitary rational decision makers who are completely informed, who 
choose among alternatives after weighing the consequences, and 
who act to maximize the goals of the organization. Any large 
organization is composed of a number of specialized subgroups (i.e. 
Marketing, Finance, Administration, ..etc.) that are loosely coordinated, 
but each with a substantial life and capability of its own. The 
performance of such subgroups affects to a great extent the 
performance of the organization as a whole.
Organizations are also composed of a number of leaders who 
compete with each other for leadership. To a large extent, what the 
organization ultimately decides to do will be the result of political 
competition among its leaders and staff. Each of these perspectives 
reflects a different organizational model of decision making (Table lll-l) 
that is very different from the individual models previously described.
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Name
Rational Actor
Bureaucratic
Political
TABLE 111-1
Models of Organizational Choice
Basic Concept
Comprehensive
rationality
Organizational output
Political outcome
Inference Pattern
Organizations select goals (s), examine 
all alternatives and consequences 
and then choose a policy that 
maximizes the goals or preference 
function.
Goals are determined by resource 
standard operating constraints and 
existing human and procedures 
capital resources; SOPs are combined 
into programs. programs into 
repertoires which determine what 
policies will be chosen. The primary 
purpose of the organization is to 
survive; uncertainty reduction is the 
principal goal. Policies are chosen 
that are incrementally different from 
the past.
Organizational decisions result from 
political competition, key players are 
involved in a gam e of influence, 
bargaining, and power.
Organizational outcomes are 
determined by the beliefs and goals 
of players, their skills in playing the 
game, the resources they bring to 
bear, and the limits on their attention 
and power.
1 Laudon, 1974; and Laudon, 1986 on which our analysis is based.
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Name Basic Concept
Garbage Can Non adaptive 
organizational
Most organizations are program non- 
adaptive, temporary, and disappear 
over time. Organizational decisions 
result from interactions among streams 
of problems, potential actions, 
participants, and chance.
Inference Pattern
a. Bureaucratic models
The bureaucratic model of organizations is based on standard 
operating procedures (SOPs). Actions performed by an organization 
are an output of one or several organizational sub-units (e.g., 
marketing, production, finance, and personnel). Problems facing any 
organization are usually too massive and too complex to the extent 
that they cannot be attended to by the organization as a whole. 
Therefore, problems are instead divided into components and 
packaged to specialized groups. Each organizational sub-unit has a 
number of standard operating procedures. These tried and proven 
techniques are invoked when dealing with a problem. Changing these 
standard operating procedures is rare, involves changes in personnel, 
and is risky (what is the guarantee that new techniques work better 
than the old ones?)
Although senior management and leaders are hired to coordinate and 
lead the organization, local sub-units that feed information upward and 
provide standard solutions effectively trap them. Senior management 
cannot decide to act in ways that the major sub-units cannot support. 
Organizational change requires a long time and is usually a result of 
learning new ways of behaving.
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b. Political models
Power is concentrated in the hands of a few people at the top of the 
organization. For a variety of reasons, the opinions of these leaders 
differ on what the organization should do. Viewpoint competition 
ensures that each individual in an organization, especially at the top, is 
a key player in the game of politics. In this respect, what an 
organization does is a result of political bargains struck among key 
leaders.
In other words, the organization’s actions are not necessarily rational 
and the outcome is not what any individual necessarily wanted. 
Instead, policy-organizational action is a compromise, a mixture of 
conflicting tendencies. This form of organizations does not come up 
with "solutions" to solve "problems". They rather com e up with 
compromises that reflect the conflicts, the major stake holders, the 
diverse interests, unequal power, and confusion that constitute politics. 
Decision-makers in this model are characterized by limited attention 
spans; participation in tens (sometimes hundreds) of games and issues; 
and susceptibility to mis-perception, extraneous influences, 
miscommunication, and pressures of impending deadlines. Players in 
the game focus almost entirely on the short-term problem: What 
decision must be made today? Long-term strategic thinking for the 
whole organization is almost forgotten as individual decision makers 
focus on their short-term interests and on the part of the problem they 
are interested in (Laudon, 1974; and Laudon, 1986).
c. G arbage Can Models
The preceding organizational models choose their starting point as the 
basic notion that “organizations try to adapt, successfully, to changing 
environmental conditions. Presumably, over the long run, organizations 
develop new programs and actions in order to meet their goals of 
profit, survival, and so on. When severely challenged by a changing
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environment, a number of organizations prove to be non-adaptive, 
incapable of learning, and unchanging” (Lockett, 1989).
Decision making theory states that organizations are not rational, 
decision making is largely accidental and is a product of a stream of 
solutions, problems, and situations that are randomly associated. That 
is, solutions become attached to problems for accidental reasons. If 
this model is true, it should not be surprising that the wrong solutions are 
applied to the wrong problems in an organization and that, over time, 
a large number of organizations make critical mistakes that lead to 
their dissolution.
In conclusion, while there are many different types of organizational 
models of decision making, an organization’s success is mainly 
dependent on the optimum choice of its management style. 
Depending on the organization’s nature, type of work, degree of 
automation, style of management adopted and many other factors, 
the rational, political, bureaucratic, garbage can, or any one of a 
number of well-know models can be selected. Though success criteria 
are easily identified, the question that remains open for researchers is 
how managers can practically settle on the best organizational model 
for decision making.
Decision making is only one of numerous management activities. It is 
one of the areas that information systems (IS) have sought most of all to 
a ffect (with mixed success). In the following section we will touch upon 
some advanced forms of IS, namely DSS, that tackle how systems can 
support the decision making process.
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B. Decision Support Systems 
J. In tro d u c tio n
In the early 1970s, a number of institutions began using information 
systems that were quite different from traditional MIS. These new 
systems were smaller (in terms of labor and cost). They were also 
interactive, designed to help end users utilize data and models in order 
to discuss and make decisions concerning (not solve) semi-structured 
and unstructured problems (Keen, 1976; Henderson and Schilling, 
1985). By the late 1980s, these early efforts to assist individual decision 
making were extended to groups and entire organizations.
2. D efin ition  o f  DSS
The common definition of DSS is derived from its characteristics. It is an 
interactive system under user control, providing data and models as a 
basis for discussing and making decisions concerning semi-structured 
and unstructured problems.
Early examples of DSS are Getty Oil's Plan Analysis and Modeling 
System (PAMS) and the American Airlines' Analytical Information 
Management System (AAIMS), built in the late 1970s. Both of these 
systems allowed managers to interrogate corporate and industry 
databases directly and permitted analysis of the data with financial, 
statistical, and other analytic models. In Chapter II, Table 11-2, we listed 
some of examples of already known DSSs and their use in supporting 
well-known corporate decisions.
3. Orig ins o f  DSS
It is difficult to understand the significance of DSS without considering 
where it fits into the evolution of information technology and 
architecture in organizations. It is considered to be a natural evolution 
that began with Electronic Data Processing (EDP) and the first
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transaction processing system and evolved in the late 1960s with MIS 
and the first management reporting systems.
Yet, by the 1970s, dissatisfaction with MIS was emerging in the end-user 
community. The ability of MIS to support decision-making directly was 
limited. MIS systems were not interactive and required intervention by 
analysts and designers just to get information. Project development 
took too long to permit the use of relevant information in day-to-day 
decision making. Rather than supporting management decision 
making directly, MIS systems were often nothing more than report 
generators (Keen, 1976; Keen and Morton, 1982).
Moreover, advances in technology by the mid-1970s had made 
different kinds of systems possible. With minicomputers, processing 
power could be distributed to users (as opposed to being centralized in 
the data processing department). Operating systems permitted 
interactive, time-shared sessions. More user-friendly software was being 
developed, especially report generators and statistical packages. The 
first databases and fourth-generation languages were created in this 
period. Equally important was the development of powerful graphics 
software and hardware that could display choices and alternatives to 
a large number of users (Keen, 1976; Keen and Morton, 1982).
With the emergence of microcomputers in the 1980s and desktop 
workstations in the late 1980s, early ideas for DSS could finally be 
realized. With the new information architecture, it was at least 
technically possible to provide end users with access to very large 
databases, analytic models, and user-friendly interfaces. In addition, 
the technical possibility now existed to provide decision support to 
groups and entire organizations. These technical advances 
revolutionized end-user expectations. Batch reports, put out by MIS 
departments, simply could not match the appeal of interactive
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terminals under user control analyzing corporate data with the aid of 
powerful statistical models.
Aside from technical advances, there was, during this period, an active 
reconsideration of decision making in organizations. There was a 
growing awareness that decisions faced by ordinary managers would 
never be responsive to operations research techniques. Simply put, 
formal mathematical models did not fit a wide variety of management 
decisions and could not be extended to group or organizational 
decision making. Yet there was also the belief that systematic use of 
information technology could make an important contribution to 
decisions under conditions of uncertainty.
DSS often had a different organizational position than MIS. Most large 
MIS groups were unable or unwilling to respond to the growing interest 
in and demand for DSS by end users. DSS groups often sprang up as 
separate entities in end-user divisions or as a central corporate DSS 
group operating under central headquarters staff control. As Keen has 
noted, DSS started as a fringe group opposed by data processing 
departments (Keen and Morton, 1982; Hogue, 1985).
4. C harac te ris tics  o f  DSS
With the understanding of the components and the philosophy behind 
DSS, it is possible to discuss more precisely what is meant by decision 
support. Because DSS promises to support decision making, it is 
important to understand the unique characteristics of DSS that support 
this claim.
DSS are designed to support semi-structured and unstructured problem 
analysis. To differentiate between them, structured problems are 
repetitive and routine, for which known algorithms provide solutions. 
Unstructured problems are novel and non-routine, for which there is no 
algorithm for solution. One can discuss and make decisions concerning
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unstructured problems, but they are not solved in the sense of finding 
an answer to an equation (Henderrson and Schilling, 1985). Semi­
structured problems fall between structured and unstructured 
problems. Along with other characteristics to be discussed, DSS were 
designed to support important decisions often made by senior 
executives (Keen, 1976; Keen and Morton, 1982).
The Simon's description of the decision making process, which consists 
of four stages -- intelligence, design, choice, and implementation -- 
(discussed in detail in Chapter II) is most widely used. Traditionally, 
(EDP) and MIS have provided managers with intelligence (information) 
on day-to-day operations. Management science and operations 
research (MS/OR) have also provided management with models for 
making choices. DSS was designed to incorporate the data of MIS/EDP 
and the models of MS/OR. DSS was intended to help design 
alternatives and monitor the adoption or implementation process.
5. Types o f  DSS
The two typologies of decision making, one based on levels in the 
organization and the other on the nature of human problem solving, 
have been combined to form a decision support typology, as 
illustrated in Figure lll-l (Gorry and Scott-Morton, 1971). In general, 
operational control personnel deal with fairly well-structured problems. 
In contrast, strategic planners deal with highly unstructured problems. 
Nevertheless, each level of the organization contains both structured 
and unstructured problems.
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Figure lll-l
Computer Based IS Support of Different Types of Decisions
Key: TPS = transaction processing system.
MIS = management information system.
DSS = decision support system.
ESS = executive support system.
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systems such as Lotus 1-2-3, Microsoft Excel and other packages; 
professional workstations; and general planning and simulation systems. 
There exist a number of different types of DSS that have emerged 
based on the evolution and advances of different technologies and 
usage. Our research will focus on four DSS classifications namely: Data 
versus model-oriented DSS; Issue based DSS; DSS generators versus 
specific DSS; and individual, group, and organizational DSS. Table 111-2 
describes the principle kinds of DSS found by researchers. These four 
types of DSS are described more fully below.
a. Data versus model-oriented DSS
Clearly, some DSS systems are more data-oriented than others. This is 
particularly true of DSS that migrate out of MIS areas. Others DSS are 
more model-oriented, often forgetting completely how data enter the 
system. At the extreme, DSS consisting of only data or only models are 
not true DSS at all. The concept of DSS requires that data and models 
be integral parts of the system.
b. Issue based DSS
El Sherif and El Sawy have introduced a new approach for managing 
the design and delivery of information and decision support systems for 
strategic decision making. It draws on experiences gained from 
implementing systems and services for enhancing the strategic 
decision making process of the Egyptian Cabinet. Their approach 
challenges the conventional views of conceptualizing decision support 
systems and methods for managing them. It introduces an "issue- 
based" management method for the design and delivery processes. 
The distinctive features of this approach includes:
• A focus on issues rather than decisions;
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• A distinction between information support services and decision 
support services;
• Prototyping the management of delivery as well as design; and
• Dynamic tracking for back-end issues.
Comparing conventional and issue-based DSS approaches suggests 
that the later can be an effective stepping stone for the design and 
delivery of executive information systems (EIS) in special context by 
providing DSSs that are “ EIS-readyM.
c. DSS generators versus specific DSS
A second important distinction can be made between DSS generators 
and specific DSS. An example of a DSS generator is Lotus 1-2-3 or any 
of the sophisticated personal computer (PC) spreadsheet packages. 
DSS generators are collections of tools that permit the development of 
a number of specific DSS. Specific DSS are systems devoted to the 
analysis of a particular set of problems (e.g., marketing, production, 
and inventory).
d. individual, group, and organizational DSS
The early work in DSS focused largely on supporting individual decision 
making. Because so much work is accomplished in groups within 
organizations, during the late 1980s most developers and scholars 
began to focus on how computers could support group and 
organizational decision making. This work followed even earlier efforts 
to develop electronic aids to community and societal decision making 
in the 1970s, based largely on mainframes (Laudon, 1977).
The baseline definition of a Group Decision Support System (GDSS) is 
“an interactive computer-based system to facilitate the solution of 
unstructured problems by a set of decision makers working together as 
a group" (DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1985).
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Table 111-2
Different Types of DSS
• Alter (1980)
• Canning (1982)
• Donovan and Madnick (1977)
• Sprague and Carlson (1982)
• Bonczek et al, (1981)
• King (1983)
• Henderson and Schilling (1985)
• Kraemerand King (1988)
• Laudon (1977)
• El-Sherif and El-Sawy (1988)
• Data-oriented versus model- 
oriented
Reporting versus decision 
analysis
• Ad hoc versus institutional; one­
time versus recurring problems
• Specific DSS versus DSS 
generators
• Procedural versus non 
procedural
• Very large versus small
• Public versus private
• Individual versus group
• Organizational and societal
• Issue based versus decision 
oriented
6. Factors in  DSS Success a n d  Failure
As experience with DSS has grown, a number of factors have been 
identified as important to their success or failure. The success factors 
are not very different from those of MIS and other systems. Studies of 
DSS applications in different institutions shows that user training, top 
management's support, length of use, and novelty of the application 
were the most important factors in DSS success. Success is defined as 
perceived improvements in decision making and overall satisfaction 
with the DSS (Sanders and Courtney, 1985).
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A study of thirty-four DSS found that a top management orientation of 
the DSS (helping to make important decisions) and return on investment 
are the most important factors in the approval process for DSS (Meador 
and Keen, 1984; King, 1981). This is an important finding because it 
highlights what organizations are looking for when they develop DSS. 
Organizations need support for senior management decision making, 
which requires custom-built, flexible, and easy-to-use systems that 
address important organizational problems.
In most of the literature, DSS covers support decision making on the 
corporate /  institutional level while carrying out their specific 
management functions (finance, marketing, resourcing, etc.); however, 
what our research is concerned the applicability of using DSS in 
national context and can DSS support large scale national problems 
such as debt management? Was DSS really used? What were the 
results or how successful was the DSS program?. In other words, we 
have seen and studied “organizational (corporate)” DSS but, is there 
“country" DSS with all its characteristics in terms of size, nature of 
problem supported, resources required, setup needed and so forth. 
Appendix lll-A presents additional background material on both 
decision making and DSS.
C. Debt M anagem ent 
?. Introduction
Excessive foreign debt was a major obstacle to economic growth and 
development for many developing countries throughout most of the 
1980's. After World War II, domestic savings were insufficient to support 
a given level of investment, so a current account deficit occurred in 
most developing countries in which foreign borrowing was the right 
solution at that time to supplement the domestic savings rate.
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If foreign savings (borrowing) had ' not been used, the rate of 
investment would have fallen to the level accom m odated by 
domestic savings, with a consequent fall in the rate of growth of the 
economy. So, the growth process for developing economics was 
naturally and inevitably associated with foreign indebtedness. In sum, 
it was a growth-cum-debt approach to development.
With the attitude that borrowing for development was a good thing, 
government agencies organized themselves essentially to maximize 
the amount of loan funds they could attract from abroad. 
Responsibility for obtaining, negotiating and utilizing loan funds was 
dispersed among ministries and agencies like the Ministry of Finance 
and the Central Bank. Another factor that contributed, in a way, to the 
aggravation of the external debt crisis was the mis-management of the 
debt itself and of the local economy by the governments of certain 
developing countries. The failure to make productive use of external 
loans reflected a number of issues such as corruption, diversion of 
foreign exchange to capital flights and over expenditure on arms. 
There was also major expenditure on grand schemes and a failure to 
devote resources to sound development policies.
The debt crisis forced a change of attitude among less developed 
countries (LDC) governments. Most developing countries now wish 
they had less debt, not more. Instead of ministries and developing 
agencies doing their best to raise loan funds, governments now want 
tight central control.
For a developing country to be able to deal successfully with its debt, it 
requires two main resources: (i)an adequate source of funds for 
servicing the debt; and (ii)a well-organized, timely supply of 
information, which enables proper development and implementation 
of necessary policies. Additionally, it needs to structure and administer 
its debt portfolio effectively.
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2. W hat is D ebt?
The term "debt" implies liability represented by a financial instrument or 
other formal equivalent. Total external debt is defined as the amount, 
at any given time, of disbursed and outstanding contractual liabilities 
of residents of a country to non-residents to repay principal, with or 
without interest, or to pay interest with or without principal (IBRD, IMF, 
BISand OECD, 1988).
With a management purpose in mind, a commonly used narrow 
definition of external debt includes all medium-term and long-term 
debt (for one year or more) owed by, or guaranteed by, the public 
sector to nonresidents. In principle, all private external debt 
guaranteed by the government or other public institutions should be 
considered as public, since it will be subject to the same regulations 
and procedures as debt owed directly by the public sector. In 
addition, such debt is a contingent obligation of the government. 
Public debt should also include liabilities of the central bank, 
government agencies, local governments, and so on.
A broader definition adds short-term public sector debt and/or private 
sector (non-guaranteed) debt (both short-term and long-term). 
Definitions become com plicated because the distinction between 
different types of external resources such as loans, grants, and direct 
investment is not always obvious.
A country's failure in knowing its foreign-currency debt may lead it to 
underestimating its foreign exchange problems and to formulating a 
debt-rescheduling strategy which is inappropriate to the circumstances 
the country is experiencing. Forward planning depends on the 
country's knowledge of its foreign currency debt. It is impossible for a 
country to construct a foreign exchange budget and to determine a 
debt-rescheduling strategy if the extent of its foreign-currency debt is
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unknown. In this context, it is not sufficient to know only the direct 
foreign debt of the government; the foreign currency debt incurred by 
the Central Bank and other organizations must also be known.
Private sector foreign currency debt is also important. Every debtor 
country should provide full economic information to its creditors, 
whether commercial or non-commercial. The information should 
include its current external-payment problems, the steps being taken to 
meet these problems, its economic prospects, its requirements for debt 
relief and the way in which the refinanced loans will be repaid. 
Creditors always want to know how they are going to get their money 
back. Although information on debt service obligations is a critical 
com ponent of the capacity to repay, banks routinely lend to countries 
without adequate data on external debt. It is possible, for example, 
that Mexico might not have been permitted to becom e so over 
extended if individual banks had been aware of the amounts their 
competitors were lending, particularly during the six months before 
August 1982 crisis when Mexico borrowed US$ 7 billion.
Similarly, information on international reserves, the balance of payment 
and domestic economic activity is available only after a substantial 
lag, although such information is essential to evaluating and appraising 
the effectiveness of a country's economic management. In the 
absence of reliable data and objective procedures for estimating the 
probability of country default, banks appeared to evaluate the 
borrowing capacity by comparing their exposure with those of other 
countries.
In 1990 a team of experts from the IMF conducted a survey2 and found 
that in a number of countries debt strategy is not sufficiently integrated 
into the macro-economic context. The reason is partly because debt
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data are still incomplete or inadequately organized, but there are also 
deficiencies in the machinery available to the government for the 
formulation and implementation of a coherent policy. This often 
hinders the government in its dialogue with international agencies such 
as the IMF and World Bank as both institutions tend to have strong views 
on policies that the country should pursue with the Paris and London 
Clubs of Lenders. In some cases, the main problem seems to be a lack 
of appropriate direction from authorities to ensure that debt 
management is given priority in the country’s policies.
Therefore, improving the management of external debt has become 
an increasingly important objective of developing countries. Central to 
this task is the provision of timely, accurate and detailed data on 
external debt outstanding and on debt-service payments falling due. 
Among other things, the absence of such data hinders the formulation 
and implementation of economic policy, leads to inefficient 
management of foreign exchange reserves, and increases the cost of 
borrowing in various ways.
3. Concept of Debt M anagem ent and Its Evolution
Debt management has two dimensions: the macro-economic and the 
institutional administrative. In the former, debt management must be 
seen as an integral part of a country's overall macro-economic 
management; in its institutional administrative dimension, it is part of a 
broader process of public administration and management (Ebeid, 
1993).
As far as external debt is concerned, a government's immediate 
interest is, of course, its own external liabilities, which affect both the
2 Proceedings of a seminar on external debt management, jointly organized by the
Islamic Research & Training Institute of the Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia and the World Bank, Washington D.C., USA, Jeddah, May 12-16,  1990.
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budget and foreign exchange reserves. Government responsibility for 
foreign exchange reserves and regulations may also imply 
responsibility for providing foreign exchange to meet private sector 
debt and, eventually, the distribution of profit from direct foreign 
investment.
To conclude, any system of debt management must allow successful 
management of public and publicly guaranteed external debt (mostly 
of a medium-term and long-term nature). Such a system can also be 
extended in both of the two following directions:
1. To include private sector non-guaranteed debt or other external 
debt of the country, as deemed necessary from the foreign 
exchange point of view.
2. To include public domestic debt, as deemed necessary, from 
the public finance point of view.
4. Debt M anagem ent Functions
Effective debt management primarily involves seven basic functions: 
policy, regulatory, resourcing, recording, analytical, controlling and 
operating functions. The first three functions are part of what can be 
called “executive debt management” . The other four functions may 
be considered as part of “ operational debt management” (Hassanali, 
1985).
• Executive debt m anagem ent might be viewed as the 
establishment of the "rules of the game" by the highest levels of 
government which gives direction and organization to the whole 
and might be called the debt management system.
• Operational debt m anagem ent is the day-to-day management 
of debt in accordance with executive direction and organization. 
Operational debt management may in turn be viewed as being 
composed of passive and active debt management (Hassanali,
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1985). Although the dividing line is not always clean the former is 
meant to involve functions which do not include actions 
(interactions and transactions) on the debt front, while the latter 
does. Passive management very much influences active 
management through the provision of information and analysis and 
is as important.
Each function of effective debt management has a major product or 
output, as shown in Table 111-3.
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Table 111-3
Debt Management Functions and Output
Executive D ebt M a n a g e m e n t
Policy Function 
Regulatory Function 
Resourcing Function
Direction and Organizations
Strategy
Structure
Staffing and means
O perational D ebt M a n a g e m e n t  
Passive M anagem ent
Recording Function 
Analytical Function 
Active M anagem ent
Operating Function 
Controlling Functions
Debt Dynamics an d  Practice
Information
Analysis
Operations
Control, coordination, and 
monitoring
The above debt management functions are thoroughly explained in 
Appendix lll-B.
5. Debt M anagem ent System (DMS)
An external debt management system of any country is normally a 
highly complex mechanism involving a number of interrelated and 
inter-dependent functions. Without good debt data, portfolio 
management becomes impossible. Legal instruments and 
administrative systems must allow the operational function to make 
quick decisions if the monitoring system is to be of any use.
Various functions of debt management are usually performed by a 
number of government agencies and institutions as well as private 
sector companies. The danger of uncoordinated overlapping is very 
great, particularly if the system is decentralized to several ministries, a
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President or Prime Minister's office, the Central Bank and a host of 
institutional borrowers.
A debt management system, to be effective, should be driven and 
controlled by a "policy unit". Such a unit is the highest authority on all 
matters and should em brace top level people in the government of 
Egypt i.e. the Ministers of Finance, Planning and the Governor of the 
Central Bank. An effective policy unit of this kind is almost always a 
formal committee of the government which meets regularly to 
formulate and follow-up on strategic, regulatory and resource features 
of the system.
Effective debt-management also entails developing and maintaining 
cooperation between the units and agencies involved. For a macro­
economist to be capable of responding to external debt management 
inquiries, he needs to focus on: (i) following economic developments in 
major capital markets, particularly regarding to interest and exchange 
rates; and (ii) presenting the country's economy and its state of 
borrowing to the international financial community. The office also 
needs market officers who follow events, in particular, financial 
markets, on a regular basis and keep track of technical innovations. 
Most of these functions are highly specialized and can be properly 
carried out only by qualified staff who must be on the same level as 
personnel of major international banks.
6. DAIS Principal Functions and Outputs
a. Principal functions
A DMS should be designed to fulfill the operational, statistical and 
analytical needs of a w ide variety of users within government with 
responsibilities for different aspects of debt management and external
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financial planning. Broadly speaking, its principal functions should be 
the following:
• Registration
• Monitoring
• Analysis
Under the heading of registration, the system provides for the capture 
of information on the financial provisions of loan and grant 
agreements, on the characteristics of the different parties or
beneficiaries to the agreements, the utilization of the proceeds, and 
the relation of each agreement to the other agreements (Husain, 1989). 
Much of this information is printed on a registration certificate which is 
system retained in permanent files as a record that the agreement has 
been registered in the system.
The DMS should also provide for monitoring and financial control. Its 
loan ledger module should include data on individual loan
transactions in sufficient detail and with sufficient accuracy to permit 
the user to eliminate the manual posting of transactions to ledger 
accounts. It should posses the facility for projecting debt-service 
payments by currency and by due dates within any given time frame. 
This would assist central banks in more efficient foreign exchange 
management and in avoiding penalty interest charges for overdue 
payments.
By combining the data in the loan ledger module with debt-service 
schedules projected from data in the loan registration module, debt- 
service payments possibly in arrears would be automatically brought to 
the attention of management for action.
The DMS should be designed to support both macro-economic
sensitivity analysis and statistical analysis of the existing debt stock. A
subsystem of DMS should be dedicated to “debt projections” , which 
could be used for macro-economic analysis. This subsystem would
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combine debt statistics, compiled into categories from data on 
individual loans. This subsystem would then be used for identifying gross 
borrowing requirements, developing a policy in respect of external 
borrowing, and assessing the likelihood of having to give serious 
consideration to debt rescheduling.
Statistical analysis should be facilitated by a flexible report preparation 
program, which permits the user to select (Valantin, 1989):
1. The type of report (cumulative transactions and loan 
balances, or debt-service projections);
2. The subset of variables from a large number of possible 
variables to be included in tables;
3. The report period (day, month, quarter or year for at least 40 
periods);
4. The subset of loans to be included in the report selected by 
specifying a combination of characteristics or individual loan 
numbers; and,
5. A scheme for aggregation.
b. System O utputs
Outputs
In addition to the reports prepared by the flexible report preparation 
program and the projections of balance-of-payments and debt-service 
data provided by the debt projection system (DPS), the system should 
be able to produce pre-programmed reports which can be grouped 
as follows: registration reports, accounting reports, user-requested 
reports and reference file reports (UNCTAD, 1988). The system should 
be able also to provide a browsing facility for reviewing data directly 
on the computer screen.
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Automatic calculations
One important feature of the DMS is automatic calculations. It relieves 
the user of the burden of calculating debt-service schedules and 
average terms for groups of loans. These types of calculations are 
fundamental for cash flow management and for establishing 
guidelines on terms for new borrowing. For analytical purposes, the 
DMS should calculate a number of characteristics (discussed in detail in 
Chapter V) of the entire loan stock, groups of loans, or individual loans 
(when appropriate).
D. Conclusion
As we have seen in the selected literature review above, the issue of 
debt management is dependent on the optimum combination of well- 
balanced debt management functions in addition to a well-defined 
debt management system. However, a number of questions remain 
unanswered, such as:
• Effective debt management encompasses such issues as 
administration; operation of an office; communications; 
information flows and legal authorizations; analysis of credit, 
balance of payments and budget; control of borrowing; 
definition of strategies; and computerization of information 
systems, as well as training and retaining people. The simple 
question is “ has anybody looked at all of these variables /  critical 
success factors (or most of them) in one combined model ? ";
• Can a combination of well-balanced debt management 
functions work in isolation or does it require a sort of a medium of 
operation to link them in order to ensure that they work in 
harmony to produce a solid debt management system ?;
• Given the pros and cons of a powerful /  successful debt 
management operation, what is the best path that a country
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can follow to reach success with the least risk possible and with 
the possibility of maximum success to be gained?;
• Does a debt management system necessarily mean 
computerization?;
• Does an automated debt management system depend only on 
normal MIS or more complex forms than that (such as DSS, EIS or 
OSS3) ?; and
• Given that a country has a good debt management system, is it 
enough to ensure the success of a debt management 
operation?
3 Organizational Support Systems.
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Chapter IV
Strategic Decision M aking  & D ebt Acquisition Process in Egypt
The Before Stage
A. The Decision Making Process in Egypt Prior to 1985
The Cabinet is the highest executive body in Egypt. It consists of 32 
ministers and is headed by the Prime Minister who is assisted by one or 
more deputy Prime Ministers. Each minister is responsible for a given 
sector, such as industry, agriculture, and energy. The Cabinet addresses 
multi-sectoral issues, policies, and programs. The cabinet's agenda is 
usually set according to the scope and urgency of critical issues. In this 
regard, the cabinet interacts with ministries, parliament, govenorates 
(states or provinces), government agencies, and universities. Its decision­
making process usually involves discussions, debates, the preparation of 
memoranda, and multi-sectoral studies.
In addressing its issues, the Cabinet has four main sectoral committees, 
each with a membership of various ministers, which operate according 
to their specializations and areas of work. These committees are the 
High-level Strategy Committee for Economic and Financial Affairs 
(HLEC); Production and Services Committee; Social Services 
Committee; and Legislative Affairs Committee. The Prime Minister 
coordinates the work of the ministries and policies are made in 
conjunction with the Supreme Court and the President. In this thesis, our 
scope of interest will be the HLEC as the targeted group for research 
and study.
One basic function that was assessed and analysed during the course of 
our empirical research was how the strategic decision making process 
took place at the cabinet level, mainly at the HLEC. The period assessed 
was before the inception of the IDSC in general and DM&EM in 
particular.
Interviews conducted with different members of our focus groups
81
Strategic Decision Making and the Debt Acquisition Process Prior to 1985 Chapter IV
revealed that strategic decision making prior to 1985 was a shapeless, 
undefined process. It was very difficult to study due to the fact that 
there were no defined patterns to follow or impose on strategic level 
decision makers. During the research a set of variables was identified 
which were unique to each situation and person interviewed. In other 
words, we determined the decision making process to be affected by 
the following variables:
1. Each decision maker possesses a unique set of management tools, 
techniques and mechanisms that allows him to manage.
The tools, te ch n iq u e s  a n d  m echan ism s d e p e n d  on  th e  d ec is ion  
m a k e r ’s b a c k g ro u n d , style o f m a n a g e m e n t, w ork e xp e rie n ce , the  
n a tu re  o f the  s itua tion  fa c e d  (H ow  s tra te g ic  o r ta c t ic a l is it?), a n d  
resources a v a ila b le  (m a n p o w e r cap ab ilitie s , tim e  re q u ire d  fo r  
d e v e lo p in g  n e w  p ro ced u re s  a n d  systems, m o n e y  a n d  th e  a v a ila b le  
in fo rm a tio n  sources).
2. Top/strategic decision makers depend highly on support assistants 
who act as topic(s) executives (advisors and/or researchers) on 
specific issues.
D ecision m akers assoc ia te  ce rta in  top ics  a n d  issues w ith  a  person or 
a  g ro u p  o f p e o p le  w ho  study, ana lyze  a n d  re c o m m e n d  a lte rna tives  
fo r the ir superiors to  choose  from . Based on  th e  d iffe re n t 
re c o m m e n d a tio n s  p roposed , the  dec is ion  m a k e r perfo rm s  
w h a te v e r dec is ion  is n e e d e d .
3. The increasing number of issues, topic(s) executives and committees 
available.
To a  g re a t ex ten t, the re  is a  h igh  d e g re e  o f ove rlap , a n d  very  m in o r  
c o o rd in a tio n  efforts, b e tw e e n  e xe cu tive  co m m itte e s  th a t h a n d le  
various issues a n d  top ics, resulting usually in a  la rg e  n u m b e r o f  
co n flic ts  a n d  co n tra d ic tio n s . As a  result, a n  e x te n d e d  a m o u n t o f  
tim e  is n e e d e d  fo r a  dec is ion  to  b e  m a d e  a n d  usually it is p ro d u c e d
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a t a  lo w  le ve l o f q u a lity  requ iring  num erous m o d ifica tio n s  a n d  
fo llow -up . C hange s  a re  g e ne ra lly  re q u ire d  w ith in  a  short p e r io d  o f  
tim e.
4. Topic(s) executives usually depend on very poor information 
infrastructure and manual systems.
They m a in ly  d e p e n d  on  pe rsona l e xp e rie n ce  a n d  in tu ition  du ring  
the ir p rocess o f analysis a n d  re co m m e n d a tion s . It is o b se rve d  to  b e  
a  very  lo n g  a n d  tim e  consum ing  process w h ich  leads  to  the  
a c c u m u la tio n  o f m ino r p rob lem s w h ich  la te r  b e c o m e  ch ron ic .
5. The nature of recommendations issued are usually very weak, 
contradicting and usually uni-directional.
A lim ite d  set o f  scenarios  o r views is p u t forth  w ith  n o  in -d e p th  
analysis no r a n y  con s ide ra tion  o f the  possible im p a c t  o f e a c h  
a lte rna tive . It w as a  process c h a ra c te r iz e d  b y  a  “ tria l a n d  e rro r” 
typ e  o f  dec is ion  m a k in g  ra th e r than  p u re  decis ion  su p p o rt fo r to p  
p e o p le .
6. The process is human dependent rather than systems dependent. 
Issues a re  re la te d  to  sp e c ific  p e o p le  w ho  h a ve  to  b e  p resen t a t  a ll 
times a n d  w h o  m ust b e  invo lve d  in a ll issues, i.e., a  “o n e -m a n  sh o w .” 
In this re s p e c t the  top ic(s) execu tives  usually e n c o u n te r  a  
b o ttle n e c k , a n d  d e a l w ith  issues in a  very sha llow  a n d  m e d io c re  
m a n n e r p ro d u c in g  p o o r  q u a lity  work.
The decision making process prior to 1985 followed a problem-handling
rather than problem-avoidance or preventing pattern (Ghali, 1993)1.
This meant that most decisions were delayed until a problem attracted
the attention of a decision maker, usually when a deadline was
1 Interview with H.E. Dr. Youssef Botrous Ghali - Egyptian Minister of International 
Cooperation, 8 November, 1993.
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approaching or had already passed. The factors of accuracy, reliability 
and quick response were not among the criteria for evaluating the 
performance of decision-makers. Decision-makers themselves lacked 
adequate guidance, support tools, information bases, scenario 
generating capabilities and good follow-up systems. Therefore, it was 
not a problem of resources (availability of computers, software system 
and human resources) but rather a problem of bureaucracy, tedious 
workflow and procedures, and huge numbers of un-needed and idle 
personnel. On a more general level, it becam e apparent to us that the 
problem stemmed from a lack of awareness about the power behind 
the proper use of information, computer systems and trained 
personnel. Figure IV-1 presents a diagrammatic view of the decision 
making process prior to 19852. This figure is meant to show the position 
of the Cabinet which acted as the central coordinating body directly 
interacting with the various ministries, parliament, government 
agencies, universities, etc. The Cabinet did not possess any capabilities 
of a “ kitchen-like” facility that prepares, studies, analyzes and 
recommends decisions to be implemented. The above six variables 
represented the main factors that influenced the strategic decision 
making process of the Cabinet in the past. In the process of our 
research, we tested the viability of each factor and cross-checked 
them against the different case studies conducted.
2 El Sherif, H. and El Sawy, O., 1988.
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Decision Making Process prior to 1985
B. Debt Management Process in Egypt Prior to 1985
Faced with the typical problems facing developing countries, including
heavy foreign debt, a balance of payment deficit, a high illiteracy 
rate, poor technological infrastructure, lack of financial resources and 
unemployment, Egypt had been striving to implement a national 
strategy for instituting a socio-economic development program. In the 
mid-1980s the government adopted a far reaching supply-push 
strategy for the introduction, implementation and institutionalization of 
large information and decision support system projects aimed at
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improving decision making at the Cabinet level with respect of socio­
economic development planning. The strategy had to be tailor-made 
to the decision-making needs at the Cabinet level, which addresses a 
variety of socio-economic development issues. These issues include 
public sector reform, administrative reform, balance of payment 
deficit, debt management, and privatization. At the Cabinet level, 
information needs and decision making were characterized by data 
rich and information poor decision support systems; operations 
research and management science (OR/MS) specialists and experts 
isolated from the decision makers; and the use and application of 
computer systems viewed as an end rather than information 
technology tools that could support decision making. Initially, the focus 
was more on technical issues rather than decision outcomes. As a 
result, the urgency and criticality of decision making issues necessitated 
provision of l/DSS services to enhance the decision making process 
using the most appropriate state-of-the-art information technology, 
tools and techniques.3
7. D eb t A cq u is itio n  Process
In the early 1980s, Egypt faced a severe economic recession, which 
was characterized by deteriorating income, a decrease in foreign 
reserves, and a sharp increase of unhealthy debt burdens. There were 
a number of reasons why Egypt needed debt management reform. 
Egypt’s main objective was to reduce the heavy debt burden on 
individuals as well as on the government so that it could concentrate 
on other development issues and problems. According to a key 
decision maker who described the debt management process prior to 
1985, “We used to perform debt management functions soley to satisfy
3 El Sherif, H. and El Sawy, Q.,1988.
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others or to respond to pressures from creditors. The reason for this was 
that in order to secure new funding, Egypt needed to appear as if it is 
regularly performed full debt management functions” (Ezz, 1993). 
Popular opinion, observed during the course of our empirical research, 
shows that prior to 1985, the debt acquisition process in Egypt was 
conducted in a haphazard manner in the sense that it lacked any kind 
of framework or modality that could govern, regulate or guide such a 
process. At that time, a government organization or agency was 
permitted to make contact, ask for whatever new money it needed, 
agree to any proposed terms, and contract new loans, and all without 
referring to any coordinating body or regulating agency. There was no 
record keeping which could account for total borrowed money at any 
one point in time. For creditors, Egypt was an excellent debtor from 
whom they received excellent terms.4
Most policy makers interviewed agreed that external borrowing was 
deteriorating and the number of bad debts was rising. It was very clear 
to outside observers that Egypt did not posses a structured procedure 
for its borrowing agencies, or a central coordinating body objectively 
setting guidelines for the process or for monitoring its implementation. 
Moreover, during the early 1980's, the period during which most of the 
debt accumulated, Egypt was faced with a massive number of 
creditors who had surpluses and encouraged over-borrowing.
At that time, debt was looked upon as an “ injection” of emergency 
funds to be used for acquiring basic needs. It was never assessed for 
feasibility and there was never any assurance that debt would 
contribute to the success of macro-economic policies and practices. 
According to the Egyptian Cabinet Minister for Economic Affairs, “ It
4 Interview with H.E. Dr. Salah Hamed - Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and Governor 
of the Central Bank of Egypt, 10 October, 1993.
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was next to impossible for any Egyptian decision maker to calculate 
and identify the total debt figure (real figure) or to determine who the 
creditors actually were”5. Consequently, it was extremely difficult to 
calculate the yearly debt burden and debt service in relation to gross 
national product (GNP) and total exports6. Similarly, it was very difficult 
to know precisely how much the annual debt service (principle and 
interest) represented Egypt's generated sources of income. Key 
questions such as is Egypt capable of paying its annual debt service or 
not could not be answered most of the time7. As a result, it was next to 
impossible for the Cabinet, HLEC, any minister and /  or any top decision 
maker to balance the malfunctioning economic situation and issue the 
correct policies and strategies without first being able to view the 
global picture.
2. CBE - LEDD organization structure, work flow and operating 
procedures
Studying the work-flow and operating procedures at the CBE -  LEDD 
prior to 1985, the “before stage” to the DM&EM program 
implementation, allows us to measure the degree of success and 
impact of the debt management and economic monitoring program 
implemented jointly by the CBE and the Cabinet IDSC. In this way, we 
can assess the contribution of the work performed in the process of
5 Interview with H.E. Dr. Atef Ebied - Egyptian Minister of Public Enterprise Office and  
Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs, 24 November 1993.
6 " Debt service to export ratio if more than 25% is a crisis state, but less than 10% is 
acceptable. For Egypt it was26 % and now has been reduced to 12%, It is expected  
to reach 6 - 7% in the next two years. This is a very comfortable figure, i.e. very 
reasonable cost of financing for our debt. It is an acceptable rate even for 
developed and economically stable countries. Economically, financing by debt is the 
best means of financing not from your own resources. But w e have to be very careful 
on the debt utilization, debt service ratio and debt pay back to maintain efficiently 
and not slip into a debt crisis". Dr. Mokhtar Kattab, Director of the DSS department at 
the Cabinet, IDSC, Interview, 1993.
7 Interview with Dr. Moatasem Kaddah - National Project Manager for the Egyptian 
Debt Management Program, 3 July 1993.
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enhancing and leveraging strategic decision making and its value, if 
any, to overall results. It was our belief that studying the “before stage” 
is extremely important for the following reasons:
1. Institutional memory persists.
2. Sometimes valuable good technical systems fail institutionally due to 
the lack of documentation of the phase prior to implementation (El 
Sherif, Interview-1993).
3. I/DSS and concepts go beyond computerization, which already 
existed in the CBE-LEDD.
4. As the program is one of the few experiences of its kind, the 
diagnostic work which was used to sharpen the objectives and the 
deliverables of the program need to be well documented together 
with the program's objectives, scope, output and successes /  
failures. It is our belief that this in itself could be a comprehensive 
package that could represent a transportable experience with few 
modifications to other debt-burdened developing countries.
5. Compared with other experiences such as in Mexico and Turkey, in 
order to be able to assess the degree of impact and measure the 
accomplishments of the DM&EM program.
a. CBE - LEDD organizational structure:
Figure IV-2 represents the organizational structure of the CBE-LEDD, 
which consisted of a director, general manager, four unit.heads who 
act as deputy general managers, and five main units which supervised 
various groups.
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CBE -  LEDD Organizational Structure
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a. Top M anagem ent Department
1. Director
2. General Manager
3. Four unit heads (VPs) for
a. External loans and other commitments unit;
b. Re-scheduling unit;
c. Registration, technical research, administration and secretarial 
unit;
d. Data and follow-up unit.
B. Units Breakdown
1. External Loans and Other Commitments Unit 
(Total o f 6 em p loyees ]
a. Loans and external credit facilities group;
b. Money market study group; and
c. Private sector loans group.
2. Re-scheduling Unit (Total o f 6 em ployees)
a. Debt verification group; and
b. Re-scheduling agreement revision group.
3. Registration and Technical Research Unit 
(Total o f 15 em p loyees)
a. Registration group; and
b. Technical research group
4. Administration and Secretarial Unit 
(Total o f 8 em p loyees)
a. Mail and archiving group
b. Typing and secretarial group
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c. Data and Follow-up Unit (Total of 12 employees)
a. Data entry group;
b. Data analysis group; and
c. Data validation, verification and follow up group.
b. CBE - LEDD roles, responsibilities and duties:
This section presents the CBE-LEDD roles, responsibilities and duties as 
stated:
1. Comprehensive study of the international money market with 
special focus on the development in money trends, cost of loans 
and investment portfolios.
2. Development of policies and strategies for external debt 
management in cooperation with concerned agencies.
3. Detailed studies of new external debt projects in foreign currency 
offered to different ministries, government agencies, public sector 
units, public agencies and authorities and universities prior to 
these organizations committing, and identifying the cost burden 
for each (feasibility studies).
4. Registration of direct loans and credit-facilities for suppliers and 
buyers in foreign currency that were received by ministries, 
government agencies, general authorities, public and private 
sector units guaranteed by public sector commercial banks. 
Usually, these credit facilities were established for more than one 
year and were thoroughly studied from the point of view of 
finance terms and applicability to different users.
5. Registration of government loans which were provided to various 
agencies by the Ministry of International Cooperation.
6. Handling of record keeping and systems for following-up external 
international and Arabian debt commitments.
7. Analysis and forecasting of external debt and other commitments
92
Strategic Decision Making and the Debt Acquisition Process Prior to 1985 Chapter IV
in addition to preparation of regular bulletins and reports required 
by national and international agencies.
8. Preparation for and participation in loan and credit facilities 
agreement negotiations.
9. Automation of external debt systems in order to build an external 
debt and commitments data base that could provide detailed 
information and reports on developments in the external debt 
status. This data could enable top policy makers to draw the 
necessary policies and strategies needed for future external 
borrowing processes.
10. Participation in the preparation of external debt rescheduling 
negotiations with creditor countries. Preparations take place in 
the form of data aggregation, validation and verification in 
addition to revising debt re-scheduling project agreements due to 
be discussed by Egypt and those countries involved.
The mandate of the CBE - LEDD appeared well thought-out on paper, 
but was never adhered to in practice. Numerous problems impeded 
proper implementation of the espoused roles, responsibilities and 
duties, including: Lack of resources; absence of qualified staff; 
complexity of the Egyptian debt stock; the very primitive work flow and 
procedures followed; and lack of user involvement and clear 
requirements. As a result, the CBE - LEDD was properly labeled but did 
not perform any task beyond debt stock inventory, and even this 
process lacked precision.
The above documented charter enabled us to identify gaps in 
performance and less-than-perfect adherence to the procedures set 
forth by the CBE-LEDD. The research procedures followed were 
discussion and informal interviews with key persons at various
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hierarchies. It was necessary to locate and acquire reports and 
documents on the workflow and procedures in addition to sample 
work tools such as forms, books, and internal memos, meeting minutes 
and performance evaluation reports. Comprehensively, our 
observations on the critical bottlenecks and problems that were 
evident in the process and procedures followed were:
1. The system that provided general reports and statistical bulletins 
to numerous concerned agencies was mainly dependent on data 
aggregated, manipulated and tabulated from sources outside 
the department. It did not incorporate any data processing 
capability or cross-checking mechanisms for incoming or stored 
data on the data base that could be used in the preparation of 
requested statistical or decision support reports for decision 
makers.
2. The creation of the “data and follow up” department which 
recorded the detailed external debt data registration on the data 
base was an apparent duplication of work being done at the 
“ registration and technical research” unit (Kaddah, interview - 
1993).
3. The number of data sheets and / or reports received from 
different banks and ministries exceeded 6000 per month. Sources 
were:
• Commercial banks 2000 per month
• CBE branches 1800 per month
• Ministries and other agencies 2500 per month
None of the above sources was interested or had the ability to
compare and cross check data validity with other sources 
(Kaddah, interview - 1993). Moreover, developing a proper 
automated mechanism for data entry, validation, manipulation
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and processing in addition to data exchange and dissemination 
with other concerned sources becam e necessary.
4. The manual system used in regularly recording and producing the 
monthly statistical bulletins, by the register and technical research 
unit, was very inefficient producing low quality output (Ezz, 
interview - 1993).
5. A strategy for specifying the borrowing sources, borrowing terms 
and conditions was not clearly defined. Additionally, CBE-LEDD 
staff was unable to identify or classify the borrowing economic 
sector especially when the purpose of the loan differed from the 
main “umbrella of activities” of the borrowing sector. For example, 
a loan for the construction of a tourist hotel for the Ministry of 
Tourism might take the code for this ministry or that for the Ministry 
of Construction and Development. The problem worsened when 
the loan was divided among different economic sectors such as a 
government loan distributed among a number of ministries. This 
led to an imprecise coding of borrowing econom ic sectors and 
the inability to generate classified reports for these sectors.
6. Data on loans and credit facilities was not used (archived and 
not used for tracking or any follow-up purposes) after the loan was 
approved and recorded on Form 1, Loans (see Appendix IV-A), 
and in the database (Ezz, interview -1993).
7. The computer system was used only as a facility for debt figures 
inventory and was not utilized in processing or manipulation 
activities. The computer was viewed by some staff, who had little 
knowledge of computers, as a mechanical or electronic means of 
debt stock keeping and easy report generating. Other employees 
feared the computer due to ignorance in how to operate it, i.e., 
difficulty in learning a new system after reaching senior position, 
fear of being replaced by the computer, and preference for
95
Strategic Decision Making and the Debt Acquisition Process Prior to 1985 Chapter IV
hand-written paperwork (physical paper copy), etc.
8. The very clear and striking phenomenon was that data 
processing and manipulation were performed almost by hand. 
Resistant to change, staff would to ask for a report print out and 
would calculate and generate all requested answers to inquiries 
manually. Clearly, the enormous amount of data and the use of 
very com plicated models such as that used by the IMF, World 
Bank and the Paris Club, manual calculation usually resulted in a 
multitude of mistakes that required time-consuming effort to 
rectify. The final result was an overdue, unreliable and valueless 
document that top management could not depend on in 
developing strategies or making decisions.
Based on the above observations and the results of the case studies 
conducted for our research, we were confident that most of the CBE- 
LEDD roles, responsibilities and duties (presented in the following section 
of this chapter) were well charted in the department books, but were 
not adhered to in practical implementation. In other words, the charter 
was wishful thinking on the part of CBE top management but they 
failed to carry through its design.
c. CBE - LEDD staff background and work experiences
The LEDD staff collective backgrounds and work experience at the 
time can be summarized as follows:
1. Most of the employees had varying money, banking, and external 
financial operations experience. For newly recruited employees, 
intensive training courses and skill building programs, in their fields, 
were being organized;
2. Some employees received special on/off site courses in debt 
management such as:
• World Bank external debt management courses; and
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• IMF economic analysis tools and techniques training 
programs.
3. Others were trained at the Cabinet IDSC on:
• Introduction to PC s;
• DOS, Data Base and Lotus 1-2-3; and
• Data entry and validation techniques.
4. Employees were trained on report preparation and generation by 
an international expert from the IMF.
d. LEDD work flow and procedures
As mentioned before, CBE-LEDD was and still is divided into five main 
units (Figure IV-2 above). LEDD workflow and procedures in respect to 
each unit are discussed individually below:
External Loans and Other Commitments Unit
The External Loans and Other Commitments Unit’s work flow and 
procedures were as follows (Figure IV-3):
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External Loans & Other Commitments Unit Data Flow
1. Supports ministries, government agencies, general authorities, public 
sector agencies, and universities in the process of committing to 
new direct external debt, whether short-or-long terms, in foreign 
currency, for a minimum of a one year credit period. It provided 
support in the form of advice on proposed borrowing terms, i.e., 
suitability of interest rate, debt installments burden, credit period 
and credit grace period, if any, and other terms and conditions 
contained in the loan agreements.
In providing such a service, the Unit followed the steps below:
a. The agency files a request in the form of a detailed letter of the 
operation and attaches the proposed financing projects with a 
credit period of at least one year, seeking the opinion of the CBE on 
the degree of suitability of the loan to its context;
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b. Requests were usually delivered by mail or by hand, registered in a 
special registration book at the LEDD, and then distributed among 
several specialized groups;
c. Requests were shared between employees at the different 
hierarchical levels to obtain detailed analytical views which were 
then consolidated and aggregated in a comprehensive feasibility 
study with comments and recommendations on accepting, 
modifying or refusing the proposed finance project. In case of 
acceptance or minor modification, the whole study had to be 
reviewed, revised and approved by the unit head and the 
department general manager;
d. Unit head and the general manager comments, if any, were 
incorporated into the overall report and a response was prepared 
and sent to the concerned agency;
e. In case of loan or credit facility approval, a registration process took 
place during which detailed data was recorded, by hand, in 
special books prepared for that purpose;
f. One copy of Form 1, Loans, was then returned to the concerned 
agency. The concerned local Commercial Bank indicated on the 
form that registration took place on a certain date, and a serial 
number was assigned;
g. In case of loan or credit facility rejection in response to unsuitable 
terms, either due to high interest rates, a short credit period or any 
other unsuitable burden, a detailed letter was sent to the 
concerned agency and the concerned local commercial bank 
explaining the reason for refusal. This letter was used to strengthen 
and support the agency during re-negotiation of the proposal 
terms; and
h. Usually special cases such as those of relative importance or 
containing a new borrowing basis to the department took longer to
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prepare and respond to.
It is worth noting here that most of the outcome of loan and credit 
facilities requests were heavily dependent on the money and banking 
experience of the unit's employees, experience accum ulated from 
previous reviews, support acquired from periodicals on the 
international money market, and changes in interest and currency 
rates.
2. Monitors direct loans and suppliers' credit facilities foreign currency, 
which is received by ministries, government agencies, public 
authorities, public sector companies and universities from abroad. 
Additionally loans and credit facilities recommended by private sector 
individuals and guaranteed by public sector banks had to be reviewed 
by the CBE before being committed. The General Monetary 
Department at the CBE regulated the process by the Internal Loans 
Law, Number 1, issued on 29/8/1978 and modified in 15/1/1987 and 
again in 8/10/1987. Agencies applied for approval on request Form 1, 
Loans. Furthermore, firm instructions were issued by the CBE on 23/9/87 
to public sector bank's regarding the importance of referring back to 
the CBE all registered foreign currency direct loans and suppliers’ / 
buyers’ credit facilities acquired by these banks clients. All loans still 
had to fulfill the minimum of a one-year credit period.
3. Government loans, assigned by the Ministry of International 
Cooperation to different agencies, were guided by the Internal Loans 
Law, Number 1, issued by the General Monetary Department at the 
CBE on 15/1/1987. All concerned local agencies had to com plete Form 
2, Loans, (see Appendix IV-A) regarding government loans that were 
assigned by the Ministry of International Cooperation. All forms had to
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be delivered to the LEDD at the CBE in order to ensure registration. The 
following process took place:
a. The in-coming loan forms and all required attachments were 
received;
b. Proposed forms were thoroughly studied by specialized staff, 
group managers, and unit heads in order to ensure that they 
fulfilled all conditions and financial terms related to government 
loans;
c. Data on the approved proposals was registered in special books 
prepared for that purpose;
d. Copy of the approved proposal was sent, after registration, to all 
concerned agencies and commercial banks.
Registration and Technical Research Unit
The LEDD Registration and Technical Research Unit workflow and 
procedure was as follows (Figure- IV-4):
1. Managing documents needed for follow-up of external
commitments through the following:
a. Handling of different registration books used in recording of all 
data concerning Arab, regional, international government loans 
and other financing agencies. This data included total loan 
amount, loan amount used, loan amount left without use, interest 
rate, other burden, loan period, period before payments began 
and installments time table;
b. Borrowing agencies supplied the department with quarterly data 
on the use of these loans;
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Systems Inputs to the Registration and Technical Research Unit
c. The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of International 
Cooperation supplied the department with the status on loans 
handled by both ministries;
d. Comparing and contrasting the process that take place between 
what was actually supplied and what was originally recorded. This 
process was then approved by the unit head ;
e. In the unit, books were classified by loan source, i.e. registration 
books for loans provided by Arabian, European and other 
countries.
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2. Data and statistics report preparation: (Table IV-5)
a. Data and statistics reports were prepared by the unit on monthly, 
quarterly, semi-annually and annual bases. Report due dates 
depended on the registration books and regularity of data 
received from the CBE-Cairo branch, General Foreign Affairs 
Department at the CBE main branch, commercial public sector 
banks, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of International 
Cooperation.
b. Reported data took the following form :
(For reports received from the various sources and their frequency,
see Table iV-A-L Appendix IV-A.)
1) Total amount paid during the report month and committed 
balance to be paid for during the current fiscal year and the 
subsequent fiscal years using the currency of the creditor country. 
The whole process was regulated by technical and economic 
cooperation agreements between Egypt and creditor countries;
2) Total amount paid during the report month and committed 
balance to be paid during the current fiscal year and subsequent 
fiscal years for a country’s payment agreements regulated by the 
supplier’s credit facility;
3) Report on the total late and committed payments regulated by 
banking credit facilities in foreign currency depending on the 
financial status at the end of each month;
4) Report on the total late and committed payments regulated by a 
supplier's credit facility in foreign currency depending on the 
financial status at the end of each month;
5) Report on the total commitments to be paid during the current 
fiscal year and subsequent fiscal years for a country’s payment 
agreement regulated by deposits at the CBE;
6) Report on the total commitments to be paid during the current
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fiscal year and subsequent fiscal years for a country's payment 
agreements regulated by the rescheduling process in foreign 
currency;
7) Report on the total commitments to be paid during current fiscal 
year and subsequent fiscal years for a country’s payment 
agreements regulated by guaranteed and non-garnered private 
sector external debt;
8) Report on the total /  aggregated commitments in foreign 
currency depending on the financial status at the end of each 
month.
9) Additionally, a full copy of all compiled data was provided to:
a. The Economic Cooperation Sector at the Ministry of International 
Cooperation;
b. The General Monetary Department at the Ministry of Economy 
and Foreign trade;
c. The General Foreign Affairs Department at the CBE;
d. General Audit Authority (annually); and
e. The Cabinet High Level Economic Committee.
c. Reports distributed to different sources and their frequency:
(For statistics on periodic reports distributed to various sources and
their frequency, see Table IV-A- 2, Appendix IV-A.J
1) A three-month statistical report was prepared from the above 
aggregated data for IMF follow-up.
2) Other special reports were prepared and presented to CBE top 
management, among them:
a. Quarterly statistical reports on suppliers' and buyers' credit 
facilities registered with the department during the report period;
b. Monthly statistical reports on total external debt in foreign 
currency with a comparison study on external debt figures for the
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same month but during pervious years. An analysis was 
performed pinpointing reasons for increased or decreased debt 
figures; and
c. A copy of the above comparison and analytical report 
periodically sent to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance, 
Economy and International Cooperation.
3) Preparation of technical research and studies:
a.Studying and evaluating for reports on external loans received 
from various sources (general audit authority, Egyptian 
commercial attaches in foreign countries, World Bank and other 
concerned agencies). Comments and highlights were prepared 
in a feasibility-study format to be presented to the bank's top 
management;
b. Conducting research on different systems and mechanisms for 
export financing and credit guarantees in foreign countries 
based on the data reports received from foreign sources and 
Egyptian commercial attaches worldwide;
c. Studying the effect of interest rates on foreign currency 
abroad through different data sources; and
d.Other studies and research were conducted on external 
borrowing policies and strategies and their local and 
international development over time.
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System O u tp u t from  the  Registration and  Technica l Research Unit 
Data and Follow-up Unit
1. The Data and Follow-up Unit (Figure IV -  6) follows up on all loans and 
credit facilities’ operations that were registered at the CBE using 
special computer forms that were completed and revised by the 
concerned local banks and then returned to the LEDD. These forms 
were as follows:
a. Form A
All basic loan and credit facility information was recorded in
addition to information on providers and users, expenditures to
date, repayment methods, related interest, commission and
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other burden repayment, and the method of calculation used.
b. Form B
Information on paid principle and interest and other burdens and 
commitments that have already matured and actually been 
paid.
c. Form C
Information on the expended part of the loan or credit facility 
and the method adopted for repayment of commitments for 
each type of use.
d. Form D
Information on unpaid maturities and the date of maturation.
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2. The Unit acts as a follow-up and control agent for the execution of 
registered loans, buyers’ and suppliers’ credit-facilities and 
government loans in foreign currencies according fo fhe following 
procedures:
a. Dafa preparation, validation and verification phase (before 
being enfered fo the computer):
1) Receive data sheets through incoming mail and register them in 
books designed for fhat purpose. Dafa sheets were usually 
distributed among staff according fo each ’s specialization.
2) Data sheets were then processed as follows:
a) Validation of all dafa ifems recorded on fhe sheef and 
assurance fhaf the form is complefe.
b) Contacting reporting banks in cases where data error or 
missing data items is pinpointed.
c) Coding of necessary intermediary steps according to the CBE 
approved coding guide.
d) Coding for loan provider and borrower according to the CBE 
approved coding guide.
b. Computer data entry and error correction phase:
1) Incoming data in the form of the previously mentioned data 
sheets, in addition to data concerning the of US dollar 
equivalencies to other foreign currencies and the changes in 
interest rate prices in international markets, entered to the 
computer database.
2) Preliminary reports printed for fhe dafa entered for revision and 
error correction.
3) Back-up and loading of sfored data on disk and tapes in 
preparation for fufure use and any requested manipulation.
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c. Data preparation and manipulation for report generation phase:
1) Up loading of all data previously fed into the computer for the 
purpose of classification, processing and manipulation as the 
preliminary step for report preparation for internal /  external 
parties;
2) Revision and thorough verification of the accuracy of the above 
data and printing of reports that contain incorrect loan 
information, with errors highlighted and reasons given for the 
errors;
3) Correction of errors and preparation of modified data for 
processing and manipulation;
4) Printing of reports on actual loan data and performing 
comparison operations between incoming data on forms and 
that printed out for verification, to include error correction, the 
reasons for the errors, and how to avoid future errors.
5) Preparation and printing of reports on the final status of external 
debt and commitments in various forms and scenarios each 
according to the request received from an internal /  external 
concerned user.
d. Data analysis phase:
Specialized personnel analyzed all data and system’s output on 
external debt. Data included creditor countries (loan providers), 
borrowed foreign currency, pay back installments and 
maturation dates, total external debt figure in relation to GDP 
and total exports, and other key economic indicators. Policy 
makers used such indicators as checks and balances for 
econom ic development.
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Debt Re-scheduling Unit
Due to declining economic conditions, Egypt was unable to pay back 
its external debts, which forced it to reschedule most of these debts. In 
order to do this, a series of procedures were followed in preparation for 
rescheduling with creditor countries. Rescheduling with creditor 
countries took place according to the Paris Club general framework 
and in the presence of representation from the IMF and World Bank. In 
the case of Egypt, the Data Re-scheduling Unit was primarily 
responsible for preparing for such activities in the following manner:
a. It studied the proposed general agreements by creditor countries 
(Paris Club Agreement) in order to understand fully the bases and 
viewpoints on which external debt would be rescheduled, as 
follows:
1) Debt amounts liable for re-scheduling;
2) Period for which debt would be re-scheduled;
3) Debt cut-off date;
4) Credit exemption period and pay back installment period 
resulting from re-scheduling; and
5) Other terms included in the agreements.
b. Data collection:
1) Using data from creditor countries:
a. Classification of incoming data sheets according to local 
banks and debtor agencies.
b. Distribution of data sheets to local banks and debtor agencies 
based on the approval document or letter of guarantee so that 
agency /  bank representatives could revise and compare the 
data to their records and comment as necessary.
c. Data sheet taken back and revised in order to ensure that 
each bank had revised checked, commented on and taken
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the necessary action on the sheets that required changes.
2) Using data from creditor and debtor countries:
a. External debt data sheets generated for each creditor country 
by the external debt unit.
b. Sheets re-typed (using typewriters), revised and approved by 
the responsible person in the re-scheduling unit.
c. Approved sheets distributed to concerned local banks for final 
revision and approval or comment.
d. Sheets sent to creditors (export guarantee agencies), for 
signing following the Paris Club Agreement, for validation and 
cross check and provision of necessary feedback.
e. Correspondence took place directly with foreign export- 
guarantee agencies or foreign embassies in Cairo regarding 
specific comments on debt data sheets.
c. Participation in data validation and verification meetings and
negotiations with creditor countries:
1) Data validation and verification meetings:
a. Delegates representing creditor countries, concerned local 
banks and representatives from the Unit usually attend these 
meetings, during which final data and revisions of figures took 
place before being recorded on the rescheduling data sheets. 
Finally, and after revision, all parties signed the sheets, which 
were then stamped by the CBE stamp.
b. An original copy of the signed rescheduling agreement was 
sent to the LEDD at the CBE Cairo branch to take action for 
payment of rescheduled interests, installments and other 
commitments as soon as the loan matured.
2) Data preparation and follow up:
Requested data on re-scheduled debt amounts were
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prepared by the unit, and follow up on whatever issues or 
modifications in rescheduling amounts was carried out with 
CBE - Cairo branch, foreign export guarantee agencies and 
concerned local banks.
3) Negotiations and agreement signature:
Negotiations concerning rescheduling agreements and their 
signing took place at the Ministry of International Cooperation. 
One or more representatives attended the event from the 
LEDD at the CBE in addition to representatives from other 
concerned agencies. The main role played by the department 
representatives was to revise and check all figures and ensure 
that they were the figures agreed upon in the data verification 
negotiations; in addition, opinion were given on new 
rescheduling burdens. Full copies of the signed rescheduling 
agreements were submitted to the LEDD for execution.
d. Study of proposed re-scheduling agreements:
The unit was supplied with proposed rescheduling agreements that 
were in the process of being signed by creditor countries by the 
Ministry of International Cooperation, where the following took 
place;
1) Review of financial burdens included in the proposed 
agreements (country by country) with a view toward verifying 
interest rate prices and other burdens in order to ensure that 
they m atched the prevailing market interest rates and that they 
were identical to those used in other approved re-scheduling 
agreements.
2) Review of all terms included in the proposed agreements in 
order to ensure that they matched the Paris Club general 
agreement terms.
1 1 3
Strategic Decision Making and the Debt Acquisition Process Prior to 1985 Chapter IV
3) Preparation of an executive summary of the whole process with 
comments and suggestions to be presented to top 
management to approve final concurrence before negotiations 
took place.
General Administration and Secretarial Unit
The General Administration and Secretarial Unit performed the
following:
1. Received and recorded incoming mail in the "Incoming Mail 
Log" and presented it to the director, general manager and unit 
heads.
2. Registered outgoing mail in the "Outgoing Mail Log" and 
forwarded it.
3. Archived all incoming documents from other internal CBE 
department or external sources after notifying all concerned 
employees of their contents.
4. Prepared, ordered and distributed stationary and office supplies 
according to the department’s needs on a regular basis.
5. Prepared annual furniture and other inventory lists.
6. Prepared leave and vacation requests for all employees in the 
department.
7. Handled personnel data files and implemented approved 
changes, e.g., promotion, bonuses, social status, etc.
8. Prepared permits for after-hours work or use of CBE facilities on 
holidays.
9. Handled overtime wage calculations based on net hours 
worked.
10. Handled all word processing and photo copying activities.
11. Managed the general department archiving.
More details on the CBE - LEDD are presented in Appendix IV-A.
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C. The Egyptian Cabinet Information and Decision Support Center 
(IDSC)
1. IDSC Inception
Late in 1984, the Cabinet Minister for Economic Affairs, Dr. Atef Ebeid,8 
expressed interest in exploring the potential of l/DSS to assist the cabinet 
in strategic decision making. The minister identified areas of concern for 
the cabinet at that time. They included improving the effectiveness of 
the cabinet's preparation of its agenda; its consideration of issues and its 
decision making; improving the quality and reliability of information; 
improving the timeliness of decisions; and supporting the country's socio­
economic reform programs. Dr. Ebeid asked Dr. Hisham El Sherif to 
develop a plan to address these challenges.
Following this identification process, the Prime Minister approved a 
preliminary project plan, driven by policy needs and national 
development priorities, to establish the national "Information Project for 
the Cabinet of Ministers” known as "IPCOM” at that time. Later in 1987, 
IPCOM was institutionalised and shifted from being a project to a full- 
fledged center, namely the IDSC.
In 1985, prior to setting up IDSC, data support for the government was 
provided by the Central Statistical Organisation CAPMAS. It was felt that 
CAPMAS provided data but not information and was not focusing on 
decision support. Egypt, like many developing countries, was 
characterised at that time as data rich and information poor. Data 
were available, but they were of questionable reliability and relevance.
8 Dr. Atef Ebied was assigned the responsibility of heading the team responsible for 
negotiating with the Paris club countries, IMF, and the World Bank. He was a key 
figure in the HLEC responsible for coordinating the Egyptian economic reform 
program activities. Moreover, he was the initiator of the Cabinet IDSC, together with 
Hisham El Sherif its chairman, and the cause behind starting the DM&EM program 
using IDSC and the CBE as its team. He is now the minister in charge of the public 
enterprise office concerning with the phase II of the economic reform program and 
focusing mainly on the privatization and public sector reform programs.
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Timely information was not available, and the integrity of information was 
often doubtful.
After the proposed plan for the IDSC was approved, a preliminary but 
intensive effort was mounted to put together a small-qualified support 
staff for the new project. Implementation began in November 1985 
based upon a specific set of priorities defined at that time (El Sherif and 
El Sawy, 1998). In the initial stages there was friction between CAPMAS 
and IDSC. In subsequent years CAPMAS learned to accept the 
existence of IDSC but there was no real co-operation between the two 
institutions. Figure IV-7 shows how the Cabinet IDSC became an integral 
part of the decision making process for the cabinet, its affiliated ministries 
and other government organisations. IDSC acted as a think tank and a 
catalyst that possessed both the infra /  info structure necessary to study, 
analyse and recommend scenarios for different decision-makers 
(Kattab, Interview-1993).
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Decision Making Process After 19859
2. IDSC O b jec tives
The IDSC’s objectives were centred around four basic missions:
• Firstly, to develop information and decision support systems for 
the Cabinet and top policy makers in Egypt;
• Secondly, to support the establishment of decision support 
systems/centres in different ministries and make more efficient 
and effective use of the available information resources;
• Thirdly, to initiate, encourage and support informatics projects 
that could accelerate managerial and technological 
development of Egyptian ministries, sectors and governorates; 
and
9 El Sherif, H. and El Sawy, OJ988.
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• Finally, to participate in international co-operation activities in 
the areas of information and decision support.
The framework of the IDSC was divided into three levels. The first level 
represented the Cabinet base where information and decision support 
systems projects were developed to support the strategic policy and 
decision making processes in development planning. The second level 
represented the national nodes where IDSC links the Cabinet with 
existing information sources within the ministries, national organisations 
and agencies and academic institutions and research centers. The third 
level represented the international nodes where IDSC extended its 
activities by accessing major databases world-wide through state-of-the- 
art information technology and telecommunications facilities.
3. IDSC’s M anagem ent Approach
Project implementation for IDSC’s clients followed different modalities. 
These included:
• In-house development in which IDSC internal teams provided full 
life- cycle development of the system or project;
• Joint implementation in which joint teams were formed with client 
ministries, governorates, or others around a specific project; and
• Subcontracting /  outsourcing of external consultants, experts or third 
party companies to share responsibility for a specific project or a 
part of it. The choice of implementation modality for a specific 
project was based on a set of established criteria: cost, time, 
expected strategic impact, and the availability of relevant expertise. 
Reliable, high-quality database development was usually available 
and was, therefore, subcontracted; however more high level 
technical systems such as Geographic Information Systems (GIS) 
were not.
• Part of the IDSC’s success can be attributed to the tailored
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management approach that IDSC followed, which mainly 
depended on:
a. Two-tiered teams
Initially, this tactic was followed because of the significant shortage of
individuals who could straddle both the technology and the 
bureaucracy of IDSC's government clients. An IDSC development 
team consisted of at least two people: one who was technically 
com petent (typically a young college graduate) and another who 
had in-depth experienced with bureaucracies (an older person with 
government experience). This tactic, apart from significantly 
accelerating the implementation of projects and avoiding technical 
failures forced a dialogue between technical and non-technical 
staffers and, more often than not, resulted in hybridisation of both.
b. Account executives
This tactic involved the designation of specific IDSC members as
responsible for the liaison between a particular client and the IDSC. 
This involved responsibility for all IS-related activities for that account 
and building a stronger IDSC-client relationship. A visiting expert10 
suggested that the best means to develop qualified account 
executives is to hybridise graduates of two-tiered teams.
c. Crisis m anagem ent teams
This tactic came into being as it became apparent that the requests
from IDSC's major clients - the President and the Cabinet - were often 
burdened with both urgency and criticality. Crisis response required yet 
another mix of skills (such as grace under pressure and empathetic 
support) that were natured through hybridisation.
10 Professor Paul Gray of Claremont University, USA.
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4. IDSC's challenges faced
IDSC's management of the development, design and implementation of 
decision support systems in development planning discussed above 
reveal a number of findings that can be generalized as a set of steps and 
procedures for future use of decision support systems in similar cases.
IDSC adopted a two phased approach for the implementation and 
institutionalization of its issue-based decision support systems projects. The 
first phase was concerned with the realization of information and 
decision support systems representing the model building phase while 
the second was concerned with the institutionalization process 
representing the management phase. The implementation phase dealt 
with the provision of policy and decision support, which was divided into 
three parts.
• First, the identification of policy needs and the full mobilization of 
human and technical resources to be able to achieve effective 
response and support;
• Second, the identification of decision areas and information 
requirements, which dealt with the translation of planned policy 
support into the specific issues of concern to the Cabinet; and
• Third, the formulation of projects with specific goals and dedicated 
human and technical resources for each potential area of policy 
and/or decision support;
The project’s teams were selected to provide fast responses that are 
focused on results and actions. They consisted of two-tiered teams 
comprised of government bureaucrats and professional technocrats 
who were able to deal with bureaucracy and knowledgeable 
professionals in state-of-the-art information and decision support 
technologies. These two-tiered teams were hybrid teams that 
represented one of the key success factors in bridging the application 
gap between systems builders and applications users.
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The institutionalization phase dealt with IDSC's experience with designing, 
developing and implementing decision support systems for development 
planning purposes. It suggested that managing institutionalization is as 
important as model building, and that institutionalisation is a 
complementary and integrated process that accompanies systems 
development, design and implementation. It was comprised of 
adaptation, diffusion, adoption, monitoring and tracking, value 
assessment and evaluation of decision support systems.
This practical experience led to the identification of a number of 
challenges related to: (i) strategic decision making at the Cabinet level, 
(ii) decision support systems, and (iii) the implementation and 
institutionalization of I/DSS (El Sherif and El Sawy, 1988). These challenges 
were classified as follows:
• In strategic decision making, the challenges included the efficient 
and effective use of scarce resources; attempts to achieve socio­
economic development planning; the crisis management mode of 
operation; conflict resolution; and the formulation, development and 
implementation of policy reform programs. Moreover, they included 
the ill-structured nature of processes; the turbulent and dynamic 
environment; and finally the fact that strategic decision making is 
usually a group effort rather than an individual one.
• In decision support systems, the challenges included managing the 
development of multiple information and decision support systems; 
the institutionalization of such systems within their application contexts; 
the development of decision support systems interfaces; and the 
availability of decision support systems tools and generators relevant 
to different industries.
• In the implementation and institutionalization of l/DSS in practice, IDSC 
faced a number of barriers caused by lack of user involvement; 
inadequacy of model evaluation; problem definition; resistance to
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change; and the diffusion of new model-based systems. Moreover, 
they included untimely, unresponsive and inadequate information 
and non-responsiveness to user needs. Additionally, there was the 
lack of top management support; lack of vital continuous 
communication; poor documentation; and language problems.
5. Services offered to fhe cabinet and ministerial commitfees:-
• Infrastructure development: Human resource, equipment acquisition, 
and financial contributions
• Systems development: To help the different ministries establish their 
own specialized decision support systems and databases.
• International database access: The IDSC provided information from 
on-line international databases and subsequently analyzed, 
correlated, and structured it according to the needs of decision­
makers. IDSC has on-line access to international database hosts such 
as I.P. Sharp (Canada), Data Resources Inc. (USA), Dialog (USA), 
Data-star (Switzerland) and Info-line (UK), allowing it to retrieve 
information on socio-economics, business, investment, trade and 
technology.
• Access to local sources: Locally, the IDSC synthesized multi-sectoral 
information provided by ministries and national agencies and 
structured it in a way which met the specific needs of Egypt's 
decision-makers.
•  Consultation and advisory support: IDSC professionals worked closely 
with top government policy makers, as well as with managers of 
decision support systems and information centers in different 
ministries, to advise on the best methodological approaches, tools, 
and techniques required to implement information projects and 
decision support services.
• Crisis management: The IDSC established a crisis management facility
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and crisis management strategic support systems to enable top 
government officials and ministries to respond quickly and effectively 
to crisis situations.
The services discussed above qualified IDSC as the l/DSS provider to 
the Cabinet. Addressing multi-sectoral issues, IDSC’s initial focus was on 
20% of the issues that constituted 80% of the problems of Egypt. Those 
issues revolved mainly around poor economic decisions that led to the 
malfunctioning of the economy. The topic of our research, decision 
making in external debt management, was one of the most important 
agenda items slotted for discussion by the Cabinet. For IDSC, debt 
management was like other programs representing a subject 
classification for an area that needed (i) build-up of infrastructure; (ii) 
build-up of info-structure; and (iii) build-up of human capabilities that 
could utilize points i and ii in leveraging the decision making process for 
top policy makers. The result was the inception and realization of the 
DM&EM program.
More details on the Cabinet IDSC is presented in Appendix IV-B.
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D. Conclusion (the Beginning):
We would like to conclude this chapter with a summary of the 
recommendations that represented the beginning of Egyptian debt 
management revolution. This revolution began with several joint 
activities between the CBE and the Cabinet IDSC and was launched 
by invitation from the Prime Minister and the Governor of fhe CBE. The 
invitation was extended to all Ministers involved in overall Egyptian 
economic reform and the structural adjustment program (HLEC). The 
l/DSS technological capabilities and power that could be adopted to 
help support, shape and leverage the decision making process in a 
number of related areas and specially debt management had been 
demonstrated. The result of this meeting was full support from the HLEC 
for program’s foundation, a set of instructions and recommendations 
that led to the formulation of the DM&EM program nucleus. Under the 
supervision of the Deputy Prime Minister and Governor of the Central 
Bank of Egypt, Dr. Salah Hammed, and the Cabinet Minister for 
Economic Affairs, Dr. Atef Ebied11, both CBE and IDSC put together a 
detailed charter and action plan. This plan was a necessity for building 
a state-of-the-art Egyptian debt management office starting with the 
DM&EM program. Below is a list of the initial key steps that were defined 
and followed by both organizations and approved by top 
management (i.e., Dr. Hammed and Dr. Ebied):-
11 Both were interviewed as part of our case studies conducted for the research of 
this thesis.
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1. Compilation and validation of a computerized database utilizing 
the following:
a. Formation of high-level, well-selected working group for 
establishing the appropriate coding standards and procedures in 
order to ensure full compatibility and harmony of the external 
debt components (e.g., economic sector, loan purpose, 
administrative sector);
b. Formation of a working group (2-3 employees) to revise and 
check pre-registered data sheets on loan terms (Form 1, Loans); 
and
c. Ensuring that the revision/check process m atched the new 
standards and procedures produced by the first working group.
2. Development of work flow and procedure systems in the CBE/LEDD 
department to ensure full automation through phased 
implementation as follows:
a. Full training and staff awareness programs in concerned 
department and related departments on the use, capabilities and 
importance of the computer in day-to-day office work.
b. Intensive state-of-the-art training courses and skill building 
programs for the Registration and Technical Research Unit in all 
aspects of work activities in order to enhance productivity and 
output. The aim was to prepare this unit to be fully responsible for 
the external debt database and guard against duplications or 
misconceptions.
c. Intensive training courses and development programs for the 
Reports and Statistical Bulletin Production Group to maximize 
computer capabilities in producing quality periodic requests. The
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reports were of three types:
1) CBE internal working reports,
2) reports and statistical bulletins for concerned agencies, and
3) reports and statistical bulletins for analysts and decision 
makers support.
3. Increasing the range of automated systems usage by linkups to 
important data sources (on-line databases); the development of 
the existing system through the spread of personal computers in CBE 
branches; and the following:
a. Commercial Banks;
b. Ministry of International Cooperation;
c. Ministry of Economy;
d. Ministry of Finance; and
e. Others;
and the development of data interchange mechanisms between the 
above sources and the General Loans and External Commitments 
Department.
4. Approving the CBE’s request for assistance and support by the IDSC 
for full data collection, consolidation and verification from:
a. The four commercial banks on buyers’ and suppliers’ credit 
facilities and direct loans;
b. The working banks in Cairo on non-guaranteed private sector 
loan data;
c. The Ministry of Finance on used and paid government loan 
installment credit and debits;
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d. The Ministry of International Cooperation on credits and debits for 
installment loans provided by international, regional and Arab 
agencies;
e. Other ministries and authorities on private loan installment credits 
and debits;
f. The Financial Notes General Department at the CBE on total 
bonds and commercial papers with varying and fixed prices;
g. The Letter of Guarantee Department at the CBE on direct loans 
data;
h. The Foreign Affairs Department at the CBE on deposits and loans 
received from the IMF;
i. The External Debt Department at the CBE on government loans 
and rescheduling agreements data;
j. The American Embassy on U.S. external debt; and
k. The General Audit Authority on total external debt and 
expenditures.
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Egyptian debt management was divided among a variety of offices in 
the Egyptian government including the CBE, the Ministry of Planning, 
the Ministry of International Cooperation, the Ministry of Finance, 
Economy, Defense and others. The Central Bank approved and 
monitored suppliers and buyers’ credit and short term borrowing by the 
Public Sector. The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation 
negotiated most program-related loans for the central government 
and was responsible for monitoring the use of loans.
Within the Central Bank, external debt data arising from the operations 
of the entities mentioned above was collected in several operational 
departments. This information was centralized in the LEDD in the 
manually maintained files and registers of the CBE. This body of 
information could not be made use of conveniently to forecast 
external payment obligations, when, for example, exchange rates and 
international interest rates varied frequently and the manual system 
lacked flexibility. Similarly, flexible aggregation of external debt data, 
which was required for balance of payments analysis and foreign 
exchange budgeting, was cumbersome and time-consuming. 
Consequently, the types of comprehensive debt reports that are so 
vital to economic planners and policy makers were not available.
By 1986, and with the initiation of the Government of Egypt’s (GOE) 
comprehensive economic reform program, Egypt requested leading 
technical assistance agencies specializing in economic reform in 
general and debt management specifically to render assistance. A 
team of external debt management experts, from the IMF, World Bank 
and the UNCTAD, made themselves available to the CBE and IDSC. 
They analyzed the Egyptian external debt process and concluded that 
a need existed for (DM&EM, 1987):
1. Increased control and monitoring of external debt operations 
and improvement in the approval and disbursement process;
128
Strategic Decision Making and the Debt Acquisition Process Prior to 1985 Chapter IV
2. Centralization of the country’s external debt database in the 
LEDD and its computerization;
3. better utilization of computing resources in supporting the 
decision making process rather than their being used solely for 
electronic archiving;
4. Better identification of roles and responsibilities for the agencies 
involved in the process in addition to enhanced linkage and 
sharing among themselves; and
5. Better flow of regular reports /  scenarios on external debt 
operations to the agencies involved in the formulation and 
implementation policy in this area.
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Chapter V 
Information /  Decision Support Systems in Debt M anagem ent
(The Egyptian Experience)
A. Introduction
In the mid 1980s the Egyptian economy has been experiencing a 
growing scarcity of foreign exchange. Sharply deteriorating external 
conditions have been an important factor behind this situation. Oil 
exports, workers' remittances, Suez Canal tariffs, tourist receipts and 
foreign financial assistance have all declined. The result has been a 
drastic reduction in import capacity, low economic growth and large 
external imbalances. Consequently, Egypt has been unable to meet 
all of its external financial obligations. Moreover, foreign banks have 
reduced their exposure and shortened maturities, while export cover 
agencies have taken an increasingly cautious position and several 
have stopped credit guarantees. Capital inflows, therefore, have 
declined considerably1. At the same time, the US$ 44 billion Egyptian 
debt was considered among the world's top five in relation to the GDP. 
If fully serviced, interest and repayment of principal would consume 
more than half of the country's export revenues (Hammed, interview - 
1993).
Furthermore, the difficult balance of payment situation of recent years 
has caused Egypt to assume a rapidly increasing external debt burden. 
It is estimated that debt service in 19852 was over 25 percent of Egypt’s 
total export earnings. To ensure that Egypt's international credit 
worthiness is maintained, external debt must be carefully managed. 
This requires not only that debt service obligations are paid on time but
1 In part from the DM&EM project document, IDSC, Cairo, October 1986.
2 Before any debt m anagement reform effort or the inception of the DM&EM 
program, (the "before stage" described in Chapter IV).
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also that new debt is contracted on terms and in amounts which are 
compatible with Egypt's payment capacity. Proposed new borrowing 
should be analyzed in the light of existing obligations before being 
approved. Policy makers, therefore, require information on the debt 
services profile of existing debt; disbursement programming for 
committed but un-disbursed funds; available sources of financing and 
their terms; and immediate payments obligations.
To help overcome the foreign exchange constraint, and set the basis 
for sustained economic growth and employment creation, the 
Government of Egypt is reinforcing an overall economic reform 
program started in 1986, which includes major liberalization of the 
economy and a comprehensive structural adjustment plan. In addition 
a process was initiated of continuous consultations and discussions with 
the IMF, the World Bank and other financial institutions and creditors to 
help mobilize resources to close the external resource gap. Successful 
management of the resource gap was at the crossroads of economic 
recovery. In addition to the implementation of sound macro- 
economic policies to favorably affect key variables in external trade 
accounts, improved balance of payments performance was also 
dependent on strengthening external debt management. In recent 
years, factor services (interest payment) and principal debt repayment 
have grown in proportion to other items. Although the country's 
general stock of debt cannot be modified except in a program of 
debt rescheduling, external liabilities management can help achieve, 
over time, a net debt reduction through better targeting of net 
borrowing for productive purposes, debt conversions (debt swaps) and 
risk management mechanisms.
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B. Debt M anagem ent and Economic Monitoring Program
The Debt Management and Economic Monitoring Program (DM&EM) 
was designed and built to contribute and strengthen the basis of 
economic management, but more directly it would reinforce the 
Egyptian authorities’ efforts to improve balance of payments 
performance. The establishment of an effective mechanism to 
manage the country’s external debt would support the objective of 
maximizing the domestic return of foreign borrowing which would be 
consistent with efforts to narrow the resource gap.
This program was formed as an integral part of the country’s major 
economic program, which emphasizes institution building in order to 
enhance the economic, management and financial engineering 
capacities of the GOE. Furthermore, it supports the GOE in intensifying 
the economic adjustment program, enhancing the external use and 
allocation of resources, improving Egypt’s credit worthiness and 
developing an instrument for hedging against interest and foreign 
exchange risks.
?. People and Reasons Behind Initiating the Program
Assigned the official responsibility from the Cabinet HLEC, the Cabinet 
Minister for Economic Affairs, Dr. Atef Ebied, and his econom ic advisor, 
Dr. Shawki Farag, becam e responsible for coordination and 
negotiations with the IMF and the World Bank. Additionally, a resident 
IMF advisor at that time, with the full support and help of a number of 
organizations, wrote a detailed descriptive report on the situation 
(Khattab, interview - 1993). His recommendations, along with other 
indications, helped determine the strategy for initiating the DM&EM 
program. It was, therefore, one of the HLEC ministers who initiated and 
supported the founding of the DM&EM and not the CBE or its governor
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as it might logically be assumed (Khattab, interview - 1993). The 
governor of the CBE began to participate in setting up the program 
later, after the general framework and guidelines had already been 
established and the benefits of the program started to show feasibility 
and clear impact. We do not mean to imply that the CBE did not 
participate in formulating the objectives, scope and deliverables. In 
the beginning, the CBE indirectly contributed by answering specific 
questions put to them without the benefit of viewing the overall 
program mandate; afterwards they participated fully in the program 
and even housed the facility on their premises (Kaddah, interview - 
1993).
During the course of our empirical research for this thesis, we were able 
to identify a number of reasons that led to the initiation of the DM&EM 
program. We have presented these reasons in full in Chapter IV, but 
would like to further discuss, in brief, some of them here;
• The vital need for a body and a system that could regulate the 
external borrowing process. This process was conducted in a 
haphazard manner in the sense that it lacked any kind of 
framework or modality that could govern or at least guide the 
process of external borrowing, the use of foreign financing and the 
ability to pay back the loan. There were no regulations for such a 
process whatsoever. Any organization or agency had the right and 
ability to contract for new loans directly, without referring to any 
coordinating body such as the Central Bank or at least by adhering 
to a national foreign borrowing strategy.
• During the mid 1980's there were tremendous surpluses of funds and 
products (mainly consumer products and not capita l goods for 
development) which creditors offered to lend, mostly without 
studying the lending terms, feasibility or borrowers' market credibility. 
To creditors this was a good long-term investment and an excellent
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strategy for disposing of their excess products and services.
• During the second half of the 1980's there were efforts as well as 
funds from international agencies such as the IMF, World Bank and 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) /  UNCTAD directed 
towards solving such chronic problems in developing countries. 
Many countries, including Egypt, were attracted by the possibility of 
solving external debt problems and the availability of funds for 
instituting a debt management program and started to establish a 
debt management function of sorts.
• Egyptian debt decision-makers viewed the need for such a 
program as crucial. The reason behind this was the fact that it was 
impossible to enter into any economic reform program and/or debt 
re-scheduling negotiations with a manual system and without 
knowing the actual amount of existing debt and its composition3.
2. Program Historical Evolution
The management of the DM&EM Program views program evolution as 
follows:
• In November 1986, the Program team began compiling various 
plans to come up with the program ’s perspective, objective, goals 
and deliverables;
• By January 1987, the HLEC and the Program team were notified that 
Egypt was scheduled to meet with its creditors at the Paris Club in 
May 1987. As a result, a highly qualified team from the CBE and the 
Cabinet IDSC was formulated and by February 1987 all related
3 According to Mr. Khaled El Sayed, program technical manager, " ...the main 
problem in our debt stock is not the complex figures but rather its numerous origins, 
terms, credit sources (creditors), users (internal borrowers), borrowing currencies,etc. It 
is hard to believe that, before program inception an agency or public sector 
organization was allowed to externally contract new debt without any guidelines or 
control procedures to follow. For that reason it was next to impossible to respond to 
an inquiry or evaluate a proposal. It used to take us from two to three months to try to 
respond and the final result was usually inaccurate..."
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hardware and software (including the installation of the UNCTAD 
system4) were already in place and operational. The team worked 
unceasingly for three months and successfully managed to enter 
the complete debt stock (5000 different-nature loans) into the 
database5. It was clear to program management that such a 
database would be a shock to Egypt’s creditors, the IMF and the 
Paris Club representatives. They had no way of knowing that in such 
a short time data on 5000 loans could be accurately complied and 
used to strengthen Egypt’s negotiating capabilities. Previously, 
Egyptian’s debt decision makers were forced to depend on a 
manual system which was not more than 60% accurate and very 
slow in responding to inquiries (days, even weeks, versus hours) ( 
Hammed, Interview -  1993). For the first time, during the Paris Club 
meetings, the Egyptian negotiating team was able to negotiate 
and correct creditor's figures and terms in addition to intellectually 
evaluate proposed options and scenarios in a fast, responsive and 
objective mode (Khattab, Interview -  1993).
3. Program Objectives and Phases6
The strategic objective of the program was to implement proper and 
functional debt management for the GOE through the establishment 
of a debt office /  technical secretariat which would ultimately feed 
positively into Egypt's economic reform programs.
4 Presented in details in point # of this section.
5 An example was given by Mr. Khaled El Sayed:" ...Yesterday, a high level expert
group from the government of Bangladesh visited us. They cam e to study our model 
and to explore potential areas of cooperation. During discussions, we learned that 
they had started to build a centralized debt database two years ago. To date  they 
had only entered 200 loans out of a total debt stock of 600. Comparing the above 
progress rate to ours (entered 5000 loans in less than three months) we determined 
that there was no comparison., we were far ahead in all factors
6 Examples of debt management cases matching the above-stated phased object­
ives list are thoroughly presented and analyzed in sections B and C of chapter VI and 
in appendix Vl-A.
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The development objectives of the program were to strengthen the 
bases of econom ic decision making and enhance the prospects for 
sound econom ic management by assisting the government in 
improving the quality and reliability of its debt management 
information systems. As for the published immediate objectives of the 
program they are as follows7:
Phase I: Initiation and Base Building (October 1986 till November 1990)
• Building a computer-based centralized database at the CBE that 
would enhance and support the essential management and policy­
making needs of the government;
• Guaranteeing the linkage and the cooperation between the 
Cabinet, the CBE, Ministries and banks through a computer network 
managing foreign debts;
• Improving the systems and procedures employed by the GOE in its 
collection, processing and reporting of external debt information; 
and
• Setting up legislations and rules that guarantee optimum utilization 
of loans and facilities.
Phase II: Institutionalization (February 1991 -  January 1995)
• Leveraging good management of external debt liabilities that 
would help in :
- Debt reduction through better targeting;
- Borrowing for productive purposes; and
- Debt conversions and risk shifting.
• Supporting the implementation of sound macro-economic policies 
to favorably affect key variables in the external trade accounts;
7 Source: Debt Management and Economic Monitoring Program brochure, Cairo, 1991.
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• Institutionalizing external debt management to build up in-house 
capabilities to support the GOE in intensifying the economic 
adjustment program, enhance external resources use and 
allocation, help Egypt improve its credit worthiness and develop 
instruments for hedging interest and foreign exchange risks;
• Assisting the GOE to establish policy guidelines on external debt, 
screen proposals for new borrowing, consider recommendations for 
debt conversion and risk minimization and supervise and monitor 
overall developments related to external debt management, with 
emphasis on strengthening the overall balance of payment;
• Helping in reforming the foreign exchange system, reduction of the 
budget deficit with the improvement of the monetary policy and 
the formulation of an investment program of appropriate size and 
with appropriate priorities;
• Auditing and taking corrective actions to strengthen the debt 
database, particularly with respect to short-term debt and direct 
disbursements to suppliers by lenders;
• Reinforcing the Egyptian authorities' efforts to improve the balance 
of payment performance and stimulate economic growth through 
the establishment of an effective mechanism to manage the 
country's external debt;
• Promoting cooperation among other developing countries through 
a number of international organizations specializing in the areas of 
development activities and technology transfer (e.g., the UNDP, the 
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development [AFESD], and 
UNCTAD) by undertaking developmental activities in the region; 
and
• Establishing a Technical Secretariat (TS) in the CBE and developing 
its in-house capabilities enabling it to handle, achieve and follow-up 
the implementation of the program objectives.
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4. Program  S cope
The DM&EM program scope focuses on directly providing and 
supporting DSS for top policy and decision makers such as the 
President, the Prime Minister, the HLEC, Ministers and other Cabinet 
members. Indirectly, it supports related individuals and institutions such 
as public and commercial banks, economic and financial institutions 
who act as cornerstones to the overall desired objective. Figure V-1 
demonstrates the scope of this program:
M inisters
High Level Economic 
Com m ittee
The Central Bank o f Egypt
Debt Management Unit
National Economic & 
Financial Institutions
National Research 
Institutions
President’s Office
Other Cabinet 
Members (advisors)
Commercial and 
Public Banks
International Economic 
& Financial Institutions
Prime M inister
Figure V-1
CBE - Debt Management Inter-Institutional Framework*
8 Debt Management and Economic Monitoring Program Brochure, IDSC, Cairo, 1991.
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5. Program Characteristics
a. Institutional Structure
The DM&EM Program operated under the overall supervision of the 
HLEC and more directly under the Ministry for Cabinet Affairs and 
Administrative Development (represented in the Cabinet IDSC) with the 
CBE being the operational counterpart agency. The Central Bank 
appointed a program director that was responsible for the overall 
execution of the program and effective co-ordination among all 
involved parties. The prime responsibility for reconciliation and the 
computerization of the external debt database was vested in the CBE- 
LEDD with technical assistance from IDSC.
A teamwork approach was adopted in the implementation of this 
program and continuous consultations took place among the different 
government agencies, the UNDP, Cairo, and UNCTAD in Geneva. The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) was 
kept informed on the progress of the program, receiving copies of the 
progress reports for comment and participating in the evaluation of 
achievements.
b. Overall program approach
Prior to 1985, debt management responsibility was fragmented among 
a variety of agencies within the government, most of which had no 
familiarity with computerized systems. In an informal survey of 
managers’ and policy-makers’ need for debt information, it was 
observed that managers lacked familiarity with automated systems 
making it difficult to assess the real requirements for the proposed debt 
management system. Also, the urgency of the program argued 
against the procurement of a sophisticated, custom-tailored approach 
to debt system development. Accordingly, the government decided to 
adopt a phased approach to the development of systems for
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managing external indebtedness, taking advantage of existing 
software for the initial phase, and considering more tailored 
approaches after debt managers had reasonable exposure to the 
disciplines and capabilities of computerized systems.
Computer systems procured under this program were capable of 
meeting the government's most urgent needs for timely and 
comprehensive debt data processing and reporting; nevertheless, it 
was recognized that no existing package would be capable of 
meeting all of the government's needs (Kaddah, interview -1993). It 
was envisioned that, within three to five years, a re-evaluation of the 
government's debt management system requirements would point to a 
new and significantly enhanced debt system. In anticipation of this 
likelihood, the government sought a system in the initial phase of the 
program that permitted the transfer of loan data files to any systems 
developed in the future with a minimum of manual re-keying of loan 
information.
c. Overall program task areas
The DM&EM program overall tasks can be viewed as follows:
• Improvement of legal, institutional and administrative procedures 
within the government to ensure the flow of timely and 
comprehensive debt information to a central debt office;
• Implementation of appropriate computer systems to capture, 
process and report debt data in formats that would support the 
essential management and policy-making needs of the 
government;
• Recruitment and training of qualified staff to administer the new 
debt management procedures and systems; and
• A debt audit to validate debt information maintained in the new 
debt system.
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6. Program Challenges Faced
Program management was challenged with fully understanding the 
problems leading up to its development, and with taking into 
consideration other indirect factors (mainly socio-economic). 
Management was, however, capable of fully employing the latest 
information technology tools and techniques due to their qualifications 
and experience in this field. The real challenge was to marry the 
problem or the “context of application” to the technology (either 
ready-made or tailored). In a remarkably short time (less than 1 year), 
the learning curve for program personnel became steeper and their 
ability to respond to almost all inquiries within a specified time limit and 
with a high degree of quality becam e the standard.
During its initiation, development and implementation, the DM&EM 
Program was faced with four critical challenges that needed to be met 
if the program was to be a success. These challenges fall under the 
following categories: 1) strategic decision making; 2) decision support 
systems; 3) barriers to management science /  operation research and 
decision support system (MS/OR/DSS) in practice; and 4) 
institutionalization challenges. Examining these challenges more 
closely, we find the following:
• First, strategic decision making challenges included the ill-structured 
nature of processes, the turbulent and dynamic environment of 
decision making and the fact that strategic decision making is 
usually a group effort rather than an individual one;
• Second, decision support system challenges included supporting 
rather than replacing managerial judgments, fast response to user 
involvement, flexibility and adaptability, and introducing prototype 
approaches to better understand organizational decision making;
• Third, barriers to implementation of MS/OR included lack of user
involvement; inadequacy of model evaluation, and problem
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definition, in addition to untimely, unresponsive, inadequate data 
and non-responsiveness to user needs; and 
• Fourth, institutionalization challenges included overcoming 
resistance to change, managing the process of change, adapting 
the new model-based systems, diffusing knowledge about the use 
of new models and monitoring the adoption of new systems and 
their impacts on both the individual and the organization.
The model developed by the Cabinet IDSC and CBE showed that the 
institutionalization of decision support systems was synonymous with 
continuous and effective use of model-based DSS. It required 
continuous adaptation, diffusion, adoption and assessment of strategic 
DSS impact. Furthermore, managing institutionalization of strategic DSS 
requires overcoming a combination of the challenges discussed above 
(El Sherif and El Sawy, 1988).
7. Program Main Users and Targeted Beneficiaries
The DM&EM program was designed to serve a wide range of users and 
institutions. It focused on top level strategic policy and decision-makers, 
mainly HLEC, providing them with the support needed for their decision 
making. Additionally, the program served Egypt's President who was a 
regular user from almost its inception and who depended on the 
program for accurate, timely and reliable information and decision 
support services. In this respect, the power of timely and accurate 
information, in addition to the program’s scenario generation facility, 
allowed the President to respond rapidly to major decisions, changes 
and challenges. Today, the President has a complete view of the 
country’s total debt status and has access to tools and techniques that 
allow him to maneuver during negotiation (Ebied, interview -1993).
It is worth mentioning that during one of his televised interviews with an 
international television channel, following successful implementation of
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the first phase of the economic reform program, the President 
acknowledged the efforts and systems that enabled him and the GOE 
to analyze Egytp's real debt status and globally /  bilaterally negotiate 
the country's future obligations.
Other users, such as the head and other members of the HLEC, i.e., the 
Prime Minister and ministers, frequently use the program facilities and 
receive backup from the Cabinet IDSC.
Some examples of users from the HLEC are as follows9:
• Dr. Atef Sedky, the Prime Minister, who mainly uses the program to 
monitor, follow-up and direct the work of the HLEC. The service 
provided by the Program to the Prime Minister is in generating highly 
aggregate reports and decision support scenarios on very specific 
issues. Such scenarios are in the form of suggested solutions (number 
of options) to a problem and the impact of each if implemented. 
Usually, a scenario combines numeric information, graphical 
representation and text explaining the findings. It is worth 
mentioning that the Prime Minister depends heavily on advisors and 
support staff due to the wide range of issues he is involved in.
• Dr. Atef Ebeid, the Minister of Cabinet Affairs and Minister of State 
for Administrative Development, the initiator of the program, is 
considered to be a heavy user of program services. He is a very 
visionary and professional person who is not easily satisfied with what 
is directly presented to him but consistently requests more depth in 
the current program and addition of new dimensions.
• Dr. Saleh Hammed, the deputy Prime Minister and the Governor of 
the CBE. Dr. Hammed depends heavily on his deputies and advisors 
who are themselves heavy users requiring intensive support, detailed 
reports and scenarios, from the program. These outputs from the
9 Collective views from empirical interviews with program users and staff, Cairo, 1993.
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program are used to provide summary reports to the Governor, who 
is a strategy-minded person, heavily concerned with details. Before 
becoming the Governor of the CBE he was the Minister of Finance.
• Yousry Mostafa, Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade, who 
although not a regular user himself, does require status reports and 
aggregate figure sheets from the program. Dr. Mostafa’s role is 
more geared towards shaping and dealing with foreign trade 
policy.
• Mohammed El Razzaz, Minister of Finance, infrequent user of the 
program due to the fact that his ministry operates its own systems. 
These systems deal with short-term data, i.e., the amount that will be 
paid on a loan for the upcoming year or other given period. The 
Ministry of Finance’s use of the program is for validation and cross 
checking of its system’s outputs.
• Other ministries include the Ministry of Transport and 
Telecommunication, Ministry of Electricity and Power, and Minister of 
Agriculture. These ministries represent 80% of the country’s total 
debt, i.e., public or publicly guaranteed debt. It is vital that the 
program serve these main debt consumers and create the 
necessary awareness by setting up a full fledge capability in each 
of the above ministries. This capability include data collection, debt 
service monitoring, staff training and periodic tailored reports 
generation, all of which are needed by top management in their 
decision making.
8. Program Deliverables and Outputs
a. Program deliverables
DM&EM program deliverables started with the production of quarterly 
bulletins that provided information on a regular basis. After that the 
program started to focus on satisfying user requests, which mainly
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involved answering inquiries on forecasting and programming for 
calculating future debt burden. One good example of these requests 
are inquiries that were initiated by the Governor of the CBE, which 
becam e a regular product because of its usefulness in monitoring and 
controlling external deb t10.
Egyptian decision-makers correlated the beginning of DM&EM 
program first phase with the commencement of the negotiation 
process both with international financial agencies and bilateral creditor 
countries. In their opinion, the programs’ outputs and deliverables were 
shaped through the follows: -
• The general Paris Club agreement and bilateral negotiations with 
creditor countries. Each country had its laws and regulations on 
which terms and conditions of the bilateral agreement were built. 
Such bilateral differences had be accommodated by the 
program;11
• Decision makers and the program team were faced with a complex 
structure of multi-version agreements with different terms and 
conditions. Each of these terms and conditions required specially 
tailored scenarios and support services;
• Given this complexity, it was extremely difficult to process and 
simultaneously respond to proposals from different creditors while at 
the same time choosing the best options. The difficulty stemmed 
from the massive number of suggestions proposed and the complex 
terms for each generated by each creditor. Decision makers faced 
varying options such as, dropping part of its debt and paying off the 
balance or dropping part and rescheduling the rest ..etc. They were 
faced with the difficulty of choosing what would be better for the 
country given the overall macro-economic framework? (Kaddah,
10 Examples of DM&EM program deliverables are thoroughly presented and analyzed 
in sections B and C of chapter VI and in appendices IV-A-2 and Vl-A.
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interview -1993).
• Program output regularity was not affected or interrupted unless 
users requested certain changes or the program management 
determines that its is no longer effective and /  or influential and /  or 
used by decision makers. An example of such case would be the 
portfolio of debt management indicators developed around a 
certain problem such as the balance of payment deficit. The 
developed indicators are presented in a form allowing decision 
makers to think and manipulate different scenarios and choose the 
best given that they know preciously the impact of the chosen 
scenario12. According to program personnel, this process required 
continuous consultations, assessment and definition by current and 
potential users (Ezz, Interview -  1993). It is worth mentioning that 
support started with response to a specific request in the form of 
several printed scenarios. Later it developed to support more 
advanced with qualified program personnel equipped with the 
latest technology (notebooks) poised to provide immediate 
response to any type of support requested by decision makers 
during any mission or negotiation process. This remarkable change 
in credibility has completely re-shaped Egypt's image in front of its 
creditors and other international monetary agencies. The real 
reason behind this change was availability of an accurate and 
reliable database and significant decrease in the response time 
from receiving a request to answering it (weeks versus hours) 
(Kaddah, interview -1993).
11 For examples please refer to section C-3 of chapter VI.
12 For examples please refer to appendices l-A and VI-A-2.
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b. Program outputs
The program ’s outputs and activities have been combined to highlight 
the parties responsible for each of the steps needed to achieve a 
given output.
Output 1
Establishing and institutionalizing the TS for debt management. 
Activities Responsible Party
Organizational structure and location in CBE IDSC/CBE.
Recruitment of consultants (local, foreign)
Definition of sfaff functions and work programs, 
methodology, procedures and interfaces 
(Local, international)
IDSC/CBE.
Consultants.
Procurement of equipment and recruitment of IDSC/CBE/ 
personnel Consultants.
Start-up and operation CBE/Consultants.
Design and execution of training programs IDSC/Consultants.
Output 2 
Refinement of database and information network
Activities Responsible Party
Auditing and taking corrective actions to
strengthen debt databases, particularly
with respect to short-term debt and
direct disbursements to suppliers by lenders IDSC/CBE.
Identification of entities to be automated 
(Beneficiaries) IDSC.
Assessment of needs of individual beneficiary
and interfacing IDSC/Benef.
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Design of needed systems IDSC/Benef.
Tailoring and implementation of systems IDSC.
Assessment of needs IDSC/Benef.
Training of end-users IDSC/Benef.
Acquisition of equipment IDSC.
Installation and operation IDSC/Benef./Subcon.
Output 3 
Reinforcement of HLEC in the area of external debt 
m anagem ent
Activities Responsible Party
Definition of responsibilities GOE.
Definition of work programs, methodology,
and procedures GOE/Consultants.
Developing an external debt
management strategy HLEC/TS/Consultants.
Institutionalizing the external debt
management function HLEC.
Output 4 
Establishment of legal framework for external debt managem ent.
Activities Responsible Party
Reviewing laws and regulations pertaining
to external debt TS/Consultants.
Performing necessary comparisons with
similar legislation in other countries TS/Consultants.
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Proposing updates and modifications to existing
existing laws and regulations regarding
external debt. TS/Consultants.
Approving legal reforms and modifications GOE/EC
9. Program Successes and Failures
The research has defined success or failure to be very much 
dependent on program users' degree of satisfaction, rate of use, 
im pact on the economy, and degree of leveraging debt 
management decision making process. We observed that a 
considerable number of these users felt the number of failures 
encountered by program management were few. Perception of 
successes /  failures varied. We found fhat the common reasons behind 
these variations can be summarized as follows:
• The degree of involvement and/or rate of usage of the 
program (Kaddah, interview - 1993);
• The unique expertise that needed to be developed by the 
program team. This expertise required extensive learning 
and experimentation during a remarkably short time 
period (Ghali, interview - 1993);
• The team's perception of program failures, witnessed 
during the program's life time as damaging to the 
program or a challenge to improve and more refine 
quality;
• The definition of the metaphor “ failure” . Was the failure 
one in the real sense, in other words, would decision 
makers have failed in their quest with or without the 
program, or was the failure due to a combination of 
unsuccessful attempts to deliver a number of outputs in­
addition to a too rapid advance in program deliverables 
which if taken slowly would have succeeded ?;
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• The difficulties involved in debt management and the 
complexity of the Egyptian case versus the rate of 
program growth (Ebied, interview - 1993);
• The degree of top level commitment and support for the 
program team; and
• The need to develop, consistently, such capabilities and 
their required info-infrastructure (El Sherif, interview -1993).
Applying the above success /  failure factors, we concluded that 
program users view its failures to be minor and mainly resulting from the 
need to learn and master new concepts and methodologies. It was a 
learn-by-doing concept, according to Dr. Khattab. We realized those 
users’ opinions on program failures originated from a belief that failure 
is a natural phenomenon necessary to build a unique learning curve. 
One success case override several failure ones, said Dr. Hammed. Dr. 
Ebied felt confident that the program answered more than 80%13 of 
received inquires (Ebied, interview -  1993). For the program team, 
success was measured by what they call a “hit ratio” i.e., the number 
of times the program received a request and was able to generate a 
response to it. Successful response is dependent on two factors, quality 
and timeliness of the response. Our empirical research results, 
specifically the Likeret Scale part, shows that 88% of the debt 
management top decision makers sample interviewed totally agree 
that the program have delivered high quality response for the different
13 According to Mr. Ezzat Abuo Ezz, the program records show that it was able to 
answer more than 80 % of the received inquires. Inquires were of different nature, 
from different source/users and have answered satisfactorily what was requested. 
Moreover, the DM&EM program issues a quarterly progress report in which key 
performance indicators such as number and names of new users, rate of program to 
users inquires, rate of usage of the program, ..etc are listed. We have observed that 
the program is regularly using a number of user surveying tools in order to assess the 
needed performance measures. Those progress reports were a vital tool for the 
program management to improvise its success: deleting un-necessay debt 
management area and adding news.
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issues requested by them14. In order for the reader to feel the impact of 
the DM&EM program, we have conducted a comparison for the mode 
of operation, nature of inquires, and timeliness and quality of the 
response between the before (chapter IV -  section A and B) /  after 
(chapter V and VI) stages of the DM&EM program implementation. 
However, there are other users who do not agree with the above 
argument and considered any failure, whatever the reason, to be the 
responsibility of program management. They believed that the 
program and its management were well-supplied with sufficient factors 
to ensure the program achieved its goals. Though they had a valid 
point, we do not tend to agree with their point of view simply because 
this is not a simple program that requires ordinary expertize and normal 
project management. In our opinion, the uniqueness of this program 
comes from the complexity of its topic, i.e., debt management. 
Difficulties involved in program functioning include: the lack of 
expertise in this field, the unique nature of the debt management in 
each country, the newness of the field, and the different financial / 
legal arrangements that take place between debtor and creditor 
countries. As a new field with no deep roots and no defined textbook 
to follow, we believe it is imperative that each indebted country builds 
its own debt management base that solidly supports its requirements. 
We learned from our research that such expertise can neither be 
bought nor outsourced due to its specificity to a given country. For 
these reasons, it is our opinion that building an expertise in this area, 
and similar ones, requires a unique setup with associated and specific 
criteria for managing success and failure.
Moreover, we observed that the program is starting to focus its forces 
on venturing into new areas that are considered the heart of debt
'4 Examples of users Inquire and DM&EM program responses are presented in 
appendices l-A and Vi-A-2.
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management, such as the debt ceiling, borrowing currencies basket, 
internal rate portfolio management, etc. Development in these new 
areas was being implemented due to its importance and demand for it 
in the next phase of the reform program (Ebied, interview -1993). The 
team was confident that programming in these areas, if properly 
developed and successfully operated, could lead to achieving the 
goals that they were striving to reach. Each area of the above, 
specifically constituted a major strategic direction for the program and 
for the country's economic policy in general.
10. Program System Components
The UNCTAD's computerized debt monitoring and financial analysis 
system (DMFAS) was considered the most suitable for debt 
management needs in the GOE. The Egyptian DM&EM program chose 
this system, but it required a number of modifications to fulfill the GOE 
needs.
The DMFAS consists of three subsystems characterized as follows:
• Its core is the subsystem used for database management. This was 
written in COBOL ANSI-74 and later modified by the program team 
to Oracle RDBMS. It may be installed on mainframe computers, mini­
computers, or microcomputers. The design philosophy employed is 
that of structured programming with a large number of sub­
programs grouped, as appropriate, into program runs for carrying 
out specific tasks. The system data files comprise a set of relational 
databases. The modular programming approach and the use of 
relational databases provide the system with the flexibility to be 
easily modified or expanded as the needs of the debt 
management unit change over time. The files created by the 
system are indexed sequential files (ISAM) and may be easily 
transferred if necessary.
• The second subsystem is a flexible table generator written in
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DataBase 111 Plus, later modified by the program team to FoxPro. 
Mainframe user must use a microcomputer with terminal emulation 
capability to make use of this subsystem. A data set maintained on 
the mainframe must be off-loaded to a hard disk after which the 
microcomputer software may be used. This subsystem was 
developed in order to supplement the pre-programmed tables, 
which can be produced by the first system. It provides the user with 
the flexibility to design his own tables, specifying, for example, fhe 
sorting criteria and hierarchy to be used for generating aggregate 
debt data and the periodicity (daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, 
annual) desired for programming of debt service payments.
• The third subsystem, the debt programming system (DPS) 
implemented in Lotus 1-2-3, allows the user to simulate 
macroeconomic balance-of-payment scenarios. This system takes 
into account debt service on existing debt and user-specified 
assumptions regarding the sources and terms of new finance in 
making debt service programming for any given balance-of- 
payment scenario. It can also be used to explore the implications of 
debt rescheduling on debt service payments and gross borrowing 
requirements. Like the table generator, the DPS is available only in a 
microcomputer environment. The combination of the mainframe 
programming language (COBOL) for database management with 
microcomputer-based analytical tools enables the DMFAS to 
capitalize on the strengths of both mainframe and microcomputers. 
On the one hand, the mainframe environment is best suited for 
storing large data sets, preserving data integrity and providing 
controlled access. The microcomputer environment, on the other 
hand, can provide the non-programmer with user-friendly programs 
for analytical purposes in an extremely cost-effective manner from 
the standpoint of both system development and training of staff.
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• All three subsystems are fully interactive, guiding the user by easy-to- 
follow screen displays.
To make the system fully suitable for the GOE needs, the assigned team 
conducted modifications in the areas of arabization, database 
structure, database portability to more than one platform, screen lay­
out, inquiry facility and the output and reports generated by the 
system. Their modifications were based on providing user-friendly 
software (encouraging decision makers to use the system) in addition 
to enhancing and leveraging its decision support capabilities by 
empowering its query and reporting facilities (easy to inquire and 
numerous report formats output [tabulated, graphically, etc.])
(More details on the system used by (DMFAS) the DM&EM program are 
contained in Appendix V-A.)
11. IDSC’s Role
The empirical research conducted for this thesis clearly reveal how 
decision-makers viewed the role of the IDSC. They viewed it to be a 
leading organization in two main areas: information technology and 
program management. DM&EM program users for example were 
confident that the Cabinet IDSC was employing the latest world class 
technology. However, what impressed them was the rate of 
adaptation, adoption and diffusion in defining problems, tackling 
cultures, in addition to, the enormous efforts exerted in localizing 
computer-based capabilities to local context and language (Ebied, 
interview - 1993). In the areas of program management and handling 
of technical assistance institutions, IDSC was viewed as a perfect 
example of an organization successfully dealing with these areas 
meeting deadlines, achieving objectives, handling problems, and fully 
utilizing technical assistance sources (e.g., funds, experts, contacts,etc.)
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(Khattab, interview-1993).
Other users view the IDSC to be vital in implementing the DM&EM 
program since its inception. They recall that there were a number of 
unsuccessful attempts at establishing similar functions earlier. What 
made the IDSC successful was that it started from where the others 
ended and took into consideration past problems, issues and failure 
factors. It has put significant effort into activating and consolidating 
previous efforts and factors leading up to the current stage. (Hammed, 
interview -1993)
Still others have perceived that IDSC have played a leading role in 
successfully handling the major cultural problems inherent in 
coordinating a number of competing organizations, each working to 
its own standards, systems and procedures (Nazif, interview - 1993). As a 
result, users have realized better coordination and a formulation of solid 
teams backed by powerful information and decision support systems 
facility. This facility enabled the team to handle situations such as the 
first and second Paris Club negotiations where one team represented 
the Egyptian delegation nominated and chosen as a subset of the 
HLEC'5.
The IDSC faced resistance and several failed efforts but nevertheless 
was diplomatic enough to continue the dissemination and full 
utilization of IT capabilities in supporting top policy and decision 
makers, in addition to efficiently handling national socio-economic 
problems. Moreover, it played an instrumental role in continuously 
transferring, localizing and training most government employees and 
program users on the usage and utilization of state-of-the-art 
technologies (hardware, software and systems methodologies) (El 
Sherif, interview - 1993). It successfully triggered the attention of top
15 More examples on the role played by IDSC and its achievements are presented in 
appendix IV-B-B.
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policy makers to the importance of using IT power in various socio­
economic problems, besides encouraging government personnel to 
use, master and com pete with each other in exploiting IT tools and 
techniques1.
Finally, most users viewed the unique setup of the IDSC as a 
government organization that was being managed in a non­
government mode that qualified it to orchestrate and synchronize the 
details of the program. None of the involved agencies, on their own 
such as the CBE or others, could have m anaged to successfully 
implement such a large-scale program (Nazif, interview - 1993). 
Additionally, none of the program funding agencies, such as the UNDP, 
would have supported the idea and its implementation (not only for 
one phase but two) without clearly ensuring that there was a body 
they could depend on. The IDSC ensured that this body could 
efficiently and effectively utilize the program-allocated resources in a 
value-added way contributing to a national mandate.
12. Program Future Plans
Future plans for the program include concentrating on new and 
complementary areas that can be used as leverage in the support of 
other economic reform decisions and policies such as:
a. Fully utilizing and supporting the use of information systems power 
in serving the GOE’s other national econom ic requirements and 
needs;
b. Strategically, program users and management agree that the
debt management functions performed to date represent not
more than 20% of the economic information systems required by
the country. Other economic areas that decision-makers strive to
move forward are capital markets, internal debt stock, the
banking system and the credit system. Each of these areas is a
major program in itself that requires equal resources and efforts to
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build and institutionalize. In the opinion of these decision makers, it 
is important to bear in mind when considering the design of such 
programs, that they must be transportable and inter-link with one 
another;
c. Capitalizing on this unique experience and accum ulated know­
how in addition to well-built credit worthiness and good image, 
decision makers believe that the team can lend assistance in 
other indebted nations’ efforts by helping them solve and settle 
their debt problems via the shortest path possible;
d. Continuously supporting the efforts expended in developing and 
implementing the necessary awareness campaigns and programs 
concerning the importance of debt management;
e. Heavily investing time, effort and resources in building a 
com petent human resources base that could carry this flag 
afterwards;
f. Exerting effort on and dedicating time to completing and 
operationalizing the remaining systems, such as the debt strategy 
module (DSM) and the debt reduction module (DRM);
g. Venturing into new complementary areas such as the legal 
aspect of debt management, credit management system 
development, capital markets systems development, 
Internal/sectoral debt management handling, an excellent stock 
exchange, and a vital export /  import information network; and
h. Helping to institutionalize all efforts through ensuring the following:
1) Defining national borrowing policies for a future defined period.
2) Identifying the maximum yearly debt burden to commit to.
3) Identifying the maximum yearly debt services required.
4) Defining the relationship between the above two points to the
gross national product.
5) Identifying the optimum debt service to export ratio.
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6) Identifying the optimum borrowing mix.
- Public versus private borrowing.
- Currency composition.
- Optimum interest rate.
7) Defining the maximum debt ceiling.
8) Aiding in debt management techniques such as hedging, swaps,
speculations etc.
9) Publicizing and promoting debt management tools techniques 
and concepts such as the legal aspects of debt management.
10) Establishing the foundation for a solid capital market and credit 
system.
11) Positively supporting corrective action efforts for improving the 
BOP.
13. P rogram  E xperience  T ransportab ility
We observed during the research that program users perceive the
program as being able to be transportable to other contexts. They
claim that the reason behind this is the fact that not only was the
program developed successful, but was also successfully implemented
in an extremely complex context such as the Egyptian external debt
management situation. Moreover, users consider the program team ’s
experience to be well-developed having trained themselves to deal
with seemingly insurmountable situations and issues thereby making
other situations seem much less com plicated by comparison. They
stress the point that the program team ’s invaluable experience was a
result of: (i) the complex nature of the Egyptian debt stock; (ii) the
numerous negotiation rounds held with international agencies such as
the World Bank and the IMF; (iii) the accum ulated experience in
dealing with the Paris Club on more than one occasion; and (iv) the
vast amount of experience in designing, developing and implementing
large scale programs requiring extensive program management skills.
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Furthermore, we have observed that the successful development of 
the program, supported by the accumulated experience built, and 
credit worthiness and positive image earned throughout the whole 
process, have qualified the program team to be invited to guide other 
nations’ efforts and help them solve their debt problem via the shortest 
path possible. Examples of such invitations are: a number of African 
(such as Nigeria) and Arabian (such as Oman) countries have formally 
requested the GOE assistance in providing expertise in dealing with the 
problem. The expertise requested was in the areas of information /  
decision support systems, human resources development preparation 
and training level, project management, and negotiations with 
creditors and financial institutions such as IMF and World Bank level. The 
other important proof that chose international program recognition 
was an invitation from the UNCTAD for the DM&EM team to lead an 
effort for establishing the African Debt Management Center. Such 
program was a recommendation from a big number of developed 
and developing institutions and communities reflecting the extreme 
dangerous situation reached in African content with regards to this 
problem. This program is still being developed and implemented.
C. The Egyptian Debt Management Office
1. The Technical Secretariat (TS)
The existing LEDD in the CBE was maintained but with major job 
restructuring, training, and job rotation. All staff from involved ministries 
and banks, linked to the main database, were assigned to work under 
the common umbrella of the program. This ensured the full 
harmonization and unification of thoughts and plans that it was hoped 
would lead to the final goal. Computer equipment, hardware and 
software were collectively procured with other networking facilities. 
These modifications were put in place in order to qualify the CBE-LEDD
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to become the debt management TS for the GOE.
Given the complex nature of the task and the limited expertise 
available at that time, the program team was able to learn quickly and 
grasp the services offered by international experts and consultants. 
Additionally, the team has helped in setting up the overall organization, 
staffing, work programs preparation, appropriate techniques 
development, training and hands-on support during start-up and 
through-out the program life span.
The organizational structure for the Egyptian debt management TS 
(Figure V-2) consisted of two main departments, namely the I/DSS and 
the Economic and Financial Analysis Department. The I/DSS 
department encompassed four units: Planning and Operations, I/DSS 
Application Development, database Administration, and Quality 
Control. The Economic and Financial Analysis Department 
encompassed four units: BOP National Accounts, Monetary and Fiscal 
Economics, Debt Monitoring, and External Interfacing. Both 
departments reported to an executive manager for the unit who was 
assisted by several legal experts. The TS reported to the HLEC 
functionally, and to the governor of the CBE organizationally.
Figure V-3 summarizes the Egyptian debt management TS interfaces 
with different local and international institutions, i.e., the process of 
data /  information processing, and I/DSS outputs for different users. The 
feeding in of data /  information takes place from debtor authorities, 
four main public sector banks, private banks and financial institutions, 
Egypt's creditors, private users, etc. Processing and scenario 
generation took place at the TS in the CBE. Output to users and 
beneficiaries inquiries went to the HLEC, the Cabinet IDSC, different 
debtor ministries, Cabinet Planning Unit (PU), Cabinet Economic 
Intellegence Unit (EIU), Ministry of International Cooperation (MIC), 
Ministry of Planing (MOP), Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of
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Economy and Foreign Trade (MOEFT), IMF / IBRD and other 
international agencies, etc.
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TS Organizational Structure
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2. UNDP /  UNCTAD Technical Assistance
As part of our research, we decided that it was important to cover 
external factors that contributed to the DM&EM program. Among 
these factors were imported systems (UNCTAD - DMFAS system studied 
in Section D of this Chapter) and the technical assistance contributions 
made by the UNDP. Starting in Phase I (October 1986), the UNDP 
offered the GOE technical assistance in the form of funding for 
studying different systems available on the market; funding for 
acquiring the chosen system (UNCTAD -  DMFAS); experts in the field of 
debt management and I/DSS; training for different program members 
in different fields (on/off site); and international exposure in the form of 
supporting the program team ’s attendance at conferences, seminars 
and workshops. During the second phase (February 1991) UNDP 
technical assistance was focused on modifying the selected software 
package and building up the needed debt management officers. 
After the compilation of a solid external debt database, the focus was 
turned to securing optimum utilization of the program’s output. There 
was a need to develop analytical capabilities and establish a 
permanent mechanism to assist the GOE in implementing sound 
external debt policies.
As mentioned earlier, the GOE had in prior years attempted to improve 
external debt management through various arrangements but without 
backup and support from a specialized technical arm. With or without 
the program, the GOE needed to secure this technical input to 
strengthen its external debt management operation.
During our case studies, we observed that, although the technical 
support function could have been contracted to foreign firms 
specialized in the field of debt management, experience indicated 
that any such arrangement was normally more costly and, in many
instances, increased the country's dependence on outside support.
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Moreover, such an alternative did not always best serve the debtor, 
since most of the subcontracted firms had direct or indirect links to 
financial intermediaries.
Finally, we would like to stress the fact that the main role played by the 
UNDP's involvement in the program was to promote institution building 
namely the Egyptian “TS Debt Office", as an element necessary to 
sustain improvements in economic management over time. This was 
very important in reinforcing the GOE's economic adjustment program 
and was well-received by the IMF and IBRD.
3. C o u n te rp a rt Support C a p a c ity
As previously presented, all agencies involved in the external debt 
management process acted in a counterpart support capacity. It was 
well orchestrated by the HLEC, specifying each and every institution's 
roles and responsibilities. Moreover, the HLEC identified the prime 
interfaces as the Cabinet IDSC, (Dr. Ebied and his team) and the CBE, 
(Dr. Hammed and his team).
Being in charge of large information / decision support programs, the 
Cabinet IDSC adequately demonstrated its capacity to carry out 
contracted responsibilities successfully. It represented a well-staffed, 
highly technical institution that could play a vital part as an executive 
counterpart. (The Cabinet IDSC is discussed in more detail in Chapter 
IV, Section C)
The CBE LEDD showed serious commitment and assumed the tasking of
TS Debt Office. However, neither institution had the needed expertise
in external liability management. The alternative was contracting
consulting services, both locally and abroad, in order to develop local
professional capabilities. The training component under this program,
combined with hands-on experience, was very effective in developing
the in-house technical know-how, which prior to this time, had been
lacking. (The CBE - LEDD is discussed in more detail in Chapter IV,
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Section B)
4. TS debt office responsibilities
The Egyptian debt office (TS) responsibilities can be summarized as 
follows:
a. Prepare national debt policies and strategies, in a cooperative 
effort with responsible government agencies, which define 
sustainable levels of external debt that are consistent with sound 
macro-economic balances;
b. Elaborate on sectoral break-downs of external debt obligations 
with a view toward enforcing cost recoveries and pay-backs;
c. Develop various loan approaches (short, medium and long) to 
secure adequate sources of external finance for handling the 
debt portfolio;
d. Ensure regular up-dating and refinement of the debt database 
and extend its coverage to all loan categories;
e. Analyze sectoral breakdowns in balance of payment 
components with a view toward strengthening their structure and 
position;
f. Promote adequate linkage of debt obligations with the national 
budget and formulate guidelines for debt management policies;
g. Conduct regular debt portfolio reviews in order to recommend 
alternatives to help hedge against various risks and reduce 
borrowing costs, including participation in secondary debt 
markets;
h. Study and propose alternatives for debt relief, including debt 
conversion (swaps and others), to help reduce the external debt 
burden; and
i. Review and propose updates to laws and regulations pertaining 
to contracting external debt.
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The Secretariat was composed of a senior macro-economist, who 
acted as the head of the unit. A monetary economist, with vast 
experience in the balance of payments and monetary accounts, 
supported him. Additional support included a fiscal economist to 
analyze budgetary interplay, an econometrician to develop 
alternative scenarios of debt growth, debt service and debt relief, a 
loan officer familiar with the modalities of international financial 
markets and new debt management arrangements, an information 
technology specialist responsible for implementing the latest IT tools 
and techniques needed to empower IT in better production of 
program outputs, and finally an attorney, with background in local 
regulations and international law, to advise on legal affairs.
5. Support for HLEC
O ne  ultimate result of the DM&EM program was enhancement of the 
CBE debt management kernel, i.e., TS, which was established to act as 
the foundation for building a comprehensive debt management office 
that offered special support to the HLEC in:
a. Firming up and refining the country's future policies and strategies 
concerning debt and future external commitments that 
represented a considerable portion of the overall macro- 
economic strategy;
b. Weathering extended negotiations with the Paris Club, IMF, and 
the World Bank during the debt relief and re-scheduling processes;
c. Regulating and establishing a well-defined channel for borrowing, 
debt terms negotiation and debt status reporting through the CBE 
via a set of rules and regulations;
d. Successfully constructing the country's image in front of major 
creditors and international funding agencies;
e. Transferring Egypt from a heavily indebted, mismanaged,
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haphazardly executed economy to a solid, well-supported and 
highly-coordinated one; and
f. Creating a sense of awareness and feasibility for efficient and 
effective borrowing through in-depth studies of past experiences 
in optimizing loan uses and defining pay back sources and 
mechanisms.
D. Debt Managem ent System Used
As previously mentioned, DM&EM program management spent a 
considerable amount of time, effort and money in defining the 
symptoms of the malfunctioning external debt process and the 
needed prescription to cure the malfunction once and for all. Among 
the list of factors that needed GOE focus and effort was the debt 
management system to be used. In Appendix lll-B, we have 
enumerated a list of twelve well-known debt management systems 
that were studied by the DM&EM program. Out of these systems, the 
UNCTAD DMFAS, chosen for its characteristics and flexibility, was 
deem ed the best match for handling the complex Egyptian debt 
portfolio. It was still necessary for the DM&EM program team to 
accomplish the localization process (local system design, modification, 
arabization, and implementation). For this reason, we found it 
important to research, in depth, the UNCTAD system and present it in 
the following section.
7. Introduction and Background
a. Introduction
Improving the management of external debt has becom e an
increasingly important objective of developing countries. Central to this
task is the provision of timely, accurate and detailed data on external
debt outstanding and on debt-service payments coming due. Among
other things, the absence of such data hinders the formulation and
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implementation of economic policy, leads to inefficient management 
of foreign exchange reserves, and increases the cost of borrowing in 
various ways.
UNCTAD provides the computerized DMFAS to assist governments in this 
task. It is a comprehensive management system for the registration, 
monitoring and analysis of external debt and other financial factors. 
Although the system is extremely powerful and flexible and has been 
implemented both on personal computers and in mainframe 
environments, the user needs little formal training or prior experience in 
the use of computers since easy-to-follow screen displays guide the 
user step-by-step in operating the various facilities of the system. The 
DMFAS was originally implemented in three language versions: English, 
French, Spanish and has now been modified by the DM&EM team to 
suit Arabic speaking countries.
The purpose of this section is to document the process of acquiring, 
modifying and implementing this system by the DM&EM program from 
the UNCTAD through a UNDP technical assistance project. It neither 
critiques nor discusses any of the modifications that took place in the 
'ready made system' provided by the UNCTAD. It will present the 
principal functions, outputs and possible links to other systems, 
explained in Section D-2. Further details regarding the scope and the 
nature of data captured by the system are provided in section D-3. 
Procedures for implementation are dealt with in forth section of this 
chapter D-4.
b. Background
The debt monitoring system was provided to Egypt by UNCTAD through 
its Technical Cooperation Service (TCS), backstopped by the 
economists and electronic data processing experts of the Money, 
Finance and Development Division. So far, the system has been
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developed and provided to interested countries free-of-charge in the 
context of technical assistance programs financed by the UNDP 
country programs. To date, UNCTAD has implemented its system in 
Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Haiti, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Togo, Trinidad, Tobago and Uganda.
As an organization, UNCTAD has 20 years experience in analyzing the 
full range of problems facing developing countries in their efforts to 
accelerate the development process. Its experience with 
computerized debt management systems also includes an intensive 
study of already installed computerized debt management systems. 
Since 1979, UNCTAD has been a regular participant in meetings of the 
Paris Club, in preparation for which its economists have com e to know 
first-hand the strengths and weaknesses of debt management systems 
in a large number of countries.
Based on earlier analytical work, the current version of the system 
computer programs was developed over a period of about two and a 
half years, beginning in mid-1982, at UNCTAD headquarters in Geneva 
for five developing countries, which requested such assistance. 
Afterwards, the program management agreed, with other additional 
countries including Egypt, to incorporate further enhancement to the 
existing version of the DMFAS. It was completed in 18 months ending 
mid-1989.
2. Principal Functions and Outputs16
a. System Functions
UNCTAD’s DMFAS is a computerized system designed to provide 
accurate and timely debt information for the purpose of debt
16 DMFAS, Information Note, UNCTAD Secretariat, UNCTAD, Geneva, February 1993 
(restricted distribution).
170
I/DSS in Debt Management - The Egypt Experience Chapter V
management. A pre-requisite for the provision of accurate information 
is the entry and maintenance of data in the DMFAS database. DMFAS 
has three modules: the DMS (Debt Monitoring System), the DRES (Debt 
Reorganization Subsystem) and the DPS (Debt Projections and Balance 
of Payments Linkage System). It also has an interface to the World 
Bank’s Debt Strategy Module (DSM) and a function to report to the 
World Bank’s Debtor Reporting Systems.
The DMS is the main module of the DMFAS, and most data used by the
DMFAS is entered in it. Although some data must be entered 
independently by the user into the DRES and the DPS, these two 
modules also use data taken from the DMS (Figure V-4).
DPS
DSM
Analysis Monitoring
DMS
Balance of payments 
aggregated debt
Data entry 
reporting
DMFAS
Re-organization agreements & 
  related loans
DRES
Reorganization
Figure V-4
DMFAS System Architecture
Debt Monitoring System (DMS)
The DMS module allows the user to follow medium-and long-term debt, 
both private, governmental and no-lending operations. The user may
I/DSS in Debt Management - The Egypt Experience Chapter V
also register short-term debt, domestic debt and grants within the
system. The module is divided into two parts - Loan Monitoring and
Project Monitoring. Loan Monitoring is used to provide reports on all 
data relating to general loan information such as loan terms, clients, 
related agreements, and loan transactions. Project Monitoring is used 
to provide reports on all data relating to projects.
To be able to produce accurate information, the user must enter the 
following data:
• The financial terms as specified in each loan contract;
• The characteristics of each loan;
• Information relating to loan participants or clients (borrowers, 
lenders, guarantors, beneficiaries, etc.);
• Historical balance and current transactions; and
• Interest and exchange rates.
The essential information describing the loan characteristics is 
registered through the use of codes which the user may modify at will. 
Once entered, the data may be updated regularly or deleted, as the 
case may be, by means of DMS commands. Various safeguards have 
been put into p lace to protect reference files and data entered by the 
user.
Efficient data entry requires careful completion of several forms 
provided along with the DMS for data collection. To facilitate the user’s 
task, the DMS menu structure follows the same formatting as the forms 
used for data collection. The DMS module automatically calculates 
amortization tables based on the information entered into the 
database. Numerous reports are then available, the most important 
ones given below:
• Projections for future disbursements and future debt service;
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• Reports on exact debt status at any time, such as debt 
outstanding, arrears outstanding, or disbursements and debt 
service during a particular period, estimated penalty interest;
• Reports to the World Bank’s Debtor Reporting System;
• Exchange rate variation reports which shows the effect of 
currency fluctuations on outstanding debt and, on net flows 
as well as the global effect;
• Reports showing the penalty interest stock and penalty 
interest flows;
• Reports on the stock of arrears and the estimation of penalty 
interest to be paid; and
• Reports on the comparison of theoretical and ledger stock.
Report formatting is left to the user who may select the output criteria. 
The user can easily produce a statement or a projection for the entire 
loan stock, a particular creditor country, a specific lender or a given 
beneficiary. The statistics produced by the DMS may be presented at 
the level a loan, or aggregated as a function of one or several criteria. 
Subsets of data can be saved on disk and used by other institutions, 
when required. A spreadsheet facility allows data to be down loaded 
from fhe DMS to generate reports, which can be formatted to the 
user’s needs.
Debt Re-oraanization Subsystem (DRES)
The Debt Reorganization Subsystem facilitates a country in its 
preparation for both the Paris and the London Clubs, namely when 
government and /  or commercial debt, respectively, are re­
negotiated. The DRES uses data from the DMS to permit the user, after 
debt re-negotiations, to establish the relationship between the 
reorganized (old) loans and the reorganizing (new) loans 
(UNCTAD, 1993). Concluded agreements can be registered in detail in
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the subsystem.
More specifically, the DRES module allows the user to:
• select eligible loans for reorganization:
• facilitate recording of reorganizing terms received:
• facilitate identification of reorganized transactions; and
• automatically update ledger accounts with reorganized 
transactions and their corresponding disbursements.
Debt Projections and Balance of Payments Linkage System (DPS)
The Debt Projections and Balance of Payments Linkage System is an 
analysis tool designed to combine projections obtained from the DMS 
with various projected scenarios of the balance of payments, which 
are calculated regularly. This allows policy makers to review their 
existing debt strategies depending on the prevailing economic 
situation. More specifically, the DPS module allows the user to:
• study the im pact of new loans on the aggregate debt profile;
• analyze the effect of debt rescheduling based on different 
hypotheses; and
• combine debt data, aggregated as required for the 
particular analysis, with various balance-of-payments 
scenarios.
The DPS can run scenarios on the ways in which balance of payment 
gaps can be closed with additional borrowing and on the 
corresponding effect on future balance of payments. Automatic 
calculations are based only on external debt data.
Debt Strategy Module (DSM)
The World Bank’s Debt Strategy Module is an analytical tool for 
developing and testing scenarios for the efficient management and
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financing of a country’s external debt. The DSM is interfaced with the 
DMS so those user defined loan groupings from the DMS can be used 
to classify loan data for subsequent analysis in the DSM. The DSM allows 
one to test various debt strategies in the context of a country’s 
prevailing macro-economic conditions, in order to choose the most 
appropriate strategy to deal with its debt.
b. System Outputs, Calculation & Linkages to Other Systems
Outputs
In addition to the reports which may be prepared by the flexible report 
preparation program and the programming of balance-of-payments 
and debt-service data provided by the DPS, the system produces 23 
pre-programmed reports which can be grouped as follows: registration 
reports, accounting reports, user-requested reports and reference file 
reports. The system also provides a browsing facility for reviewing data 
directly on the computer screen (UNCTAD, 1993).
On the complementary side, to make it more interactive, the DM&EM 
program team developed a solid shell that was used to generate the 
different scenarios in response to inquiries by users. This was in addition 
to their efforts in arabizing a large portion of DMFAS itself.
Automatic calculations
An important feature of the DMFAS is its ability to relieve the user of the 
burden of calculating debt-service schedules and average terms for 
groups of loans. In manual systems, the difficulties involved in 
performing these types of calculations, which are essential to cash flow 
management and for establishing guidelines on terms for new 
borrowing, prevent their use. Those calculations that are performed 
quickly become obsolete when conditions change in international 
financial markets.
In calculating schedules of interest payments, repayments of principal
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and schedules of other charges, the DMFAS takes into account 
variable interest rates, and changes in the interest rate base, and in the 
margin over the base interest rate from one sub-period to another. 
Programming is always done in the contractual currency of payment, 
and multiple currency loans can be accumulated by the system. 
Changes in exchange rates are taken into account in computing debt- 
service schedules in a common currency. These features may be used 
to generate hypothetical debt-service scenarios based on future 
evolution of interest rates and exchange rates.
Debt-service schedules may be calculated either on the basis of total 
commitments or on only disbursements that have actually been made. 
Amortization schedules may be calculated according to several 
different methods. When disbursement schedules are not known with a 
high degree of certainty in advance, the user may choose from 
among several possible patterns for his automatic calculation. 
Regularly recurring charges are also calculated by the system.
The terms of loans, which have been rescheduled on the basis of a 
multilateral agreement, can be used to automatically generate the 
debt-service schedules for loans that were rescheduled and to revise 
the schedules for the portions not subject to rescheduling. For 
analytical purposes, DMFAS can calculate the following characteristics 
of the entire loan stock, groups of loans, or individual loans (when 
appropriate):
• average interest rate over the lifetime of the loan;
• average margin over the base interest rate over the 
lifetime of the loan in the case of floating interest 
rates;
• the interest-rate equivalent of charges over the lifetime 
of the loan
• the average grace period;
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• the average maturity period; and
• the grant element17.
Linkage to other systems
The reports and outputs described above may be used as input for a 
number of other management activities, such as the following:
a. Programming of debt-service payments by currency and their 
payment dates together with programming of other balance-of 
payment items by means of the DPS can serve as input for the 
preparation of foreign exchange budgets.
b. The data on transactions captured by the ledger module can be 
re-formatted as input to formal accounting systems maintained 
by various agencies, such as multi-currency accounting systems 
often maintained by central banks.
c. Data on individual development programs financed by external 
loans and grants together with information on local finance and 
allocation of expenditures by major category, etc., can be 
supplied to the development planning authority as input to a 
system of program monitoring.
d. Data on agreements pertaining to the re-lending of the proceeds 
from an external loan by a government agency or designated 
bank to other domestic entities can also be captured by the 
DMFAS for purposes of facilitating recovery of debt-service 
payments arising from the re-lending agreement.
e. The DMFAS is also designed to support periodic reporting to the 
World Bank, matching its format, on a magnetic media (UNCTAD, 
1993).
17
Debt Management and Economic Monitoring Program document, IDSC, Cairo, 1987.
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c. Report Generation
Improvements to the original version of the DMFAS were needed for 
Egypt to produce all of its printed reports (for detailed listings of these 
reports see Appendix V-A, section B). It should be noted, however, that 
entering all historical transactions for each individual loan from its date 
of signature, significantly added to the time allocated to load the 
system with the required data. It was recommended that cumulative 
historical transaction balance for each loan as of the end of the fiscal 
year, and individual transactions only from that date onwards be 
entered to the system. At the end of each year, these data are (i) 
added to the cumulative historical transactions, and (ii) transferred 
from on-line storage to a computer tape for permanent storage.
3. Data Characteristics
a. Data coverage
DMFAS can maintain data on up to ten thousand loans18 or grant 
agreements for each of the following categories:
• Grants from abroad;
• External medium and long-term public or publicly-guaranteed 
debt;
• External medium and long-term private non-guaranteed 
debt;
• External short-term debt of the central government
(individual loans);
• External short-term debt of the State (summary loan
accounts); and
• Domestic on-lending.
Information on the terms and characteristics of each loan is entered 
into the system from the loan agreements and associated
18 As stated in the DMFAS literature held a t the DM&EM program.
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documentation. Subsequently, data and dates on all transactions are 
also entered. In respect to short-term debt, principally commercial 
debt, data is collected in the form of changes in balances and 
cumulative transactions during specified reporting periods for certain 
broad categories of agreements,
b. Types of data
DMFAS was designed to record detailed data on:
1) Financial da ta , interest rates and exchange rates
a. Data on the financial provisions of loan agreements is collected 
primarily for the purpose of programming disbursement and 
repayment schedules. It includes the amounts and currencies of 
the total commitment, currency of repayments, dates of first and 
last disbursements and repayment of principal and their amounts, 
disbursements and amortization profiles, and periodicity, whether 
in currency or in kind.
b. Data on commissions and other charges includes the nature of 
the charge, the beginning and ending dates for the calculation of 
regular charges, their periodicity, and whether data is known or 
estimated.
c. Data on interest rates which may be fixed or variable, includes 
information on up to three interest rates or three margins over the 
base interest rate. It could be applied during different sub-periods 
which could be options during the same period. Data is entered 
on the dates for beginning the calculation of interest payments as 
well as actual payments dates. Similar information is collected on 
penalty interest rates, as well as which rate is applicable to arrears 
on principal and which on arrears of interest payments. Data for a 
large number of exchanges rates and for interest rates used in 
floating-rate loan agreements are maintained in separate files 
(UNCTAD, 1993).
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2j D escrip tive  a n d  co n tro l d a ta
DMFAS provides a multitude of descriptive and control data pertaining 
to each agreement. For control purposes, dates may be recorded for:
• loan authorization,
• loan signature,
• loan effectiveness, and
• last date of loan availability.
Descriptive data includes clients associated with each loan, the 
relationship of each client to each loan, the shares of multiple lenders 
or guarantors in each agreement, loan category, agreement type, 
economic sector, loan purpose and national budgetary relationship. 
Additional data on each client is maintained in a separate file. These 
data include the institution type (official, private, bank, non-bank, etc.), 
country of residence and, optionally, mailing addresses and 
telecommunication information.
When loans are related to specific economic development programs, 
data is sorted in a program file. Information in the program file may 
include, at the option of the user, the following: location, economic 
sector, program manager, starting year, duration, allocations by major 
expenditure categories, original and revised estimates of total cost, 
including local and foreign financing components, and the relationship 
between the program and one or more grant or loan agreements.
3J D a ta  re la tions
Individual loan agreements are often related to other agreements. For 
instance, loan agreements pursuant to a multilateral debt rescheduling 
agreement are related to the multilateral agreement itself and to each 
of the original loan agreements, which were re-negotiated. Similarly, 
frame agreements typically give rise to several individual loan
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agreements, and the proceeds from external borrowing are often used 
for re-lending domestically, which gives rise to parallel agreements. A 
powerful feature of the DMFAS is the debt relations file, which are 
related to one another (IDSC -  DMU, 1993).
c. Data capture and entry
When received by Egypt, DMFAS was already designed to capture 
almost all data elements referred to in the specifications. Subsequently, 
the following were also included:
• Financial flow codes (grants, public and publicly-guaranteed 
loans, private non-guaranteed loans, short-term loans, domestic 
loans, etc.);
• Institution codes for debtors, creditors and other parties to a loan 
agreement (public, private, bank, non-bank, foreign affiliated, 
etc.);
• Loan /  client relationship codes, including many more 
relationships than creditor, debtor and guarantors;
• Separate loan purpose and program purpose codes in addition 
to economic sector codes;
• Inter-program purpose codes, to distinguish program allocation
by purpose (feasibility studies, site clearance, construction,
imports, etc.) (IDSC-DMU, 1993).
At the time of installation DMFAS already includes a development
program subsystem that allow for tracking several programs financed 
by a single loan as well as the allocations from a single program. The 
only feature, which still needs to be added to the system, is capturing 
of data elements on disbursements by program. If this is done, amounts 
budgeted to each program annually should also be added so as to 
compare actual with budgeted expenditures. Moreover, data entry is
already fully interactive and includes error checks and error messages.
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DMFAS also provides the ability to check for the internal consistency of 
some of the data entered on loan terms. The system can 
accom m odate a large volume of transactions on the order of 24,000 
per year or 100 per day. Peak load problems arise toward the end of 
calendar quarters which necessitate the need for batch processing 
alternatives to the normal interactive data entry procedure (UNCTAD, 
1993).
4. Implementation  
Preparation for data entry
To provide an easy and uniform way of entering data, a set of 
standard forms, together with instructions for their completion are 
provided with the system. Because interactive screen displays were 
closely related to the forms, their use, especially for loan term data and 
descriptive da ta  relating to loan agreement, is virtually obligatory. 
Transaction data, on the other hand, may be entered by means of a 
"payment order" form provided with the system or directly from 
payment vouchers or debit and credit memoranda. The information 
content of these forms, presented in Appendix IV - A, is specifically 
designed to satisfy the reporting needs of a sophisticated debt 
monitoring unit. Although most of the data for which provision is made 
was required for reporting to the World Bank, some of it was optional 
and these features did not need to be implemented immediately. 
Examples of functions that were implemented later are: development 
program monitoring; recording of client mailing and
telecommunications; monitoring of private sector debt; and short-term 
debt and re-lending agreements.
The time required installing UNCTAD's DMFAS software on a 
microcomputer is a few hours. Mainframe implementation usually takes 
up to one week. The time required for loading all of a country’s specific
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data into the DMFAS depend greatly on the number of loans that a 
given country have. Another important factor is the status of the 
present “ manual” system. The better-organized present procedures are 
the shorter the time that is spent on data entry. Users familiar with the 
system can enter data on about 20 to 30 loans per day. Before data 
entry can be undertaken, however, completion of three major tasks is 
necessary:
1. com plete a loan terms form for each existing loan 
agreement;
2. com pute loan balances on all existing loans by an agreed 
cut-off date; and,
3. assemble all ledger transactions that have been effected 
since that date.
These tasks can easily take as much as one hour per loan (Izzat, 
interview - 1993).
5. System Arabization
At the time of implementation in the DM&EM program in Egypt, the
DMFAS data base subsystem, written in COBOL, was already available
in three language versions: English, French and Spanish. Several
features of the system facilitate the preparation of different language
versions. One of these is the use of a separate text file for storing the
text used in the screen displays. Thus text could be changed without
modifying the computer programs. Secondly, a data dictionary is
stored in another independent file. Codes entered by the user are
checked for validity against the entries in the data dictionary. Thus
labels for numeric codes can be altered easily without significant
program modifications. Thirdly, data entry does not make use of cursor
control keys but, rather, data are entered by the "pair value" method.
The menu selections or data fields in the screen displays are provided in
numbers. Menu selections are made, or data entered, by entering first
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the number of the selection, followed, if appropriafe, by fhe data to be 
entered. These features, in addition to Egyptian expertise inmodifying 
the main kernel, contributed to successful arabizfion of fhe DMFAS 
system.
E. Conclusion
Effective external debt management can be facilitated by a few, well- 
selected players and the establishment of a coordinating body (such 
as the Central Bank). Additionally, it requires the composition of a 
group of high government officials responsible for the overall economic 
reform program reflecting government commitment to full debt 
management functions. This would permit the development of policy 
guidelines on the national external debt, the screening of proposals for 
new borrowings, the design of debt re-negotiation programs and the 
monitoring of overall developments.
A debt management program’s success depends to a large extent on 
the reasons behind initiating it, its objectives, phases, scope, 
management approach, challenges faced, main users and targeted 
beneficiaries, deliverables and outputs, and, most important of all, its 
top management commitment, support and approval.
A well-established debt management program is heavily dependent 
on a robust debt management system. The debt management 
function is country specific, i.e., it cannot be copied as is from one 
country to another. In that respect, a debt management system needs 
to be country-specific if its principal functions and outputs are to satisfy 
its needs. Proper implementation, ease of use, flexibility of maintaining 
and updating, in addition to good training for staff using the system, 
are critical success factors in this area. The above key landmarks 
present the basis of our hypothesis and guide the process of our 
research for this thesis.
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Chapter VI
Analysis of the Egyptian l/DSS Debt Management Program
A. Introduction
This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the Egyptian l/DSS 
debt management program. The findings are divided into qualitative 
and quantitative perspective analyses that tackle the im pact ot the 
program from different angles. For the qualitative analysis section, we 
analyzed the im pact of the program from the political, functional, and 
managerial perspectives during the different phases of the program.1
The perception and views are a result of the research conducted on 10 
different sample sets that are characterized by being from different 
levels of decision makers2 who represent a variety of program users,
supporters, and managers together with several key personnel in the 
DM&EM program team. Findings were analyzed in light of the 
theoretical foundation laid for this research covered in Chapter III, and 
the causes and symptoms of the problem, i.e., deteriorating conditions 
of external debt management, covered in Chapter IV.
For the quantitative analysis section of this chapter, we analyzed major 
national and international economic perspectives and views that have 
had a direct im pact as a result of DM&EM program implementation. 
This analysis reflects the views of several reputable financial institutions
1 DM&EM program phases:
1. Initiation and Base-Building Phase, late 1986 till late 1990. Its characteristics 
and are fully presented in Chapter V, Section B.
2. Institutionalization Phase, early 1991 till early 1995. Its characteristics and are 
fully presented in chapter V, Section B.
2 Including the Egyptian Prime Minister, Dr. A. Sedki; Deputy Prime Minister and
Governor of the CBE, Dr. S. Hammed; Minister of Administrative Development, Dr. 
Ebied; Minister of Economic Affairs, Dr. Ghali; Minister of International Cooperation, Dr. 
M. Makramala; Chairman of the Cabinet IDSC, Dr. H. El Sherif; Executive M anager of 
the Cabinet IDSC, Dr. A. Nazif; Director of the Cabinet IDSC Decision Support 
Department, Dr. M. Kattab; DM&EM National Program Director, Dr. M. Kaddah; and 
CBE - LEDD Director, Mr. E. Ezz.
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on how they perceive the improvement in the Egyptian economy to 
date.
It is worth mentioning at this point that the accelerating economic 
gains realized by Egypt during the past few years are a result of a 
comprehensive economic reform program the solid base of which is 
the DM&EM program (Figure VI - 1). Such a base was a necessity and a 
logical demand if a powerfully emerging economy was to have a solid 
foundation. It was the one key factor that drew international creditors 
and financial institutions back to Egypt after a threatened boycott 
during the mid-1980s (the period when it was deiced that Egypt should 
participate in Paris club negotiations).
r  Other x 
Programs
Privatization Programs
Public Sector Reform Program
Structural Adjustment Programs
Debt M an ag em en t & Economic Monitoring Program
Figure VI - 1
Egyptian Economic Reform Program
One critical factor that contributed to the success of the DM&EM 
program was the timely inception of the Cabinet IDSC in the mid-1980s. 
The reasons behind this being a key success factor are the following:
a. Parallel and equally important projects and programs were being 
developed and implemented by the Cabinet IDSC in other sectors 
of the government, the success of which were key to the realization 
of the DM&EM program (Figure VI - 2).
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Figure VI - 2
IDSC's l/DSS Support for the Egyptian Cabinet
b. The introduction of "think tanks" (l/DSS centers) attached to the 
bodies of different ministries and governorates and focusing their 
activities in serving decision makers through leveraging and shaping 
their decisions. This new conception had long ranging cultural 
effects as regards to perception of users and system 
implementation teams as well as the working environment they 
operated in.
This chapter will touch on the challenges faced by the Cabinet IDSC, 
and how it met these challenges and will analyze their effect on the 
success of the DM&EM program.
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B. Qualitative Perspective Analysis
The comprehensive empirical evidence gathering techniques and 
methods used in studying the DM&EM program revealed a number of 
findings and conclusions on the experience of adapting, adopting and 
diffusing l/DSS in a national context. This section covers our political, 
functional, and managerial perceptions and views about the DM&EM 
program during its development phases, i.e., initiation, base building, 
and institutionalization phases. These views will lead to the identification 
of the research findings and conclusions covered in Chapters VIII of fhis 
thesis. The perceptions, coupled with the concepts and theories 
covered earlier, confirm the importance of the findings, generalizations 
and proposed areas for future research.
1. Political Perspective
The political perspective analyzes the factors and conditions that led to 
realization of the DM&EM program. These factors include, top level 
decision makers commitment, change in the decision making process, 
change in the debt acquisition process, change in the roles and 
responsibilities of involved institutions in the external debt management 
process, change in organizational structure and dynamics, and user 
involvement in the program. The phased political perspective im pact 
could be viewed as follows: -
a. Initiation
During the Initiation Phase (from early 1987 till mid-1989), the DM&EM
program suffered from a lack of political commitment. The reason
behind this was the lack of clarity of fhe uses and benefits of the l/DSS
in the absence of proper computerization and basic information
infrastructure. Lack of user understanding and awareness also greatly
contributed to this problem. The decision making process prior to this
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phase was a long, haphazard and undefined process that was difficult 
to study or generalize. There was no defined pattern followed or 
enforced; the process was basically dependent on an individual 
decision maker's background, experience, and management style. 
Top level strategic decision makers heavily depended on advisors, 
specializing in different fields, for studying, analyzing and 
recommending solutions. The practice of relying so heavily on advisors 
was characterized by two main problems: very theoretical 
recommendations being made due to the fact that most of these 
advisors were university professors and possibly inexperienced in actual 
practice; lack of coordination and global planning among the various 
advisors. The result was consistently poor, contradicting, overlapping 
and low quality information. The nature of the recommendations was 
insubstantial and uni-directional, i.e., there were a limited set of 
scenarios that could be presented mainly because of the lack of tools 
and reliance on a “ trial and error” advisory pattern (Kattab, interview - 
1993). At that time, decision making concerning management of 
external debt was even worse. Egypt did not posses a structured 
procedure for borrowing agencies to follow, nor a central coordinating 
body, which could have objectively set external borrowing guidelines. 
This complex arrangement was not conducive to efficient external 
borrowing. The lack of a central and active coordinating body, 
involving the participation of the highest government authorities, led to 
a failure in developing a long term financing strategy and, in turn the 
development of a foreign borrowing process.
Furthermore, the structural rigidity, and poor performance of several 
public sector organizations with large external debt and several foreign 
loans contracted under inappropriate terms com pounded the 
magnitude of the debt problem (Hammed, interview - 1993). In this 
respect, we discovered that, in the past, debt decision makers
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performed debt management functions solely to satisfy creditors and / 
or lenders to respond to external pressures from financial institutions 
such as the World Bank. The reason for this was that, in order to acquire 
additional funds, Egypt had to appear as if it was regularly performing 
full debt management functions.
A major turning point was realized when the HLEC was invited by 
program management, headed by the Cabinet Minister for 
Administrative Development, for a presentation3 of DM&EM program 
capabilities, outputs and deliverables. It was a demonstration of how 
this tool could be useful for supporting, leveraging and shaping 
decision making in a national context (details are fully presented in 
Chapter V, Section B).
b. Base Building
The Base Building Phase (from mid-1989 till late 1990) was characterized 
by an escalation of interest and almost full commitment from the HLEC, 
a direct result of the successful program presentation and the 
demonstration of its output during the above mentioned January 1987 
meeting. The DM&EM Program team together with the Minister of 
Cabinet Affairs for Administrative Development and the Governor of 
the CBE presented their case in an ingenious way. The supply driven, 
touch and try, prototyping style of the demonstration attracted many 
high level users. Securing top level decision makers’ commitment was 
in itself a major goal of the project team since it helped in securing 
much needed support and resources for the program and its charter 
top/dow n approach. In addition, securing the interest and support of 
the highest levels of the constitutional authorities (the President and 
Prime Minister) helped protect the program from a lack of 
coordination. Clear, concise guidelines could then be developed for
3 Took place on the Cabinet premises in January 1987.
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all institutions involved in the debt management process.
During this phase, an overview of the program and its objectives, goals 
and achievements were highlighted. It witnessed a clear vision of what 
needed to be achieved and the method to employ to achieve it. The 
vision and strategies were translated by the program team into specific 
objectives and goals. A considerable amount of time, effort and 
money was spent on studying other international experiences. At that 
time the IMF, UNDP and the UNCTAD were invited to lend technical 
assistance in the area of debt management to support GOE initiatives. 
They were selected from a list of technical assistance agencies that 
provided this advisory service, but were specifically chosen based 
upon their experience under similar conditions in developing counties,
i.e., complex debt stock situations in a deteriorating economy "SILIC" 
(severely indebted low-income countries) country.
During this phase, high level political commitment began to yield a 
more l/DSS culture-rich decision making environment with a decrease 
in the number of lower managerial positions resisting change and in the 
number who were not interested in cooperating with the program (El 
Sherif, interview - 1993). The decreasing level of resistance to change 
helped in the re-design of various roles and responsibilities within the 
CBE-LEDD (presented in detail in Chapter V, Sec. C) specifically and in 
other involved government institutions in general (Hammed, interview - 
1993). In our opinion, this new positioning of the involved parties in the 
external debt management process under one umbrella would not 
have been realized without firm political commitment and 
encouragement from top authorities regardless of the changes in 
personnel and positions of ministers, top decision makers and /  or 
governments.
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c. Institutionalization
The Institutionalization Phase (from early 1991 till early 1995) was 
characterized by evaluation of overall program objectives and goals, 
what had been achieved, what had not been achieved, and how to 
improve the program. Unlike many l/DSS programs in the literature in 
general and implemented by IDSC specifically, the feasibility of the 
DM&EM program was apparent by the end of its Initiation Phase. It was 
during this time period that the first Paris Club negotiation rounds for 
Egypt were held during which the prototype of the debt management 
l/DSS (consisting of a full database of loans and their accompanying 
detail) was used. According to the Governor of the CBE, “ .. the savings 
realized for one day of debt service payment for the Egyptian debt 
stock would pay for the entire program” . (Hammed, 1993)
In commenting on the program, President Hoseny Mubarak said: 
before this we used to receive interest and principle payment claims 
from any creditor claiming a certain amount and we would directly 
pay without any validation and /  or cross-checking. Now, the 
government has the information vehicle and the support mechanisms 
which enable it to survey all our external debt and obligations towards 
creditors in minor detail and to the cent. We have requested the 
government to continue these efforts and build on this experience by 
utilizing the information to develop complementary tools which will 
allow the country to manage its future borrowings with a developed 
and more advanced macro-economic perspective...” .4 
With a clearer vision of the program by both users and program 
managers, increasing political support, and more user involvement, 
program enhancement was realized which led to production of a clear 
external debt acquisition and management framework that included
4 CNN Interview with President Hosni Moubark, Egypt, July 12, 1991.
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specific guidelines for roles and responsibilities for involved agencies 
and institutions. It is worth mentioning that top level commitment was 
not deterred by failures that sometimes faced the program. Top level 
supporters rationalized that a certain amount of failure was inevitable 
while the program team gained knowledge of debt management, a 
newly developing field that had no text books to follow (Ebied, 
interview - 1993). They regarded such false starts as an integral part of 
the learning process for the DM&EM program team. The emphasis of 
the program then shifted from problem solving to problem avoidance 
in an effort to effect economic development in the country. In a sense, 
top officials perceived the debt management program as the 
cornerstone for economic reform. It focused on avoiding future 
problems and burdens at both the economic and social levels, It 
devised and supported the mechanisms and the systems that not only 
looked at the past but zoomed in on the future, forecasting and 
anticipating problems and setting the groundwork for dealing with 
them (Sedki, interview - 1993). The above factors led to a major 
change in institutional structure and in prioritizing institutional functions 
that directly affected institutional management of foreign debt.
2. Functional Perspective
The functional perspective analyzes the adaptation, adoption and 
diffusion factors that led to the realization of the DM&EM program. 
These factors look carefully at technical versus conceptual l/DSS, 
application of l/DSS use, context of l/DSS use, issue-based l/DSS, 
localization and other related l/DSS issues. The phased functional 
perspective im pact could be viewed as follows: -
a. Initiation
During initiation period, the functional perspective factors were very
much supported by the political ones. That is to say that the early
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political support for the program directly affected the functional 
factors that, in turn, affected the inception and realization of the 
DM&EM program. However, program supporters, builders, 
implementors and managers were constantly faced with the 
challenges of continuously adopting appropriate state-of-the-art 
technologies (requiring continuous exposure and search for new 
technologies) in addition to working on adapting the program to the 
Egyptian decision making “cultural interface” (modification to match 
context of use in addition to arabization) and finally, in diffusing it to the 
working society in an attem pt to make it the default working standard 
(via continuous training and practical use by the work force).
In our opinion, the l/DSS's initial entry was successful5 due to the fact
that its implementation was simple and user-friendly employing simple 
tools such as spread sheets and databases that were supported by 
timely and accurate data and dependable qualified and dedicated 
staff (Kaddah, interview -  1993).
b. Base Building
The base building period witnessed a more in-depth functional analysis 
of requirements and user needs, translating them into functional l/DSS 
systems and procedures and testing them out for proper adjustment 
and implementation. Sub-systems (see Chapter V, Section 10) were 
developed for contextual applications that both addressed proper use 
and satisfied local needs. Unlike the corporate l/DSS application, 
DM&EM l/DSS application was characterized by being more “ issue -  
based", addressing semi-structured and ill-structured issues (El Sherif,
5 More than 70 % of our researched sample set have indicated that they decision
making process and style of management has been affected by the DM&EM 
program realization and that it becam e an integral part of their work processes. 
Physically, we have seen such top police/decision makers creating physical locations 
for their l/DSS support team in addition to funnelling most of their decision support 
needs through such unit.
194
Analysis of the Egyptian l/DSS Debt Management Program Chapter VI
1988). It was a unique development by local experts who found very 
little data on similar l/DSS applications to study (El Sherif, interview - 
1993). In addition, localizing the UNCTAD system (the DMFAS6), in terms 
of adapting it to local context (Egyptian debt stock structure and 
terms) and enforcing local cultural interfaces (arabization of screens 
and outputs), represented a great technical challenge (Kaddah, 
interview - 1993). Table VI -1 contains an outline of strategies used in 
tackling these problems.
Table VI -1
Examples of Contextual Fit Improvement Strategies Used by 
IDSC / DM&EM Tearrv
Description Effects
Two-Tiered Teams
IDSC /  DM&EM design teams include two 
types of members: one who is technically 
competent (typically a young college 
graduate) and another who is fully 
experienced with the bureaucracy (an 
older person with government 
experience.
Reverse Distributed Processing 
Approach for developing technology 
infrastructure that started with islands of 
personal computers, linked them 
together, built a network infrastructure, 
and finally added a mini-computer.
Arabization of Software 
Linguistic and cultural adaptation of user 
interfaces to the Egyptian decision­
making environment.
Chauffeured l/DSS Use
Use of staff intermediaries for supporting 
senior policy makers rather than having 
him or her directly on-line.
Bridged translation gap between l/DSS 
builders and typical bureaucrats whose 
inputs are sought and needed. Improved 
communication and minimized risk of 
technical failures.
Bridged user-technology gap and allowed 
accelerated implementation of 
applications. There are now 35 PCs and a 
data network of national nodes at the CBE 
and various ministries.
Bridged user-application gap. Custom 
applications and many standard tools 
(such as DBase III, Lotus 1-2-3, FOCUS) are 
fully arabized. Bilingual (English/Arabic) 
electronic mail in beta test.
Kept focus on providing support for 
strategic decision making rather than 
draining IDSC /  DM&EM resources in 
supporting non-strategic office 
applications.
6 Discussed in detail in Chapter V, Section C.
7 In part from El Sherif and El Sawy, 1988
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In our opinion, the success of this phase was very much dependent on 
the qualified staff who were created through continuous training and 
exposure to the international arena. Additionally, top management 
support and acceptance of the continuous modifications and 
changes, due to the rapid growth and changes in the l/DSS field and 
the adoption of the fast delivery prototyping approach to system 
design, contributed a great deal.
c. Institutionalization
The functional perspective of this phase meant to address more fine- 
tuning of the needs and further adjustments to the contextual issues. It 
tended to shift from supporting individual issues and inquiries to more 
global policies and external debt strategies. This level of maturity came 
as a result of many alterations and refinements to the system. As a 
result, the DM&EM program started to shift from being just a program to 
becoming a fully fledged debt management unit fully institutionalized 
at the CBE - LEDD (early 1994). Over time, the unit becam e an integral 
part of the CBE and represented the heart of the country’s external 
debt management operation. Figure VI - 3 represent our view of the 
Egyptian Debt Management Unit (DMU) institutional positioning and 
functional role.
Moreover, during this phase our research shows that the major concern 
of top policy and decision makers was the future continuity of this 
program. This concern was aimed at subsequent and complementary 
phases that needed to be developed following the same path and 
employing the same critical success factors. We agree to their 
characterization of the impact and gains8 from the DM&EM program as 
a good solid foundation for a full economic reform program, but it is
8 Presented in detail in Section C of this chapter.
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not enough. We agree that institutionalization and sustained growth of 
such a program and, in turn, the DMU, is very much linked to 
developments in areas like debt strategy modules, further 
enhancement of the l/DSS, enrichment of DM&EM program outputs 
and deliverables and widening of the scope of coverage to include 
internal debt, for example and usage. Additionally, developments in 
the field of financial and capital market systems, as well as other 
related balance of payment and trade balance systems, is a 
requirement. Ultimately, the networking of these systems and their 
integration and transportability to each other will represent the utmost 
economic goal of this program (Sedki, interview - 1993).
Central Bank of Egypt
LEDD
G overnm ent Loans
G eneral R eports
G uaranteed  
Private Sector
Supp liers  C red it
Loans From In t’l 
A gencies Q uery R eports
A rab D eposits
Buyers C redit A nalytica l R eports
DEBT MANAGEMENT 
UNIT (DMU)
Statistical / Accounting Unit
"W ho sho u ld  m o n ito r"
Operational Unit
W ho a p p ra ise s , n e g o tia te s , 
utilizes & re p o rts "
Advisory Unit
'W here  to  b o rrow ., a t  w h a t  
_________ term s "__________
Control Unit
W ho sho u ld  b o rro w . H ow  
m u c h  c o n tro l"_____
Policy Committee / Unit
" H o w  m u c h  to  b o rro w "
Figure VI-3
Institutional and Functional Role of the Egyptian DMU
(For more details about the DM&EM program and DMU focus, please 
refer to Appendix VI -  B.)
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3. Managerial Perspective
The managerial perspective analyzes the different project 
management factors that affected the inception and realization of the 
DM&EM program. Such factors address management style, 
recruitment, human resources development and training patterns, plus 
other project management related issues, in light of the program 
phases. The phased managerial perspective im pact could be viewed 
as follows: -
a. initiation
Though the initiation period has witnessed considerable political 
support and commitment, program management faced the classic 
problem of trying to implement a technology-based program, 
dependent on timely information and expertise in both l/DSS and debt 
management, in a typical government bureaucratic environment 
burdened with unskilled, less experienced, under-paid and almost 
untrained employees. Faced with this poor working environment; 
inability to recruit from outside the government sector (as long as the 
government possessed the needed human resource); lack of 
resources, as well as the means9 to pay market salaries and benefits,
the program faltered seriously during its inception. Though the Cabinet 
IDSC, which does not follow the normal government rules and 
regulations in recruitment and salary structure, was involved from the 
beginning of the DM&EM program, they represented the l/DSS 
technology section only. This part of the program was very trivial 
compared to the contextual section, i.e., the debt management and 
Egyptian debt stock experience represented by the CBE - LEDD staff.
9 According to Egyptian law, government employees cannot work in two jobs at the
same time and there is no way and means to pay them more than the salary and  
incentives contained in his contract, which is usually low.
1 9 8
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These severe constraints, the presentation to HLEC in January 1987 and 
the pressing deadline for the first Paris Club negotiation round, 
prompted the Minister for Cabinet Affairs for Administrative 
Development to secure a consensus from the HLEC, and in turn the 
Cabinet, on abolishing many of these constraints, at least for such 
critical programs. This significantly revived the DM&EM program, and its 
management started recruiting high caliber staff, paying them market- 
based salaries and incentives in addition to planning their 
organizational careers. In the meantime, program m anagem ent’s 
focus was on building the main debt database that consolidated all 
the previous attempts at computerizing the debt stock, in addition to 
securing all possible details on loans, their terms, and their status. This 
was a massive coordination, collection, buildup and refining effort 
(Ezzat, interview - 1993). Finally, according to Mr. Khaled El Sayed10, "..
during the 1991 Paris Club negotiations we were sitting in one place 
and our creditors in another and there was a runner who carried 
messages between us. We were required to respond immediately to 
any proposed suggestions or alternatives in a matter of minutes (15-30 
minutes approximately) accep t or refuse. What was being proposed 
might be a golden opportunity which, if accepted, would be a great 
achievement, and, if not, might be a great loss. The opposite was 
equally true, if the proposal was not as good as it might appear. 
Without the powerful l/DSS capability that we had, it would have been 
next to impossible for any human being to study, analyze and compare 
the feasibility and im pact of any proposed solution. Prior to this, we did 
not even have the capability to compare, check and contrast our 
debt figures and terms with other creditor countries. Moreover, we had 
reached the level of not only studying and analyzing but modifying
10 Mr. Khaled El Sayed is the senior technical project manager who was nominated 
from the CBE-LEDD and trained by IDSC.
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and convincing creditors that different scenarios might better suit both 
of us and would accomplish almost the same goal. Furthermore, 
several reports were published after the negotiation rounds describing 
our systems, especially the database, in which it was described as the 
“Cream of the crop” due to its comprehensiveness and accuracy. 
Others, such as the resident advisor of the IMF, described it as being a 
“Clear" database, i.e., error free, where its outputs are 100 % correct 
and its reliability uncontested.” 11
b. Base-Building
This period of the program reflects our analysis of findings on the 
implementation of the DM&EM program as well as on the use of l/DSS 
when faced with typical project management challenges. These 
challenges include:
M anagem ent Style: The early involvement of the cabinet IDSC had a 
positive im pact on the success of the DM&EM program in that its role 
was important with regards to managerial and organizational aspects. 
These aspects were related to spreading awareness of the concept of 
l/DSS, establishing a human and technological infrastructure capable 
of realizing the mission and objectives of the program, and training the 
program team to operate in crisis management mode, if required. In 
spreading awareness, the IDSC depended on a series of presentations 
and training courses for different users, supporters and program teams 
in which was explained the mission, objectives, importance, benefits, 
output, and other aspects of the DM&EM Program specifically and the 
l/DSS culture in general. Additionally, and with the help of the IDSC, the 
DM&EM program periodically organized high level expert meeting /
"Quoting Mr. Abou El Ezz, " ... I can show you letters between several creditor
countries and us, which moved back and forth between us for six months, as we 
debated and argued about debt figures and terms and in the end they were 
convinced that w e are right..."
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brainstorming sessions where they presented new ideas and 
developments, and suggested new deliverables while eliciting 
comments and suggestions from the audience. Such meetings were 
usually attended by various political, managerial, and technical 
decision makers.
Organizationally, the IDSC and the CBE made a major contribution in 
the formulation of the program document consisting of its objectives, 
scope, deliverables, phases, structure, etc. They also shared ideas in 
defining job descriptions for the various staff required for the program. 
Program management effected a non-governmental working 
environment from the very beginning. Open flexible hours, a favorable 
working environment, a sharing and “soft" organizational structure, in 
addition to exposure to the latest l/DSS tools were the main theme and 
a major attraction for program personal. With this favorable working 
environment, good pay, excellent training and exposure, the program 
becam e a focus of attention for many graduates and members of the 
existing work force who wanted to change careers. It is worth 
mentioning that the increase in competition for time on the program 
has also increased the need for trained personnel to operate the 
program.
Recruitment, Training and Human Resources Development: With the 
facilities offered to the program by the HLEC, recruiting from outside 
the government and paying market based salaries and unlimited 
incentives, in addition to the positions offered, as explained above, 
DM&EM program management were able to be very selective in their 
choice of staff. They recruited a mix of IDSC employees (transferred), 
CBE - LEDD employees (transferred) and others of equal caliber from 
the market place. The program proved that although academ ic and 
professional backgrounds were important, proper selection of staff,
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coupled with the relevant training and human resources development 
plans, would yield the desired caliber of staff. The program human 
resources development plan's aim was to produce economic 
information specialists, technical l/DSS specialists, and debt 
management specialists. The purpose was to form a solid nucleus of 
l/DSS debt management specialists that could support the strategic as 
well as the tactica l goals of this ambitious program.
Incentives and Career Planning: Incentives and monetary rewards did 
yield good results in terms of staff performance and productivity. With 
direct objective criteria for incentives and rewards it proved to be 
cheaper and more cost effective than the government system. The 
reason behind this was that even though the government salary scale 
was lower it proved more costly since a larger number of people had 
to be hired to compensate for the low productivity rate. Government 
workers are paid incentives regardless of their productivity since it is 
used as a means of compensation for low pay. In the system where 
seniority is based upon age and time on the job, not achievement, job 
descriptions do not match the qualifications of the job holder, and in 
the absence of performance and accounting criteria, differentiation 
via promotion and incentives is next to impossible. In overcoming these 
problems, program management developed very concise incentive 
criteria that were based solely upon performance and creativity. 
Incentives and rewards were much more than monetary benefits; they 
included travel and in-kind gifts. Overall, it was a cost effective 
transaction for the DM&ME program in the sense that they were paying 
extremely high incentives, but to fewer individuals and only those 
meeting stringent criteria.
Furthermore, career planning was an integral part of program 
management’s tasks and objectives. Our findings and the results of the
202
Analysis of the Egyptian l/DSS Debt Management Program Chapter VI
interviews, together with documentation on the program, indicate that 
a considerable amount of time was spent on career planning, job 
descriptions, organizational structures, performance and promotion 
criteria and other career aspects. Some of these aspects were 
touched upon in Chapter V, Section C and Figure V-2.
Prototyping and User Involvement: The design and delivery strategy 
followed by the DM&EM program was viewed as an iterative approach 
of l/DSS introduction to a new culture. The conditions and constraints 
faced during the early stages of the program dictated executing an 
easy and smooth penetration strategy. Following a prototyping 
approach, the aim was a fast and phased design and delivery mode 
of operation that encouraged and linked users and support 
incrementally. Our analysis of the research findings shows that at the 
beginning of the program seven out of ten ideas were generated by 
program management i.e. experts, consultants and staff. The balance 
represented those ideas initiated by users in the form of new requests 
and inquires. Moreover, we observed that six out of ten of the user 
generated ideas were general enough, and useful at the same time, 
to the extent that the program chose it to be one of its regular 
services12. Over time, various users of the program built their own
capacities and capabilities13 and were able to identify new target
service areas and produce their own required support.
12 An example of such output is the "External Debt Outlook" a classified report that is
produced monthly showing changes in the external debt situation, its analysis, 
presentation of different scenarios and suggestions that could be implemented by 
decision makers to reach a better external debt situation. What we have observed is 
that 75% of the structure of such reports are based on numeric and graphical 
representation. Moreover, beside its printed format, it is being supplied electronically 
to interested decision-makers allowing them to maneuver more with their inputs and 
gaining a different look at their issue.
13 Personalized l/DSS service in the form of l/DSS back office attached to the office of 
the decision maker and improvised in his process of decision making.
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Moreover, while user involvement was dependent on several variables, 
the most important was user awareness in terms of (i) the magnitude of 
the problem and its real implication on the national economy and (ii) 
the capabilities of l/DSS tools that could contribute significantly to the 
solution. User awareness and involvement have enriched and 
contributed to the building the program.
c. Institutionalization
During this phase, the managerial perspective suggested that full 
transformation of the DM&EM program be appraised via realizing a 
series of objectives, assessing problems, facing challenges and seizing 
opportunifies. Moreover, throughout the series of interviews conducted, 
we observed that seven out of ten requests were still being posed by 
decision makers. This result indicated a general agreement that 
expanding the implementation and institutionalization of the DMU to 
complement the DM&EM program was essential. We have noted that 
success, if realized, is very much dependent on the accum ulated 
experience and the increasing user needs. We have also observed that 
most users have stressed the fact that they are keen on pushing the 
program to continue development of the complementary phases at 
the same operational mode but having learned from the lessons 
highlighted above. Finally, we believe that this accum ulated 
experience could be made useful in other similar situations and its 
transportability would represent a power shift for those who would 
benefit from it. It is worth mentioning here that debt management 
needs to be looked at as a group effort involving many different 
countries rather than on individual basis since success and failure seem 
to affect the world economy. For this reason we support the Egyptian 
efforts in establishing the African Debt Management Center.
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C. Quantitative Perspective Analysis
1. National Economic Perspective
The national economic perspective reflected the im pact felt as a result 
of the DM&EM program and translated it into unprecedented amounts 
of debt forgiveness from major bilateral creditors, as well as the debt 
and debt service relief provided by the Paris Club. This in turn allowed 
Egypt a unique position for recreating some sort of creditworthiness 
among creditors and investors. The GOE constantly had in mind that 
the success of the DM&EM program would ensure that the Paris Club 
countries would indeed provide the 50 percent net present value (NPV) 
relief which was necessary for a meaningful attack on the debt 
hanging over Egypt.
Moreover, the GOE committed itself to seeking, from all its external 
creditors holding debt of comparable maturity (explicitly non-Paris Club 
countries, commercial banks and suppliers), debt reduction and re­
organization arrangements at terms comparable to those set forth in 
the Paris Club Agreement. In actuality, arrangements with these 
creditors may not be more favorable (to creditors) than those provided 
by the Paris Club. The GOE committed to regularly informing the 
secretariat of the Paris Club (for the first time by January 1, 1992) its 
progress in this regard (Ebied, interview -  1993). Bringing the external 
debt situation under control was a necessary condition for restoration 
of some degree of creditworthiness and feelings of some tangible 
economic net gains. The following tables (VI-2, 3 & 4) give a numeric 
sense of the net gains realized as a result of the DM&EM program and 
compare debt service payments before and after the Paris Club 1991 
agreement. These net gains will result if Egypt fully complies with 
current and projected IMF program terms and conditions aimed at 
energizing the Egyptian economy so that it can pay its debt and
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external commitments in the future. Full compliance also means 
Egypt's achieving 50% NPV debt reduction over the course of its 
phased economic reform program.
Table VI - 2
(Millions US dollars)
Egypt’s Debt service Payments Before and After 
the May 1991 Paris Club Agreement14
BEFORE 1991
FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96
Original debt service 
Obligations
6420 1979 1943 1513 1762
(6721) (2308) (2313) (2123) (1862)
ODA'5 504 208 240 247 244
17.441 (489) (541) (544) 1.534)
Non-ODA16 5916 1771 1703 1515 1268
(5956) (1819) U772). (1579) 11327)
AFTER 1991
FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96
Original debt service 
Obligations
67217 672 672 323 406
(812) (812) (812) (478) (571)
ODA 27 27 27 60 60
(147) (147) (152) (195) (205)
Non-ODA 645 645 645 263 346
(665) (665) (665) (283) (366)
For comparison purposes, we have included case studies for Egypt if it
does not succeed in firmly controlling its foreign debt and external 
commitment. The following two tables summarize what the results of 
the Paris Club debt reduction program would if Egypt does not fully
14 Second Paris Club Negotiation Round - February 1991.
l5Official Development Assistance Loans and sometimes called "concessional",
meaning "debt not contracted on market terms".
16 Debt contracted on market terms.
17 The big difference in this figure in comparison to the the before 1991 situation is due 
to the debt forgiveness that Egypt has realized in this period.
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comply with current and/or future IMF programs, i.e., if it achieves only 
30 percent reduction (Table VI-3) or 15 percent NPV reduction (Table 
VI-4).
Table VI - 3
(Millions US dollars)
Egypt’s Debt service Payments 
30 percent NPV Reduction
. FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96
Post Paris Club debt service 
obligations
672 672 672 694 775
(812) (812) (817) (849) (940)
ODA 27 27 27 87 87
(147) (147) (152) (222) (232)
Non-ODA 645 645 645 607 688
(665) (665) (665) (627) (708)
Table VI-4
(Millions US dollars)
Egypt’s Debt service payments 
15 Percent NPV Reduction
FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96
Post Paris Club debt service 
obligations
672 672 672 968 1047
(812) (812) (817) (1123) (1212)
ODA 27 27 27 103 103
(147) (147) (152) (238) (248)
Non-ODA 645 645 645 865 944
(665) (665) (665) (865) (964)
Note: Numbers between parentheses in tables VI-2 to VI-4 include debt 
service obligations to the United States, while those without parenthesis 
exclude them.
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2. E g yp t’s E c o n o m ic  In d ica to rs
According to Dr. Atef Sedki, economic relief was not the only purpose 
for implementing the program. The major goal was reversing the mind­
set, which led to such heavy indebtedness, and paving the way for 
Egypt’s economy to leapfrog into a new open market economy (Sedki, 
interview, 1993).
Other important net gains from the DM&EM program were the creation 
of vehicles for top policy and decision makers to act on the 
management of Egypt’s debt portfolio. The program empowered 
these controllers with the checks and balances to safely lead the 
creation of an optimum debt portfolio for the country. It identified ways 
of avoiding the several pitfalls that were present before program 
implementation. Among these pitfalls discovered and recorded by the 
program team, as part of program output, were:
• The percentage of borrowed and not utilized loans peaked at 45% 
of country’s total debt stock;
• an accum ulated debt portfolio that tended to be very rigid and 
mostly inclined to public or publicly guaranteed debt to the extent 
that almost 80% of the total debt stock was owed to only three 
internal borrowers (namely the Ministries of Electricity, 
Telecommunications and Agriculture); and
• No standards and/or feasibility criteria had been adopted in the 
borrowing process making it possible for and even encouraging any 
institution (mainly government) to borrow, while failing to calculate 
how the debt would be paid back, the feasibility of the loan against 
its projected use, and the feasibility of the loan’s terms and 
conditions (i.e., interest rate, grace period, borrowing currency, etc.), 
and finally failing to realize that the loan would be added to the 
country's debt stock automatically through the CBE.
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In conclusion, it is our opinion that the need tor a radical shift in the 
attitude of decision makers, was the ultimate goal to be achieved. This 
shift needed to move decision makers away from accepting given 
and/or imposed lending terms and conditions to a more discriminating 
mode in choosing what was most suitable to Egypt's economic abilities 
and needs (Sedki, interview -  1993).
Figures VI - 4, 5,6 and 7 gives a brief illustration of the change in the 
state of the Egyptian economy following the introduction of the 
DM&EM program (1982-1996) is.
Year
— ___________  ...
82 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
| TDS/XGS (%) 21.4 28.5 30.6 19.9 24.9 28.5 26.3 16.7 20.8 17.44 15.08 13.09 13.61
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Figure VI-4
Changes in Egyptian Economy Following Introduction of DM&EM
Debt Service to Export Ratio
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18 The DM&EM Program Information Bulletin 1996
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Year 82 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
Res./EDT (%) 6.1 3.8 3.8 4.9 4.3 4.8 9 15.2 24.56 32.58 35.04 38.38 44.21
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Figure VI-5
Changes in Egyptian Economy Following Introduction of DM&EM
International Reserves to Total Debt
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Figure VI-6
Changes in Egyptian Economy Following Introduction of DM&EM 
International Reserves to Imports of Goods & Services
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Figure VI-7
Changes in Egyptian Economy Following Introduction of DM&EM 
Total External Debt to Export of Goods & Services
3. International Economic Perspective
Our international economic perspective looks at views and 
perceptions of several reputable financial institutions on the 
improvements in the Egyptian economy to date.
a. The Paris Club gateway
The 1991 Paris Club Agreement gave Egypt’s creditors the choice 
between three different options (debt stock reduction, interest 
reduction and interest capitalization without interest accruing on the 
capitalized part) for debt originally contracted on concessional terms. 
It also gave them two different options (debt stock reduction and 
interest reduction) for debt originally contracted on market terms. In all 
cases, the new terms were constructed so that the NPV value of the 
original debt service payments would be reduced by at least 15% 
(option I) if the present stand-by arrangement with the IMF were 
canceled and/or no new arrangement existed 18 months after the 
expiration, and at most 50% (option III) if the IMF arrangements still
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existed after three years. In between, a possibility of 30% (option II) NPV 
reduction was offered and would come into effect if the IMF approved 
arrangements for three years, but no agreement could be reached for 
the period following the end of the third year. Egypt faced a situation 
whereby, in all cases, creditors might cancel the arrangement if a 
number of conditions were not met, including if Egypt failed to fulfill the 
financial obligations stipulated in the agreement.
Furthermore, while the Paris Club provided an important framework for 
the treatment of debt service obligations, it was mandatory that Egypt 
engage in bilateral negotiation with all participating creditors in order 
to consolidate the detailed debt data, i.e., loan terms and conditions, 
in addition to agreeing on the appropriate market rate for calculating 
future payment terms.
In December 1991, successful agreement was reached with France, 
the United States and Canada. The year 1992 was set as the deadline 
for Egypt to reach agreements with all other creditors (or at least the 
major ones that constituted 80 - 90% of the its debt stock). Because of 
the complexities of the agreement, a special account for the first three 
years’ debt service payments was established with the Banque de 
France into which Egypt deposited US$ 175 million quarterly starting 
October 15, 1991. On top of all this, creditors had the right to sell or 
exchange all outstanding claims originally contracted on concessional 
terms, and up to 10 percent (or US$ 20 million, whichever is higher) of 
claims originally contracted on commercial terms. Some creditors were 
reportedly considering ways to sell or convert claims through the debt 
conversion program when the debt conversion program started. Other 
countries, including the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK and Finland, 
canceled part of their ODA claims (Kaddah, interview -  1993).
The following tables outline international recognition from Paris Club 
creditor countries for ODA and non-ODA debt. As indicated, there are
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three conditional options for debt relief, each are bound by a set of 
phased achievements set forth by the IMF to be reached by the 
Egyptian economy. Egypt achieved the three phases reaching an 
agreement on total debt reduction of 50% as indicated in the last 
option (option III)19. The detailed options were20:
19 Ghali - Al Ahram Newspaper interview, May 27, 1994 - Cairo - Egypt.
20 Choice m ade by creditors
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A. For concessional (ODA) debt:
All Creditors: July 1, 1991 - June 30, 1994 
No principal payments, interest rate is 0.8%
“SUCCESSFUL”
June 30,1994 
C a n ce led  (OPTION 1)”
June 30, 1994 
Successful (OPTION II)22
June 30, 1994 
On track (OPTION 111)23
Canada  
Finland, 
France, the 
Netherlands, 
And the UK
• Would cancel between 0 and 60.2% 
(depending on the appropriate 
market rate and the net present 
value of original debt service 
obligations discounted at that 
market rate) of principal.
• Reschedule the remaining principal 
to be repaid between January 1997 
and July 2002
• Charge from July 1, 1994, 5% fixed 
interest.
• Would cancel between 0.3% and 
66.5% of principal (depending on the 
appropriate market rate and the net 
present value of original debt service 
obligation discounted at that market 
rate).
• Reschedule the remaining principal to 
be repaid between January 1999 and  
July 2011.
• Charge from July 1, 1994, 5% fixed 
interest.
• Would cancel between 0.4% and 
75.4% of principal (depending on the 
appropriate market rate and the net 
present value of original debt service 
obligations discounted at that market 
rate).
• Reschedule the remaining principal to 
be repaid between January 2017 and 
July 2026.
• Charge from Jul 1, 1994, 5% fixed 
interest.
21 Option I: If the 18-month stand by arrangement was canceled and /or the IMF board had not agreed on a new arrangement by 
December 31, 1992.
22 Option II: If the 18-month stand by arrangement was successfully concluded and the IMF board agreed to a new arrangement by 
December 31, 1992.
23 Option III: If IMF program had been on track and the IMF board had approved arrangements for the period beyond June 30, 1994.
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Ju n e  30,1994 
C a n c e le d  (OPTION \)*
June 30, 1994 
Successful (OPTION II)22
J u n e  30, 1994 
O n  tra c k  (OPTION 111)23
Belgium, 
Denmark, 
Germany, 
Italy, Spain 
And
Switzerland
• Would reschedule principal to be 
repaid between January 2003 and 
July 2021.
• Charge from July 1, 1994 an interest 
rate between 0.4% and 10% 
(depending on the appropriate 
market rate and the net present 
value of original debt)
• Reschedule principal to be repaid 
between January 2004 and July 2026.
• Charge from July 1, 1994 an interest 
rate between 0.3% and 8.1 % 
(depending on the appropriate 
market rate and the net present value 
of original debt)
• Reschedule principal to be repaid 
between January 2017 and July 2026.
• Charge from July 1, 1994 an interest 
rate between 0.1% and 
5.7%(depending on the appropriate 
market rate and the net present value 
of original debt)
USA Would reschedule the principal remaining after the unilateral debt write off prior to the agreement so that it would be repaid 
between January 1994 and July 2021
215
Perspective Analysis of the Egyptian l/DSS Debt Management Program Chapter VI
B. For Non-Concessional (non-ODA) Debt:
The Non-concessional debt was divided into batches:
First batch:
• All principal due as of July 1, 1991 according to the agreement of May 22, 1987.
• Principal and interest in arrears as of June 30, 1991,
• All principal and interest due from July 1, 1991 to June 30, 1994 on non-previously consolidated debt.
Second batch:
• All principal and interest due from July 1, 1994 to June 30, 1997.
Third batch:
• All principal and interest due from July 1, 1997.
All Creditors: July 1, 1991 - June 1994;
No principal payments. Interest payments on the first batch, according to the appropriate market 
rate, would be reduced by 30 percent.
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For the first batch:
“SUCCESSFUL”
June 30,1994 
Canceled (OPTION 1)
June 30, 1994 
Successful (OPTION II)
June 30, 1994 
On track (OPTION III)
Finland,
France, the 
Netherlands, 
Germany, 
Sweden and 
The UK
• Would cancel between 6.2% 
and 12.6 of principal 
(depending on the 
appropriate market rate).
• Reschedule the remaining 
part of the first batch to be 
repaid between January 1996 
and July 2016.
• Charge from July 1,1994 the 
appropriate market rate.
• Would cancel between x% and x% of 
principal (depending on the 
appropriate market rate).
• Reschedule the remaining part of the 
first batch to be repaid between 
January 1996 and July 2016.
• Charge from July 1,1994 the 
appropriate market rate.
• Would cancel between 53.2% and
61.7% of principal (depending on the 
appropriate market rate).
• Reschedule the remaining part of the 
first batch to be repaid between 
January 1996 and July 2016.
• Charge from July 1,1994 the 
appropriate market rate.
Australia,
Austria,
Belgium,
Canada,
Denmark,
France, Italy,
Japan,
Norway,
Spain, and
Switzerland
• Would reschedule the entire 
batch to be repaid between  
January 1995 and July 2016.
• Charge from July 1, 1994 an 
interest rate between 3.7% 
and 14.8% (depending on the 
appropriate market rate).
• Would reschedule the entire batch to 
be repaid between January 1995 and 
July 2016.
• Charge from July 1, 1994 an interest 
rate between 1.9% and 10.2% 
(depending on the appropriate market 
rate).
• Would reschedule the entire batch to 
be repaid between January 1995 and 
July 2016.
• Charge from July 1, an interest 
ratebetween 0.1% and 4.1% 
(depending on the appropriate market 
rate).
USA • Would reschedule the principal as of July 1, 1991 (basically what remained after the unilateral debt write off prior to the 
agreement) as well as interest in arrears as of June 30, 1991 so that it would be repaid between January 2000 and July 
2006.
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For the Second batch:
“ SUCCESSFUL”
June 30,1994 
Canceled (OPTION 1)
June 30, 1994 
Successful (OPTION II)
June 30, 1994 
On track (OPTION III)
Finland 
France, the 
Netherlands, 
Germany 
Sweden 
And UK
• Would cancel 15% of the 
batch.
• Reschedule the remaining 
part of the batch to be repaid 
between July 1996 and 
January 2021.
• Charge from July 1,1994 the 
appropriate market rate.
• Would cancel 30%of the batch.
• Reschedule the remaining part of 
batch to be repaid between July 1996 
and January 2021.
• Charge from July 1,1994 the 
appropriate market rate.
• Would cancel 50% of the batch.
• Reschedule the remaining part of the 
batch to be repaid between July 1996 
and January 2021.
• Charge from July 1,1994 the 
appropriate market rate.
Australia,
Austria,
Belgium,
Canada,
Denmark,
France,
Italy, Japan, 
Norway, 
Spain, and 
Switzerland
• Would reschedule the entire 
second batch to be repaid 
between July 1996 and 
January 2021.
• Charge from July 1, 1994 an 
interest rate between 3.6% 
and 13.2% (depending on the 
appropriate market rate).
• Would reschedule the entire second 
batch to be repaid between July 1996 
and January 2021.
• Charge from July 1, 1994 an interest 
rate between 2.2% and 10.4% 
(depending on the appropriate market 
rate).
• Would reschedule the entire second 
batch to be repaid between July 1996 
and January 2021.
• Charge from July 1, 1994 an interest 
rate between 0.3% and 6.7% 
(depending on the appropriate market 
rate).
USA • Would reschedule the principal as of July 1, 1991 (basically what remained after the unilateral debt write off prior to the 
agreement) as well as interest in arrears as of June 30, 1991 so that it would be repaid between January 2000 and July 2006.
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For the third batch:
“SUCCESSFUL”
June 30,1994 
Canceled (OPTION 1)
June 30, 1994 
Successful (OPTION II)
June 30, 1994 
On track (OPTION III)
Finland 
France, the 
Netherlands, 
Germany 
Sweden 
And UK
• Would cancel 15% of the 
batch.
• Reschedule the remaining 
part of the batch to be repaid 
between July 1999 and 
January 2024.
• Charge from July 1,1994 the 
appropriate market rate.
• Would cancel 30%of the batch.
• Reschedule the remaining part of the 
batch to be repaid between July 1999 
and January 2024.
• Charge from July 1,1994 the 
appropriate market rate.
• Would cancel 50% of the batch.
• Reschedule the remaining part of the 
batch to be repaid between July 1999 
and January 2024.
• Charge from July 1,1994 the 
appropriate market rate.
Australia,
Austria,
Belgium,
Canada,
Denmark,
France,
Italy, Japan, 
Norway, 
Spain, and 
Switzerland
• Would reschedule the entire 
third batch to be repaid 
between July 1999 and 
January 2024.
• Charge from July 1, 1994 an 
interest rate between 3.6% 
and 13.2% (depending on the 
appropriate market rate).
• Would reschedule the entire third 
batch to be repaid between July 1999 
and January 2024.
• Charge from July 1, 1994 an interest 
rate between 2.2% and 10.4 % 
(depending on the appropriate market 
rate).
• Would reschedule the entire third 
batch to be repaid between July 1999 
and January 2024.
• Charge from July 1, 1994 an interest 
rate between 0.3% and 6.7% 
(depending on the appropriate market 
rate).
USA • Would reschedule the principal as of July 1, 1991 (basically what remained after the unilateral debt write off prior to the 
agreement) as well as interest in arrears as of June 30, 1991 so that it would be repaid between January 2000 and July 2006.
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b. Non Paris Club creditor countries
The seriousness of the Egyptian economic reform program in general 
and its debt management component specifically, qualified Egypt for 
an unprecedented amount of debt forgiveness from major bilateral 
creditors. It also provided Egypt with debt and debt service relief from 
the Paris Club, a fact that allowed Egypt to restore its creditworthiness 
among international creditors and investors. One of its highest priorities 
was the successful implementation of all necessary measures, the most 
important of which was the establishment of a solid debt management 
operation, in order to secure the Paris Club countries 50 percent net 
present value relief24. Non-Paris Club creditor countries also realized
Egypt’s effort in fulfilling its commitment to seek debt reduction and 
reorganization arrangements on terms comparable to those set forth in 
the Paris Club agreements.
One other form of international recognition and appreciation for the 
Egyptian debt management accumulated experience crystallized in a 
number of international invitations from different countries and 
monetary institutions for program personnel to present their experience 
and spearhead similar programs for countries facing the same 
problems. A good example was the invitation by the UNDP for Egypt to 
take the lead in establishing an African Debt Center for the continent’s 
indebted countries (Hammed, Interview -  1993). These invitations 
represented a sort of deployment of Egypt's debt management to 
sketch out a full implementation plan for the establishment of such a 
center. It was mandated that this plan would provide all the technical 
and non-technical requirements, pre-requisites, foundations and 
outputs for countries using this center.
Moreover, the plan would also detail all resources required and provide
24 President Hosni Mobarak - Speech in front of the Parliament - April 30, 1994
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a clear guideline on how it would attack this chronic problem 
especially for countries that possessed characteristics similar to Egypt.
c. An IMF view
Howard Handy, the President of the IMF task force responsible for Egypt 
and the Middle East, headed a delegation to Egypt in February, 199725
where he announced that:
1.The economic growth rate would reach 5% in the year 1997.This 
growth would be considerably good for the economy and was 
expected to gradually increase to 7% by the end of the century.
2. IMF expectations were based on the re-engineering tasks under 
taken by the GOE together with the continuation of financial 
stability and the increasing rates of both saving and investment.
3. The “ positive” surplus in balance of payment amounted to 1.2 
billion US dollars for the year 1996. This represented a great 
achievement for the Egyptian economy and an affirmed indicator 
that the Egyptian government was applying economic measures 
which should encourage more foreign investors to come to Egypt 
and participate in its growth.
4. The deficit in the balance of trade was expected to reach 14% of 
GDP which would be no serious concern since it would be backed 
up by a huge surplus of other sources of foreign currency.
5. Egypt’s performance in fiscal reform was outstanding to the degree 
that the deficit in the national budget was reduced to 0.08% 
compared to the anticipated figure of 11% as indicated by World 
Bank experts.
6. One of the major reasons behind that reduction was the decreased 
amount of debt service payment as a result of the Paris Club 
reduction for external debt. This reduction also reflected the gradual
25 Press conference announcement during an IMF delegation regular review mission 
to Egypt, February 3, 1997, Cairo, Egypt.
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restructuring of governmental expenditures towards the service, 
health and education sectors of the economy.
7. The fiscal restructuring allowed the reduction of the inflation rate to 
6.2% in 1997. This was expected in the upcoming years to change 
the governmental deficit to surplus with the continuation of its fiscal 
measures.
IMF officials also appraised the privatization program in Egypt, with 22 
major companies being privatized, resulting in returns that were 
equivalent to 1.5% of the GDP, most of which was directed to pay the 
internal debts of public sector companies to banks. The other portion 
was directed to compensate the labor force that might have been 
harmed by such privatization. Officials also added that service of 
internal debt is expected to decrease to 50% of the GDP, which would 
result in further reduction in the deficit of the BOP. They also appraised 
the growth in the Egyptian stock market and concluded that prices 
were not overly high especially since the price index was still at a 
reasonable level.
It is worth noting that the IMF, together with the World Bank, was a 
major economic reform reference for the GOE and the DMU in 
successfully implementing the debt management program. The DMU’s 
guidance and approval for the general framework and the programs 
basic objectives was crucial to achieving success.26
d. A Standard & Poors view
Internationally, DM&EM program users, mainly Egyptian HLEC top policy 
and decision makers, have realized considerable international 
recognition and acknowledgment from top distinguished international 
financial and monetary institutions. Standard and Poors (S&P)27 in its
26 Economic reform and debt management are tightly coupled since most economic
ratios can be adjusted through various debt management techniques.
27 One of four (two American and two Europeans) internationally recognized and
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latest report28 had the following to say about Egypt’s economic
performance:
1. The credit and investment rating for Egypt reflects a strong Egyptian
(political and economic) commitment to financial and economic 
reform in order to achieve a healthy economic environment.
2. Egypt has successfully managed to decrease its financial deficit to 
1.3 % of its GNP during the fiscal year 1995/96 and is confident of 
reaching 1.1% during fiscal year 1997.
3. Nowadays Egypt has one of the lowest external debt service 
payments, including short-term debt, when compared to others 
having similar ratings. In other words, Egypt’s debt service payment 
now falls at or below 17 % of its total yearly exports.
4. Egypt has been granted the following ratings: -
a. B3 rating for long-term credit investment of hard currency;
b. A3 rating for short-term credit investment of hard currency; 
and
c. A2 rating for short-term credit investment of local currency.
5. The improvement in credit ratings reflects strong financial and 
economic strategies and policies that the GOE in general and the 
CBE in particular have successfully managed over the past years. 
S&P confirmed that this improved rating29 reflected Egypt’s success
in decreasing the inflation rate to 7.1% in 1996 and stabilizing real 
interest rates on savings and exchange rates for foreign currencies.
6. Egypt successfully built a strong foreign currency reserve of 
approximately $19.0 billion (in Dec. 1996) that in itself resulted in a 
more secure position in terms of financial liquidity needed for 
satisfying at least one year of the required imports. The report 
considered this level of financial liquidity to be one of the highest
well-perceived financial rating institutions who perform country rating worldwide.
28 Published on January 15, 1997, London, UK.
29 Credit rating is highly affected by the status of external debt management
especially the debt service ratio (Khattab, interview -  1993).
223
Perspective Analysis of the Egyptian l/DSS Debt M anagem ent Program Chapter VI
among countries given the same rating as Egypt.
7. Improvement in economic conditions and its reflection on per 
capita income resulting in an increase from $ 690.0 in 1990 to $ 
1200.0 in 199530.
It is worth mentioning that this was the first time Egypt had been 
included in the S&P rating for world ranking credit and investment. This 
in itself represented major international recognition for what the 
Egyptian economic reform program in general and the debt 
management operation in particular had been trying to achieve. 
According to an Egyptian Minister. “ This rating is very important for 
Egypt since institutions like S&P do not rate a country unless they are 
confident about the country’s economic stability. In other word's, it is 
even more important than the ratings performed by international 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank since the latter only 
develop ratings for countries requesting new money, re-scheduling 
debt and /  or facing serious difficulties with current economic 
conditions and specifically with current debt stock (the case of Egypt 
prior to 1985). Rating and ranking by a well-known financial institution 
such as S&P addresses a different type of audience, mainly foreign 
investors, thus acting as a neutral foreign investment advisor for those 
who are seeking promising opportunities worldwide. This report placed 
Egypt with other economically promising countries such those in 
Eastern Europe. It gave Egypt a higher rank than Turkey, Argentina, 
Brazil, India and Mexico and on the same level with the Philippines, 
Indonesia and China".3’
In our opinion, the S&P report offered Egypt and its promising and 
growing economy significant creditworthiness. In turn, it empowered 
Egypt’s position in achieving more international credibility in front of
30IDSC, Economic Bulletin, August 1996.
31 Ghali - Al Ahram Newspaper interview, February 19, 1997 - Cairo - Egypt.
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international financial and monetary institutions. As a result, it 
decreased the cost of financing foreign trade and positioned Egypt on 
the international investment map for promising countries.
D. Conclusion
The success achieved by the GOE in its attem pt to establish an 
economic reform program has been generally recognized at the 
organizational, national and international levels. This success was 
mainly due to success factors such as the Privatization Program, 
Capital Market Reform Program, Exporf Promotion Programs, etc. The 
impetus for most of the above was the desperate need to rehabilitate 
and revive the Egyptian economy which had warred to near death by 
the mid-80’s. Exorbitant debt, Egypt's most serious problem, required 
top government officials’ attention as well as commitment. Clear 
identification of involved institutions and the proper definition for their 
roles and responsibilities was a solid pre-requisite. Moreover, due to the 
unique nature of each individual debtor country, the debt 
management system needed to be tailored to reflect all details of the 
debt situation and be flexible in suggesting and proposing scenarios. 
Since there were no ready made systems to buy or a text book to 
follow, we believe thaf the involved institutions (IDSC -  CBE) have 
contributed a great deal in building up a solid 
l/DSS debt management. Moreover, they have succeeded in injecting 
the l/DSS culture into both builder/implementors as well as users of the 
system. Scenarios were presented in different formats (i.e., tabulated, 
graphical, interactive, etc.) were most valuable to top policy decision 
makers. Finally, a high percentage of decision makers interviewed 
relate the success of the Egyptian Debt Management and Economic 
Monitoring Program to positively affect the general economic 
environment in addition to increasing Egypt's creditworthiness in front 
of creditor countries and institutions.
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Chapter VII 
An l/DSS Debt Managem ent Executive Framework
A. Introduction
There is a great deal of emphasis put on the relationship between debt 
office computerization and the larger institutional setting and/or 
decision making process, especially at the strategic level. One 
encouraging sign is that debt management l/DSS has improved the 
external debt situation which is no longer listed among the critical 
problems facing debt managers. Despite several missing functions and 
flexibility, most of the systems in place seem to be meeting at least 
immediate needs (mainly focusing on the operational aspect of debt 
management). This success has, in turn, fostered an overdue 
awareness of the real requirements for institutional building and the 
need to address other equally important critical factors that affect the 
success of a debt management operation.
In this chapter, we will detail a successful debt management systems’ 
progression from a normal computerization process for a debt 
management operation to a fully comprehensive /  workable executive 
framework that includes all of the success criteria discussed below. In it, 
we will demonstrate that national experiences show that information 
systems, especially decision support types, can help countries organize 
their debt management, but they are neither a relief in themselves, nor 
do they operate in a vacuum. Additionally, we will stress the fact that 
any l/DSS debt management system: a solid foundation for an 
institutional setting which encompass mainly stable and trained staff, 
appropriate legal framework, high level decision making commitment, 
effective communication and cooperation between data suppliers, 
debt management office personal and users. Until recently, computer 
systems supported only the accounting, statistical, and monitoring
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functions of debt management (known as operational debt 
management functions); little emphasis was placed on the l/DSS needs 
of other functions such as policy, regulatory, and resourcing functions 
(known as executive debt management functions). The l/DSS base for 
these systems is normally at least partly available within each country 
and partly available from commercial and non-commercial 
international sources.
Although solutions supplied by international organizations or 
commercial vendors are clearly not a cure-all for debt management 
problems, it can be a cost-effective way to deliver knowledge about 
debt management. However, considerable effort, time and resources 
are needed to tailor any foreign experience to the local context and 
to overcome famous problems such as:
• the absence of accurate user requirements.
• the lack of a coordinated plan for debt information 
management.
• duplication of efforts within an office or across offices in 
different institutions.
• little or no data interface between systems containing the 
same or complementary information.
• inadequate resources, both material and human.
• the lack of express political will to support such systems.
Based upon the theoretical foundation, covered in Chapter III, and our 
empirical research observations and findings on the Egyptian 
experience, which successfully managed to define and execute the 
necessary changes to adopt imported systems and experience into a 
local context as discussed Chapters IV, V, and VI of this thesis, this 
chapter aims to propose a solid and comprehensive debt 
management executive framework. This framework will define the 
necessary success factors i.e., main corner stones, for successfully
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choosing, implementing and managing a successful debt 
management operation. It should be stressed that the context of l/DSS 
application here is on the executive level of debt management. The 
bases of our proposed executive framework are mainly the following 
settings:
• Debt Management l/DSS Info-Structure Institutional Setting;
• Debt Management l/DSS Infrastructure Institutional Setting;
• Debt Management Legal Institutional Setting; and
• Debt Management Administrative Institutional Setting.
For each of the above factor, we will explain what each one means, 
define roles and responsibilities of involved personal, clearly point out 
ownership for each factor and highlight the im pact of each factor on 
the others and on the debt management executive framework.
B. Institutional Setting for Debt Management
Since debt management is in a country's own best interests, a sound 
debt management program is a sensible and flexible way to aid 
governments in taking informed decisions to minimize the cost of 
borrowing and refinancing, or reducing the country's debt burden. 
Statistics shows that a highly indebted middle-income country could 
pay for all staff and systems required for good debt management with 
what it pays out in debt service in less than one day. The potential 
savings from a good debt management system should be adequate 
incentive for governments to invest in their debt offices as potentially 
cost-effective operations. This argument, however, must be directed at 
the proper executive government level which can respond to the 
trade-off between increased budgetary support for the debt office 
and the balance of payments implications of continued poor debt
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management handling1.
Throughout the literature, the debt management institutional setting 
has been addressed focusing on data gathering, information 
dissemination and the role of computerization in automating the 
process. According to a World Bank discussion paper2, information
dissemination was one of the basic and initial goals set for 
computerized debt management systems. Successful functioning of a 
computerized debt office depends on far more than informed 
acquisition of hardware and software. Before the benefits of a good 
and smoothly functioning debt management system can be realized, 
the institutional setting for that system can be appropriate, both to 
supply the system with data and to make use of system's information 
output. At this point, success depends more and more on solving the 
data-gathering problems “ upstream the organization” and the data- 
dissemination problems “downstream the organization” from the 
system than on machine capacity or program power (see Chapter V, 
Sec. D).
Theoretically, the potential benefits of automating a country's debt 
office and the obstacles to successful computerization can be 
graphically summarized by the illustration in Figure V ll- l.
1 Ibid, 1989.
2 "Debt Management Systems", World Bank Discussion Paper, Debt and International
Finance Division, World Bank, Washington DC, 1989. (Discussion papers from the 
second Debt Systems conference held in Paris, France, April 24 -26, 1989 and 
sponsored by the World Bank.
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Macro-economic Environment
Institutional Setting
Debt Management
Debt Data
Computerization
Management
Figure VII -  1
Debt Management Institutional Setting 
Figure Vll-l represents a group of nested functions that mainly 
represent a pre-requisite for one another. Such functions are: 
Computerization, is mainly concerned with direct debt data 
management, the processes and procedures for collecting, storing, 
retrieving and analyzing data on a loan-by-loan basis.
Debt data management, in turn, supports the information requirements 
for effective debt management.
Debt management's ambition is to extend debt management 
functions to cover the executive level that deals with policy making, 
control and advisory functions, in addition to leveraging and shaping 
the decision making process concerning contracting new borrowing 
and preparing for debt re-organizations. It is also concerned with the 
operational functions that focus on the monitoring, statistical, and 
accounting functions. It is a prerequisite for every country that 
manages its debt to perform all of these functions, whether the
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function are centralized in one agency or are distributed among a 
number of them.
Although we agree with the above-mentioned list of debt 
management functions, it does not represent a clear and operational 
prescription for an indebted country that is seriously aiming to solve its 
chronic problems. In the next section of this chapter we will propose a 
sample comprehensive executive framework that could fulfill the 
above functions and lead to a successful debt management 
operation. It will cover a broad perspective with an in-depth 
description on how to operate the executive framework and its various 
components.
C. Proposed Comprehensive Executive Framework
In the following section of this chapter, we will present and explain our 
proposed debt management executive framework. This framework is 
primarily based on our research findings which identified and defined 
key critical success components, on which a model executive 
framework institutional setting might be based. We believe that it could 
lead to a comprehensive and successful national debt management 
program. The proposed executive framework is shown in Figure VII-2
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Figure VII-3
Debt Management Info-Structure Institutional Setting
The debt management l/DSS info-structure institutional setting (Figure 
VIII-3) deals with the soft side of the infrastructure needed in the 
process of leveraging and shaping top policy decision making. It 
closely looks at the development of a detailed plan for coordinated 
debt information management in a country and checks for duplication 
of effort.
This setting involves identifying all of the potential sources and users of 
debt information, as well as existing systems in place, and developing a 
rational approach to sharing the overall task of debt information 
management. This is often done as part of the initial assessment by the
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core agency responsible for debt management and sometimes with 
the help of technical assistance agencies. However, potential overlaps, 
identified at this stage, may not be resolved prior to system 
implementation because of pressures from one or several institutions. 
Our research findings suggest that a detailed plan for coordination of 
debt information management should be developed and problems of 
mandate, overlap, information flows, and data standards be resolved, 
preferably before any system implementation work is done and, at any 
rate, before the system starts producing regular reports.
One problem, which may be identified as part of the process, is 
duplication of effort, especially in situations where resources are limited. 
In a number of cases, traditional opposition between the Central Bank 
and the Ministry of Finance resulted in some overlap and thus in wasted 
efforts such as duplicate databases, book keeping, human resources 
possession, etc). In the worst case, it runs the risk of ending up with 
conflicting sets of debt data (Kaddah, 1993).
In our opinion, operational guidelines for debt management 
institutional settings require the cooperation and coordination of the 
executive framework's info-structure institutional setting and the 
mechanism to coordinate the many aspects of debt management, 
including the use of computer based debt management systems. 
Guidelines should be developed as part of country’s master debt 
information plan. We further recommend that special external auditors 
and technical assistance agencies review the effectiveness of this 
mechanism periodically as part of the process of monitoring debt 
management projects.
The debt management info-structure institutional setting needs to be 
the sole responsibility of the owner of the debt information data who is, 
in almost all cases the Central Bank. Being the owner of all debt data 
and the main source for publishing and releasing any official statistics,
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reports and any credible figures, the CB takes sole responsibility for:
a. Developing a master plan and all the related execution 
procedures necessary for collecting, directing, cross checking and 
consolidating all related data;
b. Defining the necessary data collection and dissemination 
mechanisms to and from different sources;
c. Acquiring and developing all the necessary processing tools and 
techniques to be able to convert real data to meaningful 
information; and
d. Coordinating channels of data supplies and information 
requesters.
Empirical research has shown that the im pact of a well-built debt 
management info-structure institutional setting leads to the proper 
foundation for a debt management scenario generation function. 
Most of our research sample set have stressed the importance of 
building a "c lean” /  "clear” database that carries the characteristics 
of being accurate, timely updated and comprehensive (covering all 
loans and grants and their details). As mentioned above, the building 
of such a component is very much dependent on having a solid debt 
management l/DSS infrastructure in existence and being maintained. 
Once such a foundation is created, examined and cross-checked, the 
process of defining, producing and executing different answers for top 
level decisions makers’ questions becomes attainable. It needs to be 
stressed here that the function of constantly and continuously updating 
and cross-checking data is essential.
One other important function of the info-structure institutional setting, 
besides scenario generation, is acting as an early warning system for 
excessive debt or bad debt terms. It is simply a core for managing any 
indebtedness situation, not only managing debts, i.e., it creates an 
awareness and provides tools for "shopping - around” for the best
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terms, best borrowing currency and best contracting conditions.
In summary, a well-built and maintained debt management l/DSS info­
structure represents a high impact return component in any executive 
framework used for debt management since it is mainly concerned 
with content manipulation “soft part” that is the key to supporting the 
decision making process.
2. Debt M anagem ent l/DSS Infrastructure Institutional Setting
The debt management l/DSS infrastructure institutional setting (Figure 
VII-4) is mainly concerned with (i) the development of l/DSS for top 
policy makers and executives, and (ii) the build-up of an information 
infrastructure to help improve productivity in the country. As we saw in 
Chapter III and through the observations realized during the course of 
our study, the requirement of an automated debt management 
operation goes beyond simple and straightforward information 
systems. It necessitates a more advanced, complex and interactive live 
system (such as a DSS or EIS3) that can handle different types of
problems (structured, semi-structured and / or ill-structured) and 
respond to different managerial / organizational levels (strategic, 
tactical, and operational levels). Such systems represent a challenge 
for developing countries. The characteristics of these countries, the 
problems faced, and opportunities existing together comprise some of 
these challenges.
3 Executive Information System.
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Debt Management Infra-Structure Institutional Setting
Among the increasingly recognized challenges that have to be 
carefully taken into consideration are:
a. Wide application gap:
There exist a wide gap between l/DSS practice and technological 
innovations. Additionally, there exist a very poor tracking capabilities 
for new / appropriate technologies specially in developing countries. 
The rate at which new technologies, techniques and innovations are 
diffused is still slower than desirable. Central to this is the gap between 
practitioners and technical experts, each group having its own jargon 
and with very little, if any, in common.
b. Lack of technical expertise:
Most developing countries suffer from the scarcity of technically
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capable resources. Some countries like Egypt, Mexico and Turkey 
have qualified human infrastructure, which can potentially be 
developed, but which requires proper training and a stimulating work 
environment. Other “ technical challenges" that have been defined by 
known l/DSS experts such as Elam, Henderson, Keen and Konsynki, 
Keen, El Sherif, and others and which have proven to be an integral 
part of the success of complex executive framework l/DSS are:
a. l/DSS tools needed to develop interfaces in different cultural 
contexts (e.g., language interfaces like Arabic in the case of Egypt).
b. l/DSS software tools and generators, their availability and relevance 
to application areas.
c. l/DSS knowledge and its rate of assimilation in developing countries.
d. Management of the development of a number of decision support 
systems (more than one system or project at the same time). 
Existing approaches focus only on the development of a single 
decision support system for single or group decision making 
processes.
e. Institutionalization of l/DSS within application contexts.
f. Institutional fitting of executive framework l/DSS to existing decision 
making processes so that they work smoothly together.
c. Lack of informatics infrastructure4:
Most developing countries suffer from the limited use and availability of 
information and information channels.
d. A proposed approach for managing complex i/DSS programs:
In our opinion, El Sherif & El Sawy have proposed a very appropriate 
and important approach for managing l/DSS programs that has been 
adapted by a number of similar l/DSS programs studied during the
4 El Sherif,H. and El Sawy, O ." Issue Based Decision Support Systems, “ MIS Quarterly, 
V. 12, No. 4, Dec. 1988, pp. 550 - 569
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course of our empirical research5. Figure VII-5 illustrates the main
components of this dual-phase approach. Phase I is concerned with 
the realization of information and decision support systems while Phase 
II focuses on the institutionalization process.
The aim of Phase I is to provide support for policy needs and/or 
decision requirements, these are, hopefully, carried out through the use 
or development and implementation of appropriate l/DSS. Phase I 
consists of four main stages:
1. Debt management policy needs identification;
2. Debt management decision areas and requirements definition;
3. Debt management programs and projects development; and
4. Debt management programs implementation.
Phase II consists of the following main components:
1. Debt management systems adaptation;
2. Debt management systems diffusion;
3. Debt management systems adoption;
4. Debt management systems monitoring and tracking;
5. Debt management systems value assessment; and
6. Debt management systems evaluation.
Together, they provide the basis for continued use of the l/DSS being 
developed.
5 Other l/DSS program developed and implemented by the Cabinet IDSC.
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Figure V I I - 5
A Proposed Approach for Managing l/DSS Programs 
DM= Debt Management
Phase I: Providing Debt Management Policy & Decision Support
1. Debt management policy needs identification includes two main 
policy requirements: 
a. Planned debt management policy support that provides:
1) Debt information and policy support for:
a. Main debt policy issues discussed at strategic decision 
making levels such as the Cabinet level (or HLEC);
b. Debt management plan monitoring;
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c. Other debt issue-based l/DSS
2) Development of other related multi-sectoral macro / micro 
economic l/DSS (such as capital market l/DSS, credit system 
l/DSS, etc.)
b. Debt management crisis support at the policy making level.
2. Debt M anagem ent Decision Areas and Information Requirements 
Definition deals with translation of the planned debt policy support 
areas into debt decision areas and information requirements. This 
process includes specification of major debt issues previously 
discussed by top level decision makers and defining debt l/DSS- 
related areas for reform over a five-year period. Both debt policy 
and l/DSS requirements impact the program(s) and project(s) 
development and implementation processes.
For each main debt policy and/or l/DSS area, a program needs to be 
formulated with specific goals and dedicated resources. A master 
network and related detailed project(s) networks need to be 
developed to reflect both the strategic requirements and specific 
tactical deliverables. Typically, policy makers will require fast response 
time, focus on results, and action-oriented projects. Therefore, projects 
have to be designed with these criteria in mind. We need to stress the 
point that, based upon empirical observation, successful projects need 
to be composed of two-tiered teams with interdisciplinary background, 
one team possessing the experience to deal with the bureaucracy, 
typical government officials, and policy makers, and the other 
possessing first rate knowledge about the technology. These two-tiered 
teams proved to be very useful in narrowing the application gap(s) 
between users and builders or implementors of l/DSS.
Finally, Phase I stresses the necessity of a well built l/DSS which is mainly
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concerned with l/DSS tools and techniques, development platforms, 
localization, contextual fitting issues, etc.
Phase II: Institutionalization
A problem that has manifested itself throughout our theoretical as well 
as empirical research is that builders of l/DSS do not pay enough 
attention to the process of institutionalization, This process requires the 
design of a “change strategy” including the adaptation, diffusion, and 
adoption of the l/DSS (El Sherif and El Sawy, 1988). It should impact the 
implementation process and allow dynamic development evaluation 
of l/DSS capabilities within the application contexts. Thus, 
institutionalization is directly related to the extent that such information 
and decision support is useful in a given context.
Debt management institutionalization strategy needs to be based on 
existing knowledge and the diffusion of innovation, transfer of 
technology, and key concepts of adaptation of technology provided 
by l/DSS (e.g., adaptive design support for user involvement).
1. Debt M anagem ent Adaptation: The first component of the debt 
management institutionalization process focuses on the adaptation 
of debt management l/DSS capabilities to the contextual 
characteristics of a particular country (cultural Interface).
2. Debt M anagem ent Diffusion: The second component, debt 
management diffusion, refers to the need for spreading acceptable 
innovation within different settings but within the same context. 
Implicitly, such debt management l/DSS capabilities should have 
attributes that lend themselves to diffusion of innovation including 
relative advantage, compatibility, observability, and the ability to 
try different scenarios.
3. Debt M anagem ent Adoption: The third component of the debt 
management l/DSS institutionalization strategy focuses on the
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adoption process including all the capabilities, requirements and 
needs of a given user (user interface). A user interface should 
integrate both the managerial and human characteristics. Such 
interfaces should be designed not only to reflect the ease of use 
and friendliness for the ultimate user, but to consider as well his 
functional activities and mental context, in addition to his own 
jargon.
4. Debt M anagem ent Monitoring and Tracking: The forth component 
of the debt management l/DSS institutionalization strategy deals 
with monitoring debt management parameters of the critical issues, 
assumptions, priorities and information/decision requirements in 
addition to changes in the technology and their im pact on the 
decision making process.
5. Debt M anagem ent Value Assessment: The fifth component of the 
debt management l/DSS institutionalization strategy deals with how 
decision support systems have greatly improved strategic decision 
making in Egypt. This includes tangible and intangible benefits such 
as improvement of decision making at the Cabinet and 
governorate levels better use made of available resources, debt 
management and technological infrastructure development.
6. Debt M anagem ent Evaluation: The final component of the debt 
management l/DSS institutionalization strategy deals with appraisal, 
analysis and validation of the added benefits of decision support 
systems created for socio-economic development planning.
The debt management l/DSS institutional setting needs to be the sole 
responsibility of a central, neutral, very powerful, and well-placed 
organization. The reason for that is the fact that it need to be regarded 
as the sole responsible source of issuing, enforcing and executing debt
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management related decisions (definitely after consulting and 
coordinating with related institutions). Such an organization needs to 
belonging to a central government body (such as the Cabinet HLEC in 
the case of Egypt). It should have ultimate power of enforcement 
and/or execution of development strategies, programs, and projects. 
The executive framework proposed is a “ think tank", a fully developed 
organization attached to the Cabinet or the top level policy 
committee shaping the economic related aspects of a developing 
country (Ezz, interview - 1993). The Egyptian DMU supported by the 
Cabinet IDSC, exemplifies such an executive framework with all its 
advantages and disadvantages (Chapter IV, Sec C).
In terms of ownership, however, when we think of roles and 
responsibilities attached to the debt management l/DSS institutional 
setting, we mean a central role played by an organization such as the 
DMU supported by the Cabinet IDSC and complemented by other 
involved agencies and ministries such as the Central Bank, Ministry of 
Finance, Ministry of Economy, etc. The burden of coordination, 
monitoring and following up for such roles and responsibilities clearly 
lies at the core of the l/DSS institutional setting, namely the DMU. 
However, naming of roles and defining of each entity’s responsibilities 
should be addressed and specified at a higher level such as the 
Cabinet and/or HLEC in the case of Egypt.
Finally, concerning the im pact of Phase I and II on each other, each 
phase is considered to be a pre-requisite for the success of the other. 
In other words, institutionalization necessitates a solid formation of debt 
management policy needs identification, debt management decision 
areas and requirements definition, and debt management l/DSS 
programs /  projects development and implementation. Equally 
important, the three components of the institutionalization phase 
(adaptation, diffusion and adoption) are key success factors for
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proper/successful formulation, implementation and operation of 
complex debt management l/DSS programs.
During the course of our empirical research, it became apparent that 
an approach such as that proposed would lead to a high probability 
of success for a complex debt management l/DSS national program. 
The reason behind that is the fact that if it is properly implemented, 
l/DSS institutional setting would be a solid infrastructure that the info­
structure, scenarios and solid decision making process could operate 
on. The key success of our proposed approach is built on the optimum 
combination of its four components and how well do they 
complement each other.
3. Debt M an ag e m en t Legal Institutional Setting
Output
Figure VII-6
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The debt management legal institutional setting (Figure VIII-6) is mainly 
concerned with the appropriate legislative and institutional framework 
for external borrowing. It requires separate legislation-set for borrowing 
by the government (for its use or for lending), private sector, and the 
central bank. This legislation-set has to be backed by regulations and 
procedures for the approval of each category of borrowing and 
service payments. Legislation covering the issue of government 
guarantees (generally by the Ministry of Finance), its criteria and 
procedures for their approval is also required. Additionally, procedures 
are necessary for making withdrawal applications for each loan (El l ,  
Interview - 1993).
There are several agencies of the government that share responsibility 
for part or whole of the external borrowing process. These would 
probably be the Ministry of Finance and the central bank, possibly the 
Ministry of Planning (if the planning function has not been integrated 
with the Ministry of Finance), and the Treasury of the Accountant- 
General’s office. In some instances, an autonomous body, the Ministry 
of International Cooperation in case of Egypt, is set up with special 
responsibility for external debt either by legislation or administrative 
order. Additionally, agencies responsible for distributing borrowed funds 
to projects and programs would have to be established (El l ,  1993).
The legal framework for government borrowing needs to be generally 
set out in a Foreign Loans Act for foreign borrowing and a Domestic 
Loans Act for domestic borrowing. Subject to the satisfaction of certain 
conditions, these acts authorize the concerned minister or committee 
to raise loans on behalf of the government for specific purposes. It 
would require a responsible person or body to seek the views of the 
central bank on the terms and conditions of the loans, obtain the 
approval of the Cabinet and/or Parliament or equivalent body for the 
borrowing and table the agreement in Parliament after signature. It
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may also be necessary to ensure that the borrowing will not result in the 
total outstanding debt exceeding the amount specified in an act or in 
a decision of the Cabinet or relevant policy committee (kaddah, 
interview - 1993).
The legal framework described in the preceding paragraphs exists in 
some developing countries such as Mexico, Turkey, and Egypt though 
all the provisions may not be complied with. It emphasizes the 
predominance of the Ministry of Finance and the central bank in 
monitoring the contracting loans, giving them a major role in loan 
operations and consequently in debt management. In most countries 
the Treasury, the Office of the Accountant-General or an equivalent 
office (Central Bank in case of Egypt) has the responsibility for initiating 
action on government expenditures, including debt service payments 
and the accounting thereof as well as loan receipts. In some 
instances, they have to be responsible for reporting on government 
guaranteed debt to Parliament or its equivalent. It is worth mentioning 
that, if the planning function has not been integrated within the Ministry 
of Finance or an equivalent body, it is recommended that the Ministry 
of Planning evaluate programs and projects while approving their 
inclusion in the capital budget of the country.
A country’s legislation covering its borrowing, issue of guarantees, and 
the regulations giving effect to these legislations provide the basis for 
establishing institutional and administrative arrangements between the 
various agencies of government responsible for loan operations for 
regulating and monitoring their contracting, utilization and repayment. 
We recommend that such debt management legal institutional setting 
ownership resides in the central bank which needs to be empowered 
to play the active role described above. In some instances, a top 
policy committee HLEC in case of Egypt) which represents the top 
authority responsible for a country’s debt management specifically
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and in most cases economic reform, monitoring and strategization in 
general guides the central bank. Representation in such a committee 
needs to be at the cabinet level (or at least deputy minister) and 
chaired by a prime minister (or deputy prime minister) and should 
include all top level decision makers involved in the debt management 
process (directly or indirectly). Definitely, the Central Bank should be 
part of this advisory committee, however it has a dual role as a main 
player in shaping its strategies and in executing major parts of it.
The im pact of the legal institutional setting component of our 
suggested debt management executive framework is very powerful in 
overcoming the problem of lawyers playing only a marginal role in 
financial development and debt management. This is a typical 
problem in most developing countries, where appraisal and 
implementation of projects and programs have been firmly in the 
hands of financial analysts, economists and political actors. 
Developing countries have rarely taken legal expertise seriously, 
allowing contractors and other non-lawyers to prepare and negotiate 
legal documents such as loan agreements. To gain strength, the legal 
component of debt management needs to be mandatorily backed 
up by political commitment. We recommend that countries aim at a 
modern vision of the lawyer as an advisor rather than as an advocate 
called upon to resolve problems or controversies only after they have 
occurred. The lawyer as an advisor must, in fact, be prepared and 
capable to assist in all phases of a transaction, namely strategic 
planning, choice of sources of financing, negotiating, implementation, 
management, etc. Also, lawyers would help in formulating positions in 
clear terms, weighing alternatives and assessing the implications, rights 
and obligations flowing from a particular provision, and, of course, 
dealing with legal clauses such as those relating to constitutionality, 
legality and authority. In summary, the times when lawyers should be
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involved are:
• when the decision to borrow is taken:
• during negotiations;
• during contracting; and
• during administration of the loan.
4. Debt Management Administrative Institutional Setting
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Figure VII-7
Debt Management Administrative Institutional Setting
The debt management administrative institutional setting (Figure VII-7) 
is mainly concerned with studying debt feasibility, loan management, 
and debt portfolio management. In addition, it coordinates between 
the different parties involved in debt acquisition and /  or debt 
management and in negotiating and /  or dealing with funding 
agencies and international monetary organizations.
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This setting should have a common understanding of the government's 
debt strategy, the tools to be used in implementing the strategy and 
the different role(s) to be played in executing it. In most instances, the 
debt management administrative institutional setting will involve more 
than one agency playing a specific and hopefully a complementary 
role. For the day-to-day operations of debt management, it is essential 
that all parties involved in this process communicate freely and 
cooperate willingly with each other. Naturally, the more decentralized 
and complex the debt management system is, the greater the need 
for a framework of information, coordination and control. Simplicity 
and centralization, therefore, have considerable advantages 
especially during the early phases of a debt management program 
(Kaddah, interview -1993). Unfortunately, this is easier said than done, 
in large debtor and / or complex indebted countries, particularly when 
there is no binding framework for external borrowing and /or there are 
a large number of ministries and agencies involved in debt issues. 
Therefore, it is essential that, on one hand, the debt management 
administrative system be firmly established at the outset with clear and 
well-publicized rules and regulations. On the other hand, it should 
permit flexibility over time. Although, ideally, countries should have 
studied other systems, sought expert advice and thought hard about 
what they want before launching a debt management system, the 
start-up stage will nevertheless reveal the need for certain informal 
arrangements that should be reflected in the formal system (Hammed, 
interview - 1993). Thus, it will force possible modifications of the initial 
concept (as was the case when the IDSC and the Central Bank of 
Egypt agreed to start the Egyptian debt management program). More 
importantly, allowance must be made for some element of trial and 
error.
As we have seen in Chapter III and through the observations during our
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empirical research, there are many different types of organizational 
executive frameworks. Each and every executive framework follows a 
different pattern of management and /  or a decision making process. 
The success of any of these executive frameworks is mainly dependent 
on the optimum choice of some key success factors such as the 
organization's nature and type (rational, political, bureaucratic, and 
garbage can), type of work being performed, degree of automation, 
style of management adopted, etc. Though these success criteria are 
easily identified, we have observed that the relationship between 
organizational levels is not aligned with the management behavior and 
decision making pattern corresponding to the respective level. In other 
words, we observed that decision makers occupying a specific 
organizational level, for example the strategic level, are not only 
performing duties and responsibilities required and specified for that 
level, i.e., making strategic decisions, but are also forced to act on 
issues and decisions demanded by other organizational levels. The 
reasons for this phenomena that were discovered during the course of 
our research and that controlled and shaped our observations have 
been thoroughly covered in Chapter IV, Section B.
Organizational arrangement is one major com ponent of the debt 
management administrative institutional setting where the
implementation of a debt management project requires the early 
identification of an agency substantially involved in loan operations 
where the DMU will be located. The familiar choices would be from 
amongst the Ministry of Finance, the Planning Commission or Ministry of 
Planning, the Treasury or Accountant-General’s Office, or the Central 
Bank. There might be instances where the DMU is set up as an 
authorized body mandated in legislation or an administrative order as it 
is the case of Egypt where the Ministry of International Cooperation is 
the entity administrating the DMU in the CBE that hosts it. Whatever
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legal form this unit may take, it will be necessary to draw up detailed 
terms of reference and have them endorsed by the political authority 
in the country (Hammed, interview - 1993). Thereafter, it should be 
widely circulated within government, private sectors, and all creditor 
agencies that all requests for information on external borrowing comply 
with the terms of the mandate assigned to the DMU by the 
government.
It is recommended that a Debt Policy Committee (a sub-committee 
from HLEC in the case of Egypt) be set up to formulate an annual 
borrowing plan and strategy. It should establish procedures to ensure 
that the borrowing limits do not exceed the ceiling established on total 
outstanding debt, annual borrowing levels, the debt service ratio (DSR) 
and other debt indicators to be monitored. Further, a working group 
consisting of representatives from each of the agencies mentioned in 
the preceding paragraph should be set up to oversee the 
implementation of the programs with all its minor /  major detailed 
steps. Some times, it may be useful to share this arrangement with a 
few of the larger borrowers.
The staff of the DMU should have experience in loan operations and 
accounts; and the capability to undertake debt analysis, evaluate loan 
portfolios, and identify opportunities for improving the debt profile in 
addition to computing skills with experience in the use of computers, 
database management systems and spreadsheet packages. 
Knowledge and familiarity with loan operations is necessary to interpret 
loan agreements and extract basic loan details. Knowledge of loan 
accounts would also facilitate the compilation of loan transactions. 
Computing skills would assist in mastering the use of the computer 
software and the basic tasks of database maintenance. Finally, 
economic and financial knowledge is necessary to undertake debt 
policy analysis and engage in active debt management. The actual
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composition of a program team would vary in each country, 
depending on the complexity of the country’s loan portfolio and loan 
numbers, availability of the required skills, the debt service situation, the 
priority assigned to debt management by the government and 
whether or not it wishes to computerize its debt data.
It is recommended that a solid training strategy be adopted since it is 
essential and crucial for the debt management administrative 
institutional setting. Training should be considered as a major 
component in debt management programs, carried out at various 
stages of the project cycle. The first step is to train staff to complete 
computer coded data entry sheets with information on basic loan 
details, the repayment terms, and disbursement and payment data. 
Interpreting loan agreements and extracting transaction data from 
loan files, ledgers and creditor statements assists in this. Further, it would 
involve the staff of the DMU and other agencies who will be submitting 
information directly to the DMU on data entry sheets. The next stage of 
the training would be for the staff who would be using the software. It 
would cover operating the computer; inputting data into the software; 
use of routines and modules in order to generate reports and scenarios; 
and various aspects of database maintenance. Once the database 
has been completed and the staff of the DMU is using the software to 
produce standard reports, the next phase of the training would take 
place. This phase would be on database management systems used 
for the development of software and formatting country-specific 
external debt reports using the report writing facility. Thereafter the 
training would cover the use of the management tools in the software 
and the query facility in the database management system to analyze 
the external debt of the country and evaluate the country’s loan 
portfolio. Following this, the staff of the DMU would be trained in the 
use of the software for debt restructuring, including refinancing,
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rescheduling and debt reduction. Finally, it would be necessary to 
familiarize staff with the preparations for debt re-negotiations with the 
Paris and London Clubs and with their procedures. Depending on the 
country’s loan portfolio, additional training might be required to expose 
staff to the major financial markets and the loan instruments used to 
access them.
One solid conclusion that was drawn, based upon our empirical 
research, is that there is no textbook executive framework for the debt 
management administrative institutional setting for effective debt 
management systems. However, we were able to propose a nearly 
comprehensive executive framework, as discussed throughout this 
chapter, that encompasses almost all the components needed for 
debt management setups employed by different countries. They are 
normally highly complex mechanisms involving many functions, all of 
which are interrelated and interdependent. Quoting Mr. Tekka Sankala, 
a UNCTAD expert, who was the chief technical assistance expert 
involved in implementing the foreign component ( DMFAS ) of the 
Egyptian debt management program:
" ... Debt management systems and , in particular, the 
structures (or units which perform functions related to debt 
management) differ from country to country. They are 
shaped by historical precedent constitutional division of 
responsibility between various tiers of the government the 
internal organization of the government itself, the 
importance of external debt in overall economic 
m anagem ent the relative importance of particular types of 
credits within the overall debt structure, and the regulatory 
function of external debt management...".
" ... Debt management systems differ in the degree of 
control exercised by authorities, the strictness of the
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regulatory environment and the nature of the reporting 
system instituted for external debt operations, which may be 
mandatory or voluntary, and which may require prior 
authorization for incurring external obligations or only 
exposit reporting. They also differ in their treatment of 
private sector versus non-financial domestic instruments...." 
Debt management administrative institutional setting ownership 
lies with the Central Bank and the ministry /  committee 
responsible for studying borrowing feasibility. In some countries, a 
ministry (Ministry of International Cooperation together with the 
CBE in the case of Egypt) is the entity responsible for studying 
new debt terms, conditions, feasibility and pay back ability of the 
borrower requesting such debt. This ministry is represented in a 
higher level committee (HLEC in the case of Egypt) where it 
presents /  reports regularly on borrowers’ requests, available 
lenders, new lending terms, and progress recommendations for 
approving or dis-approving of such request(s). It needs to be 
made clear here that it is the high level com m ittee’s decision 
that is taken into consideration whether or not it agrees or dis­
agrees with the ministry’s recommendations. The high level 
committee in most cases is the body aided by the DMU in all 
related aspects of new debt, debt rescheduling, debt payment 
abilities, etc. In our opinion, it is the decision maker, or in other 
words, the client, whom the DMU serves since the DMU 
encompass almost all parties involved in the debt process.
In our opinion also, the administrative institutional setting 
represents a vital component for the detailed dynamics of a 
successful debt management executive framework. If has been 
a key factor in the area of managing new borrowings, and 
dealing with the management of existing debt portfolios. Of the
255
An l/DSS Debt Management Executive Framework Chapter VII
four key components needed for a successful debt 
management executive framework, the debt management 
administrative institutional setting represents the main interface 
with the user /  client for such a system, i.e., the system’s 
beneficiaries seeks decision leveraging scenarios mainly through 
the debt management administrative institutional setting.
D. Conclusion
The four proposed critical success components discussed in this 
chapter represent the basic cornerstones for successful implementation 
of a debt management national program. They need to be fully 
developed and well maintained since they share equal importance 
and have almost the same impact on each other as on the success of 
the debt management executive framework.
For each of the proposed critical success components, there should be 
a defined owner or a group of owners who are m andated to build 
these components. Furthermore, the roles, responsibilities, and 
interfaces of the main players need to be very clear especially if more 
than one owner is involved. The same applies to the critical success 
components constituting the framework. Moreover, areas of overlap 
and duplication need to be identified for all actors in order to avoid 
any lost effort, time and money.
Finally, since the success of each component alone would positively
contribute to the success of the executive framework as a whole, it is
very much recommended that the optimum combination for the
proposed four components be overseen by a single entity, preferably
the*one executing the debt management program. Besides having the
four proposed critical success component well-balanced and
managed, the key to success to any debt management program is the
user, i.e., the client, who can make or break the success of any
program. It is his degree of attraction and dependency on the system
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that is a positive (or negative) indicator for the implementing and 
management teams.
Last, but not least, we believe that our proposed executive framework 
represents a well-tested path that an indebted country might follow in 
achieving its goals with the least amount of risk possible. This framework 
ensures a linkage and encompasses most components of almost all 
debt management systems reviewed in the literature. It links the entire 
source, utility and functionality of a powerful debt management 
executive framework.
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Chapter VIII 
Research Findings, Generalizations and Future Research
A. Introduction
This chapter provides a comprehensive review of our empirical 
research results. The research was centred on one major theme: the 
im pact of l/DSS on debt management in Egypt. We will be analyzing 
the research findings across the different management levels: users 
and decision-makers, builders, implementers and program managers. 
Research findings, together with the information gathered from 
interviews carried out and the survey questionnaires completed by our 
targeted focus group will be considered. These findings are meant to 
explain the various development phases of the DM&EM program as 
discussed in Chapter V.
The program was studied in light of the theoretical foundation of the 
research presented in Chapter III. The nation-wide crisis in Egypt that 
led to program realizaton and the numerous problems associated with 
this process are detailed in Chapter IV of this thesis.
This chapter also covers our observation on the challenges faced by 
the DM&EM program during its introduction and the perception of the 
decision constituency in terms of acceptance, support, usage, and 
perceived im pact on the process of decision making in particular and 
on the Egyptian economy in general. Moreover, it will shed some light 
on how the Cabinet IDSC managed to implement the DM&EM 
program successfully despite the overwhelming challenges attributed 
to resistance to change by government bureaucrats.
The research conducted for the DM&EM program revealed a number 
of illuminating conclusions that can be drawn from Egypt's experiences 
in introducing, managing and sustaining an l/DSS function for 
supporting the decision making process for such a nationally sensitive 
and crucial issue as external debt management. Moreover, it pinpoints
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key lessons learned from the Egyptian experience in particular and on 
development and implementation of a DM&EM program in general. 
Finally, based on the lessons learned, we will conclude this chapter with 
a set of generalizations for future implementation of l/DSS programs in 
similar contexts, i.e. to support top government policy and decision 
making in developing countries. These generalizations are primarily 
based on our research findings; in addition, we will include correlation 
between our empirical research and other related research work done 
in the field.
B. Research Findings
Based on the analysis of the empirical research and the field work 
conducted on the DM&EM program, the following section will highlight 
the research findings in light of our thesis theme: the im pact of using 
l/DSS for debt management in Egypt. Our findings correlate with a 
number of l/DSS research aspects such as project management, 
decision making, organizational dynamics, and potential challenges 
known to afflict government-related bureaucracies in developing 
countries.
1. Problems associated with the implementation and use of l/DSS Debt 
M anagem ent Systems:
The introduction of any technology - based tool can be impeded by a 
number of potential problems. Below we will be presenting some of the 
main observed principal problems encountered during the 
implementation process of the Egyptian debt management program 
and it was handled: -
a. Need for identification of the principal systems, user requirements 
and the logical selection of an approach and /  or specific hardware 
and software:
259
Research Findings, Generalizations and Future Research Chapter VIII
A classic information systems problem (application development and / 
or use) that local systems staff are often unfamiliar with a set of 
applications (in this case the debt management application). Users, on 
the other hand, are unable to express their requirements clearly in 
systems terms, or because of their unfamiliarity with the capabilities of 
systems, are unsure of what they can reasonably ask for.
The DM&EM team were alerted to some of the above problems and 
managed to avoid part of it through exchanging information and 
experiences via hosting specialized experts in the field (to train staff on 
different levels) and extensive participation of DM&EM program 
management in conferences and workshops (such as those organised 
by the World Bank, IMF and UNDP). Such exchange of knowledge and 
expertise mechanisms has contributed much to enriching the program 
team's experience. Listening to other experiences, expressing their 
views and being warned about major pitfalls encountered have 
shortened their learning curve (Ezz, interview - 1993). Performance 
reports for the DM&EM team reflects such fast track learning.
One clear research conclusion was that selecting a system or a 
technical partner can require specialised knowledge and skills beyond 
those available in some developing countries and may necessitate the 
use of impartial outside advice. Egypt has learned from its previous 
failure case. According to Dr. Ebeid, choice was heavily influenced by 
considerations that had little to do with the relative advantage of the 
system software itself. It has depended mainly on the uniqueness of the 
case and the similarities between Egypt and other countries where 
chosen external technical assistance organizations had previous 
experience. Other considerations such as system's support (local /  
external), complexity, flexibility, scalability, nature of debt stock, and 
user requirements (whether debtors or creditors) were equally 
considered (Ebeid, interview -  1993). Moreover, it is the tendency in
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most similar cases that, once the choice has been made and the 
results become visible as the system is installed, there is little chance to 
compare alternative systems and a natural tendency to defend the 
decision made. However, it was not the case for the DM&EM system 
due to the fact that it was a semi-tailored system that was designed 
and built via a cut and paste approach from a number of experiences. 
The main systems was the DMFAS with more additions and modification 
added (i.e developed and implemented) by the program team. The 
main reason for this was both issues of contextual (complex nature of 
the Egyptian debt stock) and cultural (language and other local 
culture related issues) fitting.
b. Used Systems Categorization:
We have observed that the DM&EM program management was quite 
convinced that the modified DMFAS system in addition to the 
developed sub system are cateigorized in the l/DSS category. Until this 
research was concluded we were not totally convinced that it 
complies with the basic characteristics of a DSS specially but rather a 
complex, interactive, query answering IS. Though we disagree with the 
DM&EM program positioning at that stage of development, we quite 
believe that by completing the other sub-systems1 (explained in details
in chapter V section D) and making them fully functional, this would 
represent a perfect example for l/DSS. The reason behind this is the fact 
that it will possess the capability of answering simple information 
queries (satisfying the characteristics of an IS) as well as being equally 
robust in responding to complex modelling inquires (satisfying the 
characteristics of a DSS also). In chapter III, we have used figure lll-l to 
graphically present the difference between TPS, MIS, DSS and ESS. In
1 Some of its plan presented to us by the program team.
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this chapter we will use the same figure (figure Vlll-l) in order to 
diagrammatically present our point of view.
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c. Inadequate resources:
Normal l/DSS projects can suffer a great deal from lack of resources 
allocated locally or by external assistance projects so how about 
complex applications such as debt management? Human resources, 
equipment, and technical support seem to be the three main areas for 
which inadequate provisions are sometimes made. The failure cases 
Egypt has experienced before the DM&EM program were partially 
because of the above reasons (individually or together). For that 
reason, it was apparent to the Egyptian HLEC in general, and DM&EM
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program management in particular, that the design and delivery of 
debt management l/DSS needed to be reviewed carefully in the light 
of similar experiences in other countries to ensure adequate / 
continuous resource allocations. In this respect, the DM&EM program 
had to carefully study available systems and experiences world-wide in 
order to optimize the “ build and/or modify and/or buy” decision that 
needed to be made regarding the debt management l/DSS to be 
chosen (Kaddah, interview -1993). It needed to take into consideration 
the unique /  complex features of the Egyptian debt stock as well as the 
known challenges of a growing developing country.
d. Lack of expressed political will:
The DM&EM program team experienced a lack of appropriate 
direction from authorities to ensure that debt management activities 
were accorded a proper position in institutional priorities. This, of course, 
was related to the question of local resources allocafed for debt 
management mentioned in point c. Though our research we have 
observed that during the initial stage of the program there was a lack 
of top level political attention and, as a result, inadequate resources, 
the scheduling to participate in the first Paris Club round (May 1987) 
made all the difference. Senior government officials becam e sensitized 
to the benefits that could be gained if appropriate attention was given 
to debt management l/DSS activities and were made aware of the 
importance of integrating such program into the debt management 
plan from the beginning. Therefore, one clear conclusion from this 
research is that building the awareness function is considered to be a 
very vital prerequisite for the success of an l/DSS program since it 
creates user’s support as well as top level political will.
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e. Staffing:
Another observed problem, which the program faced during its initial 
phase, was the selection of staffing from existing government staff. This 
staff was inexperienced and unskilled in program development and 
system use. Recruiting a high caliber of personnel from outside was next 
to impossible due to deteriorating working conditions in the 
government sector and the attraction offered by the private sector. 
The reasons behind these problems were typical of government 
institutions in developing countries. The situation was completely turned 
around once the attention of top level government decision makers 
was attracted to the benefits that this program could yield. The 
problems expressed above were almost completely done away with 
the addition of an incentives program to include opportunities for 
training, technical exchanges, and study tours abroad. Efforts to match 
remuneration to responsibility and productivity becam e a useful tool in 
this situation.
f. Training:
Problems with implementing the DM&EM program seemed to arise 
more frequently with respect to basic or introductory training related to 
computers, information systems, and debt rather than with more 
advanced, product - specific technical training. We have noticed that 
in addition to extensive training sessions and seminars, program team 
members were keen to attend regular, well-structured training 
programs offered by the Cabinet IDSC focused on the latest l/DSS 
technologies.
g. Hardware and software:
Generally, for the DM&EM program software and hardware availability 
was not a major problem, although in some cases hardware failures did
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and still do occur. We have noticed that software problems tended to 
focus on missing functionality (i.e., features which were promised but 
which were not present or delivered on schedule), rather than on 
“ bugs” in the systems. In addition, in a country like Egypt, localization 
issues, in terms of either language (cultural interface) or structure (to 
accom m odate the complex nature of the Egyptian debt portfolio), 
and interfacing with other financial applications and systems both 
inside Egypt and between Egypt and other countries, posed significant 
challenges to the program team2.
h. Other factors:
Other factors observed include the crucial need for development of a 
detailed plan for co-ordinating debt information management in the 
country and the serious attem pt to avoid duplication of effort that 
could waste both time and resources as discussed in Chapter VII.
2 Explained in detail in Chapter V
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2. Debt M anagem ent & Economic Monitoring Program - Strategic Issues & Policies
Based on the analysis of the empirical research and the overview of the DM&EM program implementation phases, this 
section identifies the research findings in light of the major strategic issues and policies targeted by the program and their 
respective focus, objective(s) and output /  impact. In the interest of clarity, we have tabulated them as follows:
STRATEGIC ISSUES & POLICIES FOCUS OBJECTIVE(S) Output /  Im pact
1. M anagem ent of BOP. • Establishing an interconnection  
betw een m acroeconom ic policy and  
the external debt burden
• Foreign currency scarcity
• M anagem ent of external resources • Maintaining economic  
stability while achieving 
growth
2. Sectoral loans dem and • Estimating future loans within the 
framework of the external and internal 
debt ceiling
• Applying cost recovery /  pay-back  
principles
• Establish a sectoral project evaluation  
system
• Determine sources of loans (internal /  
externa l) in com pliance with the national 
plan
• Successful
m anagem ent of national 
debt
• Escape from payback  
bottleneck
3. External debt ceiling • Defining ceiling in the state budget
• Developing criteria for maximum  
am ount of loans
• Integrating all borrowing bodies in 
the econom y
• Define the optimum borrowing volume
• Establish an annual overall ceiling for 
external debt
• Control of budget 
fiscal g ap
• BOP m anagem ent
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STRATEGIC ISSUES & POLICIES FOCUS OBJECTIVE(S) Output /  Impact
4. Screening of new borrowing Making decisions on renewed /  
restructured /  more cost effective debts 
Defining g a p  in BOP i.e., potential 
voiume of new borrowing
G enerate  /  monitor new methods of 
financing /  supply searching 
Control a t the microeconomic level
Reduction of marginal 
costs on total borrowings
5. Negotiation for debt Evaluating loans, needs, sources (prior 
approvals)
Estimating future indebtedness 
Evaluating available sources
Establish loan evaluation system for 
comparison of loan opportunities 
Proper choice of available funds /  
conditions
Ensure full and effective  
utilization of loans (i.e., 
optimum utilization of 
funds).
6. Risk minimization • Risk concerning:
a. interest rate
b. exchange rate
• Hedging the risk by choosing
a. the optimum currency composition
b. an ad eq u ate  maturity structure
• Minimum exposure to risk
• Proper debt portfolio 
m anagem ent
7. Enforcing paybacks from the 
business sector
Incorporating deb t in debtor budget 
Imposing com m itm ent for 
reimbursement
Force debtors to payback on schedule by 
ensuring they include deb t obligations in 
their budgets
Follow-up on the pay-back process
Debt payback on an 
ongoing autom atic basis
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STRATEGIC ISSUES & POLICIES FOCUS OBJECTIVE(S) Output /  Im pact
8. Debt re-negotiating Specifying a  profile for negotiation 
employing financing /  trading approach  
Emphasizing low-risk refinancing
Handling debt negotiations inclusive of 
legal and administrative aspects
Integration of economic, 
financial and legal 
elements
9. Debt conversion schemes Existing tools of debt swaps, deb t equity, 
debt export
New tools for debt conversion- 
notes/bonds
Reduction of external deb t 
Extending maturities.
Relief of external debt
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STRATEGIC ISSUES & POLICIES FOCUS OBJECTIVE(S) Output /  Im pact
10. l/DSS implementation for 
strategic support
Leveraging decisions for top level 
decision makers
Building a  productive external debt 
m anagem ent national function 
Responding to the Paris Club crises
Develop an accurate , timely scenario 
generating capability.
Support high level econom ic committees 
and the Cabinet.
Support negotiations with creditors, 
especially Paris Club affiliates.
Solid l/DSS debt 
m anagem ent capability 
that acts as a base for a  
full-fledged debt 
m anagem ent office 
Modified debt decision 
making process (including 
changes in roles and  
responsibilities)
New positioning in terms of 
negotiation with creditors
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C. Lessons Learned:
The experience gained during the empirical research work conducted 
on the DM&EM program, as well as the theoretical material covered for 
both l/DSS and debt management, revealed a number of critical 
findings:
1.The strucfuring of an issue (such as debt management) is an 
integral part of the design and implementation of l/DSS systems 
especially in areas dealing with national socio-economic 
development planning. The main reason for previous failure 
cases in implementing a good external debt management 
function was the detachment of the issue structuring from the 
design and delivery of the functional system (Kaddah, interview-  
1993).
2. Providing l/DSS debt management systems for development 
planning is often coupled with both urgency and criticality of the 
issue. Therefore, debt management systems design should allow 
for crisis management modes of operation, which entails the 
preparation of crisis teams with managerial and technical 
support capable of operating in stress situations. Sometimes we 
are faced with pressure situations where creditors provide 
lucrative/non-lucrative offers however they need the debtor to 
answer back in hours (Sedki, interview -  1993).
3. Providing debt management systems requires much time and 
effort in building and integrating databases from multiple data 
sources and sectors (Ezz, 1993).
4. An effective l/DSS debt management system depends on the 
availability and accessibility of timely, relevant and accurate 
information (EL Sherif, interview -  1993). Before the program 
inception, though computers were available, information was
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very much lagging, inaccurate and lacked responsiveness to 
inquiries (weeks or even months).
5. Continuous user involvement is an integral part of the success of 
any of l/DSS debt management system (Kattab, interview -  
1993).
6. Successful implementation of l/DSS debt management systems is 
a necessary aspect, but not a sufficient condition, for successful 
institutionalization; both processes should be well integrated.
7. While successful implementation is based on top management 
support, successful institutionalization is based on organizational 
support (Hammed, interview -  1993).
8. Evaluation and assessment of l/DSS debt management systems is 
a vital process that should accom pany all phases of 
implementation and institutionalization (Kaddah, interview -  
1993). We have observed that the program management have 
adopted a very strict review and evaluation policy, which they 
used to run on weekly bases.
9. Continuous multi-level training of human resources leads to the 
successful adaptation, diffusion and adoption of l/DSS systems 
within various organizations (El Sherif and El Sawy, 1988). This was 
purely the case in the debt management program implementation 
(Ezz, 1993).
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D. Generalization
This research is important for developing countries and specifically 
Egypt in that it has studied the positive and the negative im pact of the 
DM&EM program at both the national level and the international level. 
It has also studied the direct and indirect economic and 
developmental planning effects on Egypt since its inception in 1987. At 
the theoretical level as well as the practical level, our research on l/DSS 
has measured the im pact of its introduction on shaping and leveraging 
decision-making processes especially at the top strategic level. It has 
observed the changes in the roles and responsibilities that took place 
within the concerned institutions as a result of its realization. These 
changes along with other financial, technological and human 
infrastructure investments made in the program were thoroughly 
studied.
Based on the findings and the lessons learned from this experience, a 
set of recommendations /  generalizations can be drawn for future 
implementation of similar l/DSS programs in similar contexts. The 
generalizations included in this chapter are based on the results of the 
research on the subject and on the unique findings of our empirical 
research, and encompass the following: proper management of 
foreign debt; optimum functional capabilities of l/DSS debt 
management systems; and lessons learned as a result of 
implementation.
1. M anagem ent of Foreign Debt
As we noted previously, developing countries resort to foreign financing
to encourage internal growth and to increase the resources available
for investment. It is important that, before receiving foreign funds, plans
be made on how to repay them, and consideration be given to the
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limits such debt will impose on future economic policy. Investment 
projects financed with foreign debt should yield enough foreign 
currency to cover the servicing of the debt. In theory, therefore, debf 
management involves knowing the level of the debt, keeping it within 
the desired limits, and obtaining the best available terms for it. In 
reality, debt management is very different for the following fwo 
reasons: First, public foreign debt has been used mainly to create (or 
maintain) fiscal deficits, caused not by greater public investment but 
by higher public current consumption or, in some cases, ambitious and 
unprofitable investments. Second, the volume of foreign debt incurred 
by any given country has usually been independent of fhe size of its 
current account deficit plus net foreign direct investment. The result has 
been a serious debt-servicing problem, the “debt crisis” , attributable in 
most countries largely to the absence of debt management (Kattab, 
interview -1993).
Debt management should take place at two levels: the macro- 
economic and the administrative level. Macro-economic 
management is the most important since the management of the 
economy, as a whole is the main factor in determining the volume of 
foreign debt. When more borrowing can no longer cover debt 
servicing, it is recommended that one of two alternatives take place. 
One is to create a bigger surplus in the trade and service accounts by 
reducing expenditures relative to output. The other is to create a fiscal 
surplus, since in developing countries most foreign debt is owed by the 
public sector while most foreign assets are held by the private sector. 
The debt-service problem is, therefore, more a fiscal issue than one 
related to the balance of payments. Nowadays, turning fiscal deficits 
into fiscal surpluses could be called macro-economic debt 
management (IBRD, 1988).
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Institutional management of foreign debt (figure VIII -  2) can be 
organized in a similar way in most countries, with minor differences due 
mainly to unique features in the historical formation of administrative 
institutions. The research review of some groupings of the institutional 
structure in selected countries, including Egypt, permits some broad 
generalizations.
The evidence of the institutional structures in the DM&EM program, as 
well as in programs in other selected countries such as Mexico and 
Turkey, forms the basis for the following presentation on efficient 
institutional management of foreign debt through prioritization.
The first institutional priority for foreign debt management is the 
statistical unit. This unit depends very much on the strength and the 
organization of exchange control regulations. Problems in ascertaining 
the level and characteristics of the foreign debt as well as the absence 
of exchange control leads to a lack of statistical control.
The second most important institutional priority is to have a control unit 
(Figure VIII - 3) for debt service and for foreign debt commitments and 
disbursements. The key factor in debt management is to be able to 
service the annual burden. The main priority is, therefore, to establish, 
through balance of payments forecasting, the level at which foreign 
debt can be serviced, and then to incur the foreign borrowing 
appropriate to that level. The only way to avoid the accumulation of 
debt service above sustainable levels is to control commitments and 
disbursements. The unit must have a global picture of the evolution 
and movements of external debt and its service to be able to make 
informed debt management decisions.
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Figure VIII - 2
Proposed Institutional Management of Foreign Debt 
An Information Flow Perspective
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Proposed New Role for the Control Unit
A third institutional priority is an advisory unit (Figure VIII - 4). Most 
countries to date are following defensive or passive management of 
debt, which involves avoiding unsustainable debt servicing and foreign 
financial crises (Hussain, 1989). But active debt management consists 
mainly of the daily analysis of foreign markets and the study of future 
options. An advisory unit should be able to advise the government, 
public sector and the external borrowing approval committee, if one 
exists, on the best control mechanizmes so that they have adequate 
terms of reference for authorizing new borrowing. This advice is best 
presented in the form of generated scenarios, which illustrate the 
advice and its related impact. It is also this advisory group or technical 
secretariat (TS)3 that provide debt management decision makers with
the tools that help them formulate their inquiry and generate the
3 For details on the Egyptian debt management technical secretariat please refer to 
Chapter V.
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relevant response to the problem they are tackling from the angle they 
feel best suits the situation.
Another top priority is that the debt management TS reports to a high 
level committee (HLEC in case of Egypt). This committee should include 
high-ranking economic policy decision makers so that it has close 
connections with the decisions affecting monetary and fiscal policy. It 
should meet as often as possible to be able to adapt its 
recommendations to the changing conditions of both foreign capital 
markets and macro-economic performance.
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Proposed New Role for the Advisory Unit
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Finally, one institutional problem that affects many countries is whether 
the Ministry of Finance or the Central Bank should be in charge of 
negotiating the central government and public sector borrowing, or 
whether it should be done only by the central government, leaving 
other government agencies and public sector companies to negotiate 
and manage their own foreign borrowing. From the experience of the 
DM&EM program the latter is the worst option to consider due to the 
haphazard manner that each individual borrowing agency will follow in 
addition to the duplication of effort, money, time and expertise that is 
required by each and every borrower. More important, in the case of 
public or publicly guaranteed debt, creditors are forced to claim back 
their money directly from the country if the debtor organization fails to 
service its own debt. The disastrous result is that borrowing is 
accomplished without any limitations and without consideration given 
to feasibility, usage4, or payback. Establishing a single public borrowing
unit that co-ordinated the debt acquisition process helps to negate 
most problems caused by mis-information problems as the unit 
progresses toward specialzation and the accumulation of skills and 
expertise in the debt management process (Figure VIII-5).
4 It was found that almost 38% of the total loans borrowed by Egypt (prior to 1985)
were not utilized until the maturity dates, Said Dr, Saleh Hammed - Deputy Prime 
Minister and Governor of the CBE (Interview, 1993).
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2. Optimum Functional Capabilities of l/DSS Debt M anagem ent 
Systems
l/DSS debt management systems vary a good deal in sophistication, 
complexity, and functional capabilities. The generalization process of 
the empirical research findings for the DM&EM program produced a list 
of l/DSS debt management functions. This list represents a collective 
view of a number of famous debt management experts5 together with
our own views and observations. For the purpose of testing our 
research finding observations (especially point b, section B of this 
chapter), we will articulate such list to satisfy such purpose: -
I. IS Functional Capabilities6:
a. Data entry, validation, and editing in order to create and maintain 
the components of the debt database. This includes what is 
commonly referred to as debt registration /  recording and debt 
transaction accounting.
b. Production of standard reports, with varying degrees of user 
parameterization for record selection, aggregation, computing, and 
output formatting. Reports can be based on debt and data entered 
by the user, extracted from external systems, and/or generated by 
the debt management system. Reports can include single loan 
summaries and histories, ledger accounts, arrears notices, creditor 
exposure, external debt outstanding, debt service projections, 
country reports for the World Bank, various statistical aggregations, 
utility reports, etc.
5 Mehran, 1985; Husain, 89; IBRD, 88; Kaddah, interview, 93; kattab, interview, 93; Ezz, 
interview, 93.
6 These functions are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
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c. Querying and ad-hoc reporting, including an interactive query 
program to enable selection of records meeting specified criteria 
and a reporting language or report generator permitting easy user 
definition of reports. Note that if user parameterization is sufficiently 
generalized, the "standard” reports in function B may be able to 
meet many of these requirements.
d. System utility and maintenance functions, including file backup, 
security, parameter initialization, etc.
e. Interfacing to external systems for the purposes of:
• Importing debt data (e.g., transaction information from an 
accounting system, exogenous data);
• Exporting debt data (e.g., aggregate data to a spreadsheet for 
inclusion in a macro-economic model);
• Sharing of common debt database elements or files with another 
system;
• Administrative and operational control (e.g., passing payment 
information to an authorization tracking system);
• Reporting debt data in machine-readable form fo external 
agencies (e.g., the World Bank); and
• Accessing external financial or statistical information sources 
(e.g., Reuters, IP Sharp).
f. In the case of a supplied debt management systems package, 
facilities for customizing data structures, processes, and reports or for 
developing new functions which can be integrated with those 
already provided in the package.
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g. Access to information sources for operational portfolio 
management, including:
• Market conditions including availability, instruments, maturities, 
etc. (see also Function e);
• Sources of finance; and
• Un-drawn amounts in existing loan.
h. Access to networking facilities for information exchange amongst 
debtors, including electronic mail and computer conferencing.
II. DSS Functional Capabilities7:
a.Generation of projected transactions are based on rules for periodic 
disbursements, payments and fees.
b.Analytic /  management tools that support:
• Sensitivity testing, to determine the effect of variations in 
exchange and interest rates on future debt servicing;
• New loan testing, to evaluate loan offers or possible borrowing 
strategies;
• Calculation of the grant element in loans;
• Monitoring loan utilization and, to a limited degree, the use of 
loan funds in specific projects; and
• Integration of debt data and exogenous macro-economic data.
c. Facilitation of structural changes to the debt portfolio and dafabase, 
resulting from:
• Refinancing, rescheduling and restructuring exercises;
• Debt servicing optimization via currency and exchange rate 
options and swaps; and
7 These functions are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
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• On-going lending operations.
d. Decision-support systems and tools, to assist in policy formulation; 
evaluation of alternative strategies; development of negotiation 
strategies; portfolio management and optimization of composition, 
maturities, and interest; and exchange rate exposure. Such systems 
would be sophisticated extensions of the tools included in Functions 
b and c and would use the collective expertise contained in the 
information sources in Functions e and g of the previous section.
e. Access to information sources (both within a developing country 
and from other countries) for policy formulation, regulatory functions, 
and debt co-ordination, including:
• Laws, regulations, procedures for authorization, contracting and 
administration of loans;
• Foreign exchange regulations and procedures;
• Examples of workable institutional arrangements;
• Economic and financial policies impacting on external debt 
management;
• Current international loan practices (e.g., what creditors can and 
cannot require, sample agreement clauses);
• New financial techniques and their implications for developing- 
country debt strategies;
• detailed experience in previous negotiations;
• Training opportunities; and
• Sources of technical advice (including consultants).
Note that Functions g &h (section I) and d & e (section II) are not widely
considered as fully fledged parts of l/DSS debt management or of
other operational support systems used by debt managers. Such
functions (related information sources), as in the case of g and h, are
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labour-intensive and demanding to construct and continuously 
maintain. Addition, functions g &h (section I) and e (section II) would 
partly depend on the development of good relations with technical 
assistance agencies such as the UNCTAD, WB, ..etc., in order to gain 
from their expertise in identifying, classifying, processing and sharing of 
information8.
8 See also Section D -  1.
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E. Future Research
Challenges faced, experience developed, opportunity seized and 
lessons learned from DM&EM program implementation could help 
highlight some present gaps in the process of developing l/DSS debt 
management systems. It could direct future research to key areas, both 
in l/DSS as well as debt management that need further research 
exploration. The process of identifying such dependent and 
independent key issues supports the duplication of similar systems in 
similar contexts. The theoretical and practical experience gained from 
the thorough study of the DM&EM program can represent a 
transportable experience that could be used in similar situations by 
other countries. It reflects an insight for new areas of l/DSS application 
in non-profit and development-related government policies, decision 
making and management.
1.Present gaps in the developm ent process of l/DSS Debt M an ag e­
ment Systems:
We have observed that the DM&EM builders (designers, implementers, 
operators, etc.) are dealing with a dynamic rather than a static system. 
User requirements, financial practices and instruments, government 
policies and approaches, and computer technologies evolve and 
make new demands on their systems. Changes are sometimes 
dictated by internal system demands as well, i.e. the need to improve 
performance, reduce system overheads, replace obsolete 
development technologies and/or tools, etc.
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Results from our empirical and theoretical research foresee the 
following three main areas in future systems development.
a. Facilities for customizing data structures, processes, and reports or 
for developing new functions, which can be integrated with those 
systems already available. (IS related)
To date, most users of DMS have been satisfied with using the package 
more or less in turnkey mode, although it does not fully cover their 
requirements. Additionally, principal DMSs provide some facilities for 
user customization, mainly during system installation; however, it is 
generally not easy to add data elements (for example to the loan file 
dafa definition) if a user wanfs fo wrife a separate application program 
to access or manipulate the loan record. Moreover, with the increasing 
use of computer-based tools in all aspects of work, the dem and for 
customized solutions and inter-connections between applications will 
tremendously grow.
b. Decision support systems and tools to assist in policy formulation, 
evaluation of alternative strategies, developm ent of negotiation 
strategies, portfolio m anagem ent and exposure optimization of 
maturates, interest and exchange rate compositions. (DSS related)
Currently, most DMSs provide the user with relatively limited facilities for 
constructing different scenarios and determining the effects of 
changes with various parameters on critical variables com puted by the 
system. In its simplest form, user must generate the required variables ( 
for example, by printing the associated reports or by computing and 
then exporting the variables to a spreadsheet), save the contents of 
the database, modify the parameters in question (often one by one), 
re-compute the variables, and compare the results. This can be a time- 
consuming and tedious process (although not as tedious as performing
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the entire analysis manually). Determining optimum scenarios may 
require multiple repetitions of this procedure. Moreover, senior decision 
makers and/or less technical users of the DMS may require higher-level, 
more user-friendly interfaces to the system than what are currently 
available for asking such “what -  if" questions. The construction of 
appropriate scenarios may also involve accessing external data 
sources of models, or indeed may require exporting data from the DMS 
for processing by external processes.
c. Access to information sources for policy formulation, regulatory 
functions, debt co-ordination, and operational portfolio 
m anagem ent and to networking facilities to update the content of 
these sources and to exchange information among debtors.
(Institutional setting related)
Research results and observations indicate a number of specific needs 
for information for policy formulation, regulatory functions, debt co ­
ordination, and operational portfolio management which could be 
better met by the systematic collection and organization of specific 
types of information. There could be a number of different methods for 
providing access to such information, depending on the source of the 
information and the existence of related systems and services already 
in place or planned. Clear examples are: database of laws, 
regulations, and administration of loans might be part of a national, 
legal or administration information system; Information may also come 
from external sources, such as commercial, financial or statistical 
services, and later may be analyzed and re-packaged to meet local 
needs.
At the regional or global level, there may be opportunities to establish 
or to participate in existing information systems and networks. Country- 
specific information can be shared via contributions to co-operative
2 8 8
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databases, newsletters, and referral services. Thus, documentation such 
as publications, working reports, etc., for example, on workable 
institutional arrangements for debt co-ordination might be deposited 
with an existing regional development information system (such as 
PADIS in Africa or INFOPLAN in Latin America) for analysis, indexing, and 
inclusion in the system’s databases and information products.
In case of any co-operative efforts to construct databases or 
exchange information records, standard methodologies may have to 
be created or adapted to format and index such information. 
Definitely, some of this information (such as experiences during previous 
negotiations) can be quite sensitive, yet potentially very useful to other 
developing countries in similar situations.
2. Key Areas of Future Research in Debt M anagem ent
Our research has generated a number of key potential issues and 
opportunities that represent directions and grounds for future research 
in the areas related to building, managing and sustaining l/DSS in 
economic development planning. We conclude this thesis with several 
questions and issues for the reader to consider and hope that our 
research will lead to further research in the field until all issues are dealt 
with and a DMS is as perfect as human kind can make it:
• What is the role of staffing, recruitment, and training of debt 
managers?
• What is their relative position in the government hierarchy; what are 
the skills required; the authority and powers they enjoy; and what is 
the access they have to decision-makers?
• How to capture, co-ordinate, and integrate the information flows
originating from different agencies, departments, ministries, and the
private sector without actually taking over those functions directly or
even posing a threat to the agencies responsible for generating
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primary data?
• How to properly provide policy makers with useful information and 
proper scenarios that are both timely and well-focused, and which 
can be linked with other economic variables, like the balance of 
payment and fiscal aggregates? So that policy makers can look at 
debt as part of a broad picture, rather than looking at the debt 
situation in isolation or in a compartmented manner.
• How to standardize data definitions and concepts, how to classify 
them into various categories that meet the multifaceted needs of 
users both internal and external, and how to develop standards and 
specifications that ensure the data are of acceptab le  quality?
• What is the appropriate role of external technical assistance in 
developing the local institutional capacity?
• What has worked in technical assistance, what has not worked, and 
what can be done to improve and strengthen the delivery of 
technical assistance?
• With an increasing number of countries running into domestic debt 
problems, does it make sense to continue dealing with external debt 
as a single entity or is there a justification for combining domestic 
and external debt management systems rather than keeping them 
on parallel tracks?
• Can successful debt management experiences be replicable / 
transportable?
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Macroeconomic Aggregates
The following are some macroeconomic aggregates:
• Total External Debt (EDT) which consists of public and publicly 
guaranteed long - term debt, private non - guaranteed long-term 
debt, use of IMF credit and estimated short - term debt.
• Total Debt Service (TDS) which shows the debt service payments on 
total long - term debt (public and publicly guaranteed and private 
non - guaranteed), use of IMF credit and interest on short - term 
debt only.
• Export of Goods and Services (XGS) are the value of goods and all 
services (including workers’ remittances) sold to the rest of the 
world.
• International Reserves (RES) are the sum of a country’s monetary 
authority holdings of Special Drawing Rights (SDR), its reserve 
position in the IMF, its holdings of foreign exchange and its holdings 
of gold.
• Gross National Product (GNP) is the broadest indicator in 
economic output and growth. It covers the goods and services 
produced and consumed in the private, public, domestic and 
international sectors of the economy. It also provides the overall 
framework for analyzing and forecasting economic trends. It has 
the unique attribute of integrating the markets for goods and 
services (demand and spending) with production of the goods 
and services (supply or costs) in one format.
• Imports of Goods and Services (MGS) is the net transaction of a 
country’s imports of goods and service in a given period.
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Definition of Debt Indicators: 
•  Total External Debt to Exports of Goods [EDT/XGS]
Higher external debt relative to exports that earn foreign exchange, 
indicates a higher debt payment burden that undermines growth 
prospects and the ability to import. A country with a high debt burden 
relative to exports may choose to impose foreign exchange controls to 
limit outflow of funds and grant export subsidies.
•  Debt Service to Export Ratio [TDS /  XGS]
Countries are ranked from low ratio values to high values. Higher values 
indicate greater amount of interest and principal payments on external 
debt as com pared to the foreign exchange cash - flow generated by 
exports. A country whose foreign exchange earning exports are low 
relative to debt payments may have to lower domestic business activity 
and imports to economize on foreign exchange.
•  International Reserve to Total External Debt [RES/EDT]
International Reserve assets are composed of foreign exchange, gold 
and special asset allocations from the IMF. Such reserve assets are 
means of servicing debt. Higher external debt relative to reserve 
holdings indicates a lower liquidity cushion and a greater likelihood 
that the government will impose reserve-building austerity policies that 
economize on imports and encourage exports.
•  International Reserve to Imports of Goods and Services [RES/MGS] 
Reserves can be used to pay for imports necessary to sustain economic 
performance. Higher reserve holdings relative to imports indicates 
borrowing or policy adjustments such as exchange rate devaluation. 
The following graphs elaborate on how to put debt indicators into 
direct application. (For examples on Egypt, please see chapter VI, 
page 209).
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Interviews 
Preliminary Questions1
1. What are your qualifications (highest education /work experience)?2
2. What is your perception of the metaphors strategic, tactics and 
operations management levels? And how do you perceive their 
inter-relatedness and the effect of each level on the others? Do you 
think that people belonging to one management level perform 
functions at other levels?
3. What are the types of data and levels of detail /  aggregation 
required by your?
4. What is the extent to which your depend on assistance from advisors 
and /or support staff? And what exactly are their roles?
5. How do you perceive the role of the project in the overall econom ic 
reform program?
6. Do you deal directly with project personnel or through an 
intermediary?
N.B. Depending on the results obtained from the above questions, the pattern of
1 The purpose of the preliminary questions was to identify the m anagement level of
the interviewee via a defined set of criteria in the form of questions that would allow 
us to objectively place him in the right management level, based upon his 
management pattern of behavior as a decision-maker and not depending of his 
official post and/or management hierarchy.
Some of these questions might need clarification for the jargon used (e.g., what is a 
strategic level). In this respect simultaneous explanation and interpretation of the 
terminology used is carried out depending on the immediate feedback of the 
interviewee when the question was asked.
2 Depending on the level addressed, information could be a obtained from a 
question like this. Usually for top level persons, we depended on indirect sources of 
information such as personal bio, C.V., assistant, etc.
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behavior and management practice of the interviewee will be determined. 
Consequently, each management level will be targeted with one of the following 
questionnaires.
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Questionnaire - Strategic level
1. Did your participate in setting-up the mandate of this project?
2. How often do you depend on the support of the project in shaping 
your decision making process? And to what extent is it useful?
3. What is the type /  kind of support that your receive from the project?
4. Could your give us an idea of how the strategic decision making 
process used to take place before the inception of the project?
5. Did your realize a kind of change in the pattern of the decision 
making process as a result of the project and its deliverables?
6. What were the number of major success /  failures before and after 
the project? And what were the main reasons behind them?
7. How can you classify the outcome of the project from the point of 
view of im pact on the overall economic reform program?
8. What is your degree of satisfaction on the performance/ 
deliverables from the project?
9. How did your perceive the issue of having a PC with the latest daily 
money and banking market update (either local or international) in 
the form of an EIS on your desk? And how often do you use it? Did 
your have any formal orientation?
10.Are all the issues, problems and ideas supported by the project 
initiated by your?
11 Jo what extent does your share in the development and build-up of 
a scenario? Does this imply that the project is premature, mature or 
post-mature?
12.What are the areas that need further development and /  or 
restructuring in the overall project mandate?
13.How can we improve the effectiveness of the project in order to 
achieve its desired national/international mandate?
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14.In your opinion, how can we institutionalize this project in the future?
15.Finally, can we say that at a certain point in time our debt 
management experience could be fully transportable to other 
countries? And if yes, how?
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Questionnaire - Tactics level
1. What was the main reason behind initiating the project idea? And 
how did it evolve?
2. Who identified those reasons and asked for this kind of assistance?
3. Could your give us an idea of how the strategic decision making 
process used to take place before the inception of the project?
4. Did your realize a kind of change in the pattern of the decision 
making process as a result of the project and its deliverables?
5. What are the strategic objectives of the project?
6. What is the scope of the project?
7. Are all inquires /  services initiated by the project?
8. According to the project conception, what is the basic philosophy 
behind the metaphor "supporting and/or shaping/leveraging high 
level decision makers” ? Is there more than one type ?
9. Who are the main users and targeted beneficiaries? And what is the 
philosophy adopted in satisfying their needs?
10.What is the degree of user involvement? And in what form?
11 .Can you give us an idea of the modalities of project 
implementation?
12.What is the status of the project to date?
13.What were the main reasons behind the successes /  failures?
14.Can you shed some light on the outcome /  deliverables of this 
project?
15.What was IDSC's role in this project? And what was its degree of 
involvement?
16.Could you give us an idea on the project structure, human power 
and workflow procedure?
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17.Could we say the outcome of the project is im pact on the process 
of decision making? If yes, how and to what extent?
18.What was the impact of the project on the organization, national 
and international levels?
19.What do you think of the project experience? And to what extent 
could this idea be transportable /  re-transferred to other contexts?
20.In your opinion, what are the project plans?
App. - 8
Appendices
Questionnaire - Operations level
1. When did you join this project?
2. Being a XXXX (post), how would you describe your work?
3. Did you perceive a change in your job tasks/functions and 
assignments before and after the project introduction?
4. Did you perceive a change in decision maker's management 
pattern (decision making process) after the introduction of the 
project?
5. Did you receive any kind of training on or off the job? If yes, in what 
areas specifically and was it adequate?
6. What was the environment /  platform used in implementation?
7. Were tailoring and adaptation functions (arabization and other 
functions) a must? And who requested it? And why?
8. What is the breakdown of the system? What are the technical 
specifications of the system? How many phases of implementation 
were there?
9. How often do you participate in the overall planning of the project?
10.Was there a role-played by international experts and consultants? 
And if yes, what specifically did you gain from them?
11 .What . were the main difficulties /  problems faced during 
implementation?
12.Who can you define as your target users? And what is their degree 
of involvement?
13.Can user requests be classified and /or categorized?
14.Did the user have any orientation on the use of computers before? 
And if yes, in what areas and was it adequate /  beneficial or not?
15.What were the modalities used in their training?
16.What are the detailed steps followed in receiving and delivering a 
user request?
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17.Do you perceive a change in the work performance before and 
after project introduction? If yes, in what sense?
18.Could you give us an idea on how you perceive the future of the 
project?
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Appendix ll-B
Four Point Lickert Scale
Four Point Scale Supplementary Questionnaire Sheet
(Version IV)
You are kindly requested to respond to the following statements. Most 
of them are accom panied by either examples or explanations for 
facilitating this exercise and assuring that the meaning is clear in your 
mind. In addition, each one has a scale of points from 1 to 4. Point 1 on 
the scale represents complete disagreement, while point 4 on the 
scale implies complete agreement. In between answers range from 
disagreement to agreement with at levels (1 = complete
disagreement; 2 = disagreement; 3 = agreement; 4 = complete 
agreement). Best of luck and thank you in advance.
Four p o in t Sca le  S tatem ents
1 2  3 4
• Regardless o f his organ iza tiona l hierarchy, 
decision-m aker's qua lifica t-ions
(educa tion  a n d  work experience) a ffe c t 
his m a n a g e m e n t pa tte rn  o f behav io r3.
In other words: Education b a ckg ro u n d  and  
work expe rience  in fluence  a decision 
maker's m ode  o f ope ra tion  regardless of 
his o rgan izationa l h ie ra rchy i.e. 
h iera rch ica lly  positioned a t a s tra teg ic  
level while perform ing ta c tic a l and  /o r 
ope ra tiona l m a n a g e m e n t functions.
M anagem ent and /or decision making pattern of behavior are used
interchangeably in this text. The purpose of using them is to classify decision-makers 
and their pattern of behavior when dealing or handling a situation that requires a 
certain decision or action to be performed. According to management practices, 
there are a number of different combinations for such patterns such as, strategic level 
decision-makers who are global in nature and depend heavily on advisors and 
support staff. On the other extreme, we have strategic level decision makers that do 
not believe in the global picture and like to drill down searching for facts and proofs 
for what they are after. Most of these categories are either very visionary and can see 
things which others cannot envision or are, usually, not satisfied by what has been 
provided by their advisors /  support staff. The same applies to decision makers on the 
tactical and operational levels.
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Decision maker's o rgan izationa l h iera rchy or 
post does no t necessarily in d ic a te  his 
m a n a g e m e n t pa tte rn  o f behavior.
For example: A Minister or an Under Secretary 
position does not necessarily in d ic a te  th a t 
he is perfo rm ing s tra teg ic  decision m aking.
• Decision makers a t any h ie ra rch ica l level 
in the  organ ization ca n  perform  
m a n a g e m e n t functions in any o ther level 
d e p e n d in g  on a set o f variables.
For example: A decision m aker a t a stra teg ic  
h ie ra rch ica l level (such as a  Minister) ca n  
perform  m a n a g e m e n t functions in any 
o ther level d e p e n d in g  on a num ber of 
variab les such as, the  situation fa c e d , 
nature  o f p rob lem  a t hand  , the  c h a ra c te r 
o f the  decis ion m aker himself, e tc .
• A g o o d  in d ic a to r fo r a  decision maker's 
pa tte rn  o f beh av io r cou ld  be  the  typ e  o f 
d a ta  and  level o f details he uses.
For example: If a  decision m aker is usually 
dea ling  w ith  very high level (agg rega te ) 
d a ta , the  g lo b a l p ic tu re  a n d  fe w  m inor 
details, his m a n a g e m e n t pa tte rn  o f 
behav io r c o u ld  be  classified as s tra teg ic.
• Users o f the  d e b t m a n a g e m e n t and  
e co n o m ic  m onitoring p ro je c t pe rce ive  it 
as a critica l success fa c to r  for the 
e co n o m ic  reform  program .
For example: Key m em bers o f the C a b in e t 
HLEC, w ho  represent the  co re  user g roup  
fo r the  p ro jec t, regard  the d e b t 
m a n a g e m e n t and  e co n o m ic  m onitoring 
p ro je c t as a  fu n d a m e n ta l fa c to r  o f the  
success a n d  ach ievem ents  re a ch e d  to 
d a te  by the  Egyptian e c o n o m ic  reform  
program .
• The p ro je c t has successfully de live red  a 
num ber o f p roducts  a nd  services th a t 
shaped a n d  le ve ra g e d  the  decision 
m aking process on a m a cro -e co n o m ic  
level.
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For exam ple: Project products such as, the 
comprehensive data base, scenario 
generators and information bulletin. 
Project services such as information / 
decision support services have successfully 
helped and supported the process of 
decision making especially macro- 
economic ones.
• The concept of 'supporting the decision 
making process' 4 was clearly understood
and grasped by the management of the 
project who were able to successfully 
provide products and services that helped 
key decision makers such as members of 
the HLEC.
• The introduction of the project and the 
continuous enhancement of its outputs 
and services have significantly leveraged 
the process of decision making of top 
policy and strategy people.
• The non-conventional project setup has 
significantly contributed to its success to 
date.
In other words: The management style 
adopted, the qualified personnel
employed, the flexible organizational
structure, the non-government 
environment set-up (i.e., running the 
project as a strategic business unit with 
clear objectives and goals, using highly 
qualified staff in addition to utilizing 
external (international / local) expertise 
and advisors).
• Special requirements were necessary/a 
pre-requisite for the success of modifying 
the ready-made systems and the build up 
of the complementary ones.
For exam ple: Special requirements such as 
clear overall vision of what needed to be 
done, well coordinated objectives and 
goals between different management 
level of the project personnel, etc.
4 Enabling decision makers to perform the right decision a t the right time through
building and providing accurate and timely information in addition to computer- 
based decision support scenarios which reflect the spectrum of solutions to a certain 
problem besides the im pact of each one if selected.
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• The project has reached its ultimate 
phased objectives and succeeded in 
fulfilling its mandate to date.
• The failures that the project faced are 
negligible.
In other words: Thev were mainlv due to the 
build up of the unique learning experience 
by project personnel and also the 
awareness of its client base.
• The project services offering pattern is still 
more inclined to the side of supply driven 
approach.
• Continuous user involvement has greatly 
helped in shaping and fine-tuning the 
project's mandate, objectives, scope and 
deliverables.
• The project has more to deliver in order to 
reach its institutionalization stage.
For exam ple: Establishina the debt ceilina 
system, financial and capital market 
system, debt strategy module, the internal 
debt system, etc.
• The cumulative experience of project 
personnel is solid enough to be exported 
to other contexts (countries and 
institutions).
• The continuos training and exposure to 
latest state-of-the-art information 
technology tools and techniques have 
greatly shaped the output and service 
level of the project.
• The rate of success reached by the project 
to date is highly coupled with the role and 
effort exerted by IDSC in supporting and 
facilitating its mission.
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Appendix ll-C
Interviewee List
• Ebied, Atef, Egyptian Minister of the Public Enterprise Office & Minister of 
State for Cabinet Affairs, November 24, 1993, Cairo, Egypt.___________
• El Ezz, Izzat A., CBE- LEDD Director, Interview, October 24, 1993, Cairo,
Egypt-_________________________________________________________
• El Sayed, Khaled, CBE -  LEDD Technical Manager, Interview, October 
24, 1993, Cairo, Egypt.___________________________________________
• El Sherif, Hisham, The Cabinet, IDSC Chairman, Interview, May 18, 1993, 
Cairo, Egypt.___________________________________________________
• Ghali, Youssef Botrous, Egyptian Minister of International Cooperation, 
Interview, November 8, 1993, Cairo, Egypt._________________________
• Hamed, Salah, Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and Governor of the 
Central Bank of Egypt, Interview, October 8, 1993, Cairo, Egypt._______
• Kaddah, M.B., DM&EM Program Director & Member of the Paris Club 
Negotiation Team, Interview, February 18, 1997, Cairo, Egypt._________
• Kattab, M.A., IDSC -  DSS Department Director, Interview, July 15, 1993, 
Cairo, Egypt.___________________________________________________
• Nazif, Ahmed, IDSC Executive Manager, Interview, July, 24 1993, Cairo, 
Egypt-_________________________________________________________
• Sedki, Atef, Egyptian Prime Minister, Interview, October 24, 1993, Cairo, 
Egypt._________________________________________________________
• Wassif, M. Makramalla, Egyptian Minister of International Cooperation, 
Interview, October 6, 1993, Cairo, Egypt.___________________________
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Appendix lll-A
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
A. DSS
7. D iffe rence  b e tw e e n  MIS, DSS, a n d  EIS:
The development of inexpensive, powerful microcomputers was 
stimulated by equally powerful advances in software design which 
furthered the principal goal of DSS: to provide tools to end-users. 
Simultaneously, MIS systems have added many DSS features and have 
attempted, with limited success, to adopt more user-friendly software, 
giving end users direct control over sessions. While all of fhese 
advances have been positive for end users and managers, they have 
made the job of researchers and scholars more difficult because the 
distinctions between DSS, MIS, and EIS use are difficult to make (Turban, 
1988).
Table lll-A-1 attempts to summarize the differences between MIS, DSS, 
and EIS. DSS has been placed between MIS and EIS to suggest that DSS 
is a bridge between them.
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Table lll-A-1
Differences between Management Information Systems (MIS), Decision 
Support Systems (DSS), and Executive Information Systems (EIS)
Dimension Conventional MIS DSS EIS
Focus Information processing Analysis, decision 
support
Status access
Typical users 
served
Middle and lower levels, 
sometimes senior 
executives
Analysts, professionals, 
managers (via 
intermediaries)
Senior executives
Impetus Efficiency Effectiveness Expediency
Application Production control, sales 
forecasts, financial 
analysis, human resources 
management
Diversified areas where 
managerial decisions 
are made
Environmental 
scanning, performance 
evaluation, identifying 
problems and 
opportunities
Database(s) Corporate Special Special
Decision
support
capabilities
Direct or indirect, support, 
mainly structured routine 
problems, using standard 
operations, research, and 
other models
Supports semi-structured 
and unstructured 
decision making; mainly 
ad hoc, but some 
repetitive decisions
Indirect support, mainly 
high-level and 
unstructured decisions 
and policies
Type of 
information
Scheduled and on- 
demand reports; 
structured flow, exception 
reporting of mainly 
internal operations
Information to support 
specific situations
New items, external 
information on 
customers, competitors, 
and the environment; 
scheduled and on- 
demand reports on 
internal operations
Principal use Control Planning, organizing, 
staffing, and control
Tracking and control
Adaptability to 
individual users
Usually none; 
standardized
Permits individual 
judgment, what-if 
capabilities, some 
choice of dialog style
Tailored to the decision­
making style of each  
individual executive, 
offers several options for 
outputs
Graphics Desirable Integrated part of many 
DSS
A must
User-
friendliness
Desirable A must if no
intermediaries are used
A must
Treatment of 
Information
Information is provided to 
a diversified group of 
users who then 
manipulate it or 
summarize it as needed
Information provided by 
the EIS and/or MIS is 
used as input to the DSS
Filters and compresses 
information, tracks 
critical data and 
information
Supporting
detailed
information
Inflexibility on reports, 
cannot access the 
supporting details quickly
Can be programmed 
into the DSS
Instant access to the 
supporting details of 
any summary
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Model base Standard models are 
available, but are not 
m anaged
The core of the DSS Can be added, usually 
not included or limited 
in nature
Construction By vendors or IS specialists By users, either alone or 
in combination with 
specialists from the 1C or 
IS Department
By vendors or IS 
specialists
Hardware Mainframe, micros, or 
distributed
Mainframe, micros, or 
distributed
Distributed system
Nature of
computing
packages
Application oriented, 
performance reports, 
strong reporting 
capabilities, standard 
statistical financial, 
accounting, and 
managem ent science 
models
Large computational 
capabilities modeling 
languages and 
simulation, application 
and DSS generators
Interactive, easy access 
to multiple databases, 
online access, 
sophisticated DBMS 
capabilities, complex 
linkages
Philosophically, DSS and micro computing are identical in that 
professionals largely dominate both: Users receive information from a 
professional staff of analysts, designers, and programmers.
In terms of their objectives, MIS focuses on structured information flows 
to middle managers. DSS is aimed at top managers and operational 
managers, with emphasis on change, flexibility, and quick response. 
With DSS there is less of an effort to link users to structured information 
flows and a correspondingly greater emphasis on models, assumptions, 
and display graphics. Micro-computing tends to focus on automating 
well-defined, specific tasks (e.g., document preparation and 
spreadsheet analysis.) Until recently, there was little concern with 
systematically tying microcomputers into corporate or external data 
flows, although this situation is now changing.
Perhaps the greatest differences can be found in systems analysis and 
design. Micro-computing is almost entirely dom inated by packages. 
Users establish their needs and buy a package, but then are limited to 
changing the capabilities of the package. If information requirements 
expand, users must buy a new package. Analysis and design are done 
by end users.
Both DSS and MIS rely on professional analysis and design. However,
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whereas MIS follows a traditional systems development life cycle, 
freezing information requirements before design and throughout the life 
cycle, DSS systems are consciously interactive, are never frozen, and in 
a sense are never finished. At the other extreme, EIS systems are highly 
graphical and use many indicative and tailored techniques to match 
the decision-maker’s style.
While these differences among MIS, DSS, and EIS are true in general, 
there are many exceptions. For instance, microcomputer spreadsheet 
and database packages can be programmed (or menu driven) by 
end-users to support a wide variety of decisions. Microcomputers can 
therefore provide the platform for developing a MIS, DSS and EIS.
2. Support for Decision Making at Different Leveis
While many early DSS were aimed at senior management, many users 
of DSS are found at middle-management levels. There are many 
reasons for this, but experience indicates that a well-designed DSS can 
be used at many levels of the organization. Senior management can 
use a financial DSS to forecast the availability of corporate funds for 
investment sorted by division. Middle managers within divisions can use 
these estimates and the same system to make decisions about 
allocating division funds to projects. Capital project managers within 
divisions, in turn, can use this system to begin their projects, reporting to 
the system (and ultimately to senior managers) on a regular basis how 
much money has been spent.
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3. Support for Organizational (Group) Decision Making 
It is wrong to think that individuals make decisions in large 
organizations. In fact, most decisions are made collectively. (Rational, 
bureaucratic, political and "garbage-can" models of organizational 
choice were discussed in Chapter III). Frequently, decisions must be 
coordinated with several groups before being finalized. In large 
organizations, decision making is inherently a group process, and DSS 
can be designed to facilitate group decision making.
DSS are uniquely suited to support a number of organizational 
processes, such as decision making and political competition. As 
previously noted, DSS are highly flexible and can support a number of 
different assumptions and decision processes. An organization wide 
DSS should permit different groups, using different assumptions, to 
analyze the same problem and com e up with interesting, unique 
answers (Henderson and Schilling, 1985).
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B. Framework for Developing DSS
Developing a DSS requires new kinds of tools, a different concept of 
who is involved in building systems, and new organizational 
arrangements.
1. DSS technology
DSS technology can be divided into three levels. The application 
system level technology is called specific DSS. This includes the 
hardware and software that decision-makers use to guide their 
decision making. A Lotus spreadsheet used to make financial 
projections and test assumptions is a specific DSS.
A second level of technology is called DSS generators. A Generator is 
a package of related technologies, both hardware and software, that 
provides the tools for building specific DSS. Mainframe systems such as 
Boeing's Executive Information System (EIS), IBM's GADS system, the 
Execucom Systems Corporation's Interactive Financial Planning System 
(IFPS), and EXPRESS, marketed by Tymshare, are all examples of 
mainframe software DSS generators. These packages contain data 
management, graphic display, financial and statistical modeling, and 
query language capabilities. More recent additions to this market are 
decision analysis systems that employ selective artificial intelligence 
qualities to help decision-makers arrive at decisions and summarize the 
results.
DSS generators have experienced tremendous market growth since the 
arrival of microcomputers. Integrated spreadsheet packages, 
database packages with graphics, and related graphic support tools 
are examples of DSS generators that can be used to develop a large 
number of specific applications. A more fundamental level of DSS 
technology is a DSS tool. These are the building blocks of generators. 
Included are special purpose languages such as APL, which permits 
the radical development of applications, screens, menus and
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interactive dialogue. Also, it includes graphics subroutines of language, 
special purpose graphics hardware and supportive 
telecommunications hardware. Each of these levels of technology 
involves a different set of roles.
2. Roles:Users, Builders, and Toolsmiths
Along with the development of end-user computing and the growth of 
more user-friendly mainframe software, a number of new roles have 
emerged in the organization that link technical specialists with 
professional systems staff on the one hand and with a user group on 
the other. DSS entails a more elaborate division of labor and more 
specialized roles.
Five roles are involved in DSS, each related in a unique way to the 
technologies previously described (see Figure lll-A-1).
ROLES IN  
MANAGERS (USERS)SF EC FIC d :>s
INTERMEDIARIES
DSS
DSS BUILDERS
GENERATOR
TECHNICAL SUPPORT
TOOLSMITH
Figure lll-A-1
Roles and Tools in DSS
(Source: Sprague and Carlson, 1982)
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1. The manager or end user is the person or group ultimately 
responsible for making key organizational decisions. This person or 
group operates in an environment of uncerfainty and faces 
bureaucratic constraints and political competition in the effort to reach 
on organizational decision. A DSS must provide information on how 
things are progressing, help to design alternatives, aid the user in 
arriving at a decision that others will support, and finally facilitate that 
implementation.
2. The intermediary is a skilled staffer who helps to schedule the 
manager or task force's workload. This person plays an important 
gatekeeper role by determining what problems com e to the attention 
of the manager, what information is presented, and how it is presented, 
and is influential in scoping the solution.
3. The DSS builder is generally a member of a special DSS group who 
uses a DSS generator to build the capabilities desired by end users. This 
person must be familiar with the business problem but must also have a 
keen understanding of how to make the technology work (although he 
or she need not necessarily understand how it works). This 
occupational role has seen the largest growth (and has experienced 
the greatest shortages) of any role described here.
4. The technical supporter is a member of the data processing group or 
department who develops or installs DSS generators and tools. DSS 
require links to corporate databases, graphics software, display 
hardware, and a host of highly technical facilities.
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5. The toolsmith is a member of the data processing staff who develops 
new technology, new graphics, and new software to serve DSS 
applications. Toolsmiths often work for private vendors that develop 
DSS packages or for service bureaus that deliver DSS services, rather 
than for end-user organizations. This person is most often a computer 
scientist or systems engineer.
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C. The Process of Developing a DSS
Building a DSS is different from building a Transaction Processing System 
(TPS) or MIS system. DSS generally use smaller amounts of data, do not 
need on-line transaction data, involve a smaller number of important 
users, and tend to employ more sophisticated analytic models than 
other systems. Because DSS are customized to specific users and 
specific classes of decisions, they require much closer participation of 
users. In addition, they must be flexible and must evolve as the 
sophistication of users grows. In order to build effective DSS, a new 
strategy and design process is needed.
1. Strategy
There are many different ways of developing DSS, each suited to 
different conditions. These options include “quick-hit” development of 
a few specific DSS, phased development of a related series of specific 
DSS, and development of a full-service DSS generator (Sprague and 
Carlson, 1982).
The auick-hit approach essentially involves scanning the organization to 
find easy, rapid development opportunities, characterized by willing 
users, a well-understood problem, and readily apparent, fruitful 
approaches using information technology, in short, low-risk, high-payoff 
development. Hopefully, the required tools and techniques can be 
purchased from a vendor and applied directly.
The problem with this approach is that development tends to be 
unplanned and ad-hoc (a virtue becomes a vice). Different DSS are 
developed, with no sharing of capabilities or experience. The specific 
DSS constructed have no general capabilities and may not be 
adaptable to future problems, forcing total re-design in the near term. 
The auick-hit method is the most conservative and most popular 
approach to DSS development. It does not require a central DSS 
group, users can develop systems as needed, and the short-term
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investment is minimal (although the long-term one may be more 
expensive).
The staged development approach attempts to build a string of 
specific DSS, one at a time, but in a coordinated fashion that involves 
the sharing of software; hardware, and, most important, expertise 
among projects. Generally, this approach requires a central corporate 
DSS group. The DSS group has the opportunity to engage in a 
systematic program of development, while appearing to work on only 
one project at a time. Therefore, this strategy seems conservative but is 
in fact more ambitious. The disadvantages of this approach are a 
delay in developing the first system and the risk that later systems 
cannot use the technology of earlier ones. There may not be a 
synergistic effect in which later systems build on earlier capabilities. 
Nevertheless, this is the second most common approach to DSS 
development and the most common one wherever the organization 
has a DSS group.
The most ambitious strategy requires senior management support for 
the development of a DSS generator or general DSS capability prior to 
developing specific DSS. This is essentially a multi-year effort, perhaps 
requiring up to three years with current technology. The effort focuses 
on developing a powerful set of tools, an integrated DSS generator, 
and supportive hardware and physical facilities. A few large 
companies have taken this approach. The Egyptian Cabinet's DSS 
structure is one example of a powerful organization-wide commitment 
to DSS (for a detailed example see Appendix IV-A, p. 42). While this 
approach has the advantage of taking a long-term, coherent view of 
DSS, it runs the risk of encountering technological and market 
obsolescence (e.g., the fall in the price of microcomputers in the last 
few years).
There is no one best strategy. The strategy chosen should be linked to 
the organization, the users, the tasks, and the builders. If we divide
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strategies into two groups, the less ambitious and the more ambitious, it 
is clear that a more ambitious strategy is possible for a firm that has had 
considerable experience with information technology, has identified 
tasks receptive to this approach, and has supportive users and willing 
builders. Any organization where one or more of these conditions does 
not exist should select a less ambitious strategy.
2. Analysis
In the traditional systems life cycle, analysis is concerned with two 
stages: project definition and systems study (in which the old system is 
critiqued and a new system proposed). The end result is a list of 
information requirements and the broad outlines of a future system.
But the purpose of DSS is not to deliver a system in response to a 
specific set of information needs. Its purpose is to deliver a set of 
process independent capabilities. These capabilities are referred to as 
representations, operations, memory aids, and control mechanisms 
(the ROMC approach). The purpose of systems analysis in DSS 
construction is to identify a problem and a set of capabilities that users 
consider helpful in arriving at decisions about that problem.
How can we identify a problem receptive to DSS techniques?
• First, users should identify problems. Hence, users must have 
some knowledge of DSS techniques;
• Second, there must be a body of data to work with and analyze;
• Third, the problem must be one for which no simple formula 
provides a solution;
• Fourth, there must be some systematic way of thinking about the 
problem (graphs, lists, charts, operations, etc.) that a DSS can 
automate or assist; and
• Fifth, the problem must be important enough to engage the 
time and energy of management groups ranging from first-line
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supervisors to senior management. Hopefully, the amount of 
time that is spent deciding on the problem using traditional 
methods can be estimated. The analyst should try to show how 
a DSS could reduce management costs.
What kinds of capabilities should be considered? The ROMC method 
directs the analyst to specific capabilities. For example, 
representations may include a list, a graph, a cross-tabulation, or 
virtually any symbolic conceptualization of a problem that can be 
represented in two or three dimensions. Representations should be 
kept simple. Maps, pie charts, PERT charts, and tabular data entry 
forms are examples. Representations should not confuse fhe viewer; 
they are intended, after all, to clarify. A seven-dimension regression 
equation is probably not simple enough.
Typical operations are the ability to plot, scale, and draw, forecast, 
print, and display any data in the system. Other implicit statistical 
functions include the basic arithmetic operations, means, standard 
deviations, correlation, and regression.
Memory aids distinguish DSS from simple micro computing. DSS have 
databases both internal and external to the organization; they have 
workspaces and the ability to profile data, to trigger alarms when 
critical values in streams of data are exceeded, and to manipulate 
data files (merge, join, sort, etc.).
Control aids are user-friendly front-end languages, example use of 
function keys at terminals, and a menu-driven capability, as well as the 
ability to run commands for experienced users (turning off the menu). 
A DSS generator has all of these capabilities. A systems analyst then 
need only select those that are specifically needed for a given sysfem.
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3. Design
In the traditional systems life cycle, design involves the development of 
detailed logical and physical design specifications of the system, 
programming, and installation. The major product of the design is a 
system that meets a specific list of requirements.
But in DSS there is no list of information requirements, and initially the 
user does not know what the final system will look like. All of the vital 
features of the system that are decided up front in the traditional life­
cycle methodology are decided at the end in DSS design.
DSS must therefore use a dynamic (changing, evolving) method that is 
iterative (repetitive). The reasons for this are several. The users do not 
know and cannot specify in advance the functional requirements of 
the system. They need an initial system to react to. Their perception of 
the problem or the task will change as experience with the system 
grows. The users themselves change as they learn. They themselves 
cannot agree on how to handle a task or problem. Hence different 
users want different systems. With DSS, the trick is to know how to 
design a system under these conditions of uncertainty, disagreement, 
and differences in style. What is needed is a system that can be 
customized for a large number of users.
Iterative design utilizing prototyping is the solution; it has three stages:
• Stage 1. To develop a small, stable simple system that will fit on 
the user's desk, if possible. No complex analysis is involved. The 
user and the designer simply spend an afternoon together, with 
the user describing the problem and the designer creating 
screens (representations) of it on the spot until the user has 
selected a number of representations that appear to be useful. 
Here early analysis and early design occur all at once.
• Stage 2. To refine, expand, and modify the system in a series of 
cycles. In each cycle the analyst/designer re-analyzes the 
problem, designs new elaboration of the system, implements
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them for the user, and evaluates their use. The user participates 
directly in establishing the technical capabilities of the system.
• Stage 3. To evaluate the system after each cycle. The use for a 
DSS can disappear as a problem disappears. Continual 
evaluation is a key virtue of DSS. Users must ask: does the system 
help me? Does it save time? Are my decisions more effective 
and if so, how? Is the DSS better than nothing at all? The DSS 
staff must ask: Is this DSS a worthwhile use of our time? Is the 
com pany receiving value for the effort? How can we quantify 
the value of making more effective decisions?
4. Implementation
In the traditional systems life cycle, the information system staff, after 
gathering information requirements, essentially disappears from the 
user area for several months. A system is then designed to meet the 
information requirements and is delivered on a certain date to the user 
area. Then a period of implementation begins. This can be a 
crumbling experience for users and systems personnel alike. The users 
may discover that the system is not what they wanted and may be 
shocked at certain aspects. The designers, who may not have 
interacted with the users for a long time, may becom e defensive and 
insist that the system work exactly according to specifications.
The entire situation is often characterized by enormous communication 
and language (jargon) gaps.
With a DSS there is no separate implementation stage. The system is 
always being implemented and, therefore, in a sense, is never 
implemented. It continues to grow. As a DSS goes through iterative 
cycles, users and systems personnel are in daily contact. The users see 
the system develop before their eyes. There is generally little 
opportunity for communication gaps to develop and no opportunity for
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any party to be shocked by the other's work.
Additionally, there are certain elements of implementation that tend to 
stabilize a DSS. Implementation involves developing documentation 
on the system. An important problem with DSS is that they develop in a 
totally ad-hoc manner. There must be documentation on applications 
to ensure transportability and user-independent existence. 
Implementation also involves developing a training program. Most end 
users will be keyboard literate, but most will need training in the specific 
DSS syntax, operations, controls, and representations. This is also an 
ideal opportunity to educate users about the role of DSS and to search 
for new DSS applications.
Finally, implementation involves an ongoing process of system 
evaluation and tracking. User surveys, observations, recommendations, 
and usage patterns are all-important ways in which a DSS can be 
evaluated. These data can be especially useful to the DSS group, 
clarifying its contribution to the firm, helping it to understand what users 
like (and dislike), and allowing it to identify problems in its internal 
operations and personnel.
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D. A dynamic systems development life cycle for DSS
The different purposes and requirements of DSS that distinguish them 
from TPS and MIS systems lead to the differences in analysis for DSS and 
design methods previously described. There are also large differences 
among DSS. Some are very large efforts involving important 
organizational actors; others are small, involving only a few managers 
in a single division. Therefore, the life cycles for different kinds of 
systems will vary accordingly. Figure-4 presents an overview of the 
iterative DSS life cycle, which provides for several different variations. 
Full-scale, organization-wide DSS may continually cycle through the 
thirteen stages of the DSS life cycle shown in Figure lll-A-2. However, 
this situation is rare. The vast majority of DSS are smaller, ad-hoc, and 
specific. These systems will go through trimming cycles. This life cycle 
can follow many different paths, depending on the complexity of the 
system. The emphasis is on iteration and flexibility of design to meet 
changing conditions and new perceptions of requirements.
Prototyping and exploration of management decision making are 
perhaps the most powerful DSS techniques and have a great 
advantage over traditional development methods.
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Planning
Research
Analysis
Design
Feasibility
Assessment
Prototyping
System
Construction
Testing
Evaluation
Demonstration^ 
Orientation
Training 
Deployment
I
M aintenance  
Adaptation
Figure lll-A-2
Development Life Cycle for Simple DSS 
Source: Meador and Keen, 1984
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Appendix lll-B
Debt Management and Debt Management Systems
A. Debt Management Functions5
As briefly discussed in Chapter II, debt management functions are 
grouped into executive and operational debt management. Executive 
debt m anagem ent includes policy, regulatory and resourcing 
functions, while operational debt management includes recording, 
operating and controlling functions.
1. Executive Debt M anagem ent
The Policy Function involves the formulation of national debt policies 
and strategies in coordination with the agencies with prime 
responsibility for the economic management of a country. Broad 
policy considerations determine a country's sustainable level of 
external borrowing. This, in turn, is affected by the flows that the 
country can use efficiently and the ways it can generate the 
additional foreign exchange earnings needed to meet the service 
charges without risking external payment difficulties. These 
ramifications of foreign borrowing mean that external debt policy 
affects national planning, balance of payments, budget 
management, and all government agencies that determine the type 
of investment undertaken in a country. The major output of this 
function is a well-defined and feasible national indebtedness and 
external debt strategy.
The Regulatory Function of debt management involves the legal, 
institutional, and administrative arrangements for external debt 
management. It involves the establishment of a well-defined
5 Proceedings of a seminar on external debt management, jointly organized by the
Islamic Research & Training Institute of the Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia and the World Bank Washington D.C., USA Jeddah, May 12-16, 1990.
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regulatory environment to provide for the well-coordinated and, where 
necessary, centralized administration of external indebtedness at the 
level of recording, analytical, controlling, and operating functions, 
supported by efficient information flows. The major output of fhis 
function is the establishment and continuous review of the 
administrative and legal framework that specifies organizational 
responsibilities, rules and procedures among units involved, legal 
reporting requirements, etc. This is the organization structure. It will in 
large measure define the degree of control exercised and the data 
which can be recorded.
The Resourcing Function makes sure that the recording, analytical, 
controlling, and operating functions are performed by qualified staff. It 
involves recruiting, hiring, motivating, training, and retaining staff. At 
times, it might involve the hiring and supervising of outside consultants 
to provide for specialized technical expertise in particular areas such 
as computerization, debt audits, or preparation for rescheduling 
negotiations. This function must also be understood very broadly as the 
provision of adequate material resources (office space, 
communication equipment, etc.). The main output can be termed 
Staffing and Means.
2. Operational Debt M anagem ent
The functions pertaining to operational debt management, particularly 
the recording, analytical, operating and controlling functions, are 
performed on two levels: the aggregate Level and the dis-aggregated 
level of single transactions. The distinction is not always easy to make 
but is necessary for a better understanding of debt management.
The Recording Function requires collecting detailed information on 
debt on a loan-by-loan basis. The fundamental decision to make in 
devising a recording framework for external debt is to decide what 
constitutes external debt and which data will be collected. The data
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collected on a loan-by-loan basis will be aggregated to provide 
statistics for analytical purposes. The main product of this function is 
information, on both the aggregated and dis-aggregated levels.
Very closely related to the recording function is the Analytical Function, 
which is a major consumer of the information provided by the former 
function. At the aggregate level, it involves macro-economic analysis 
to explore the various options available, given economic and market 
conditions, ad the future structure of external debt. It keeps under 
constant review the im pact of various debt management options on 
the balance of payment and the national budget. It helps to form a 
view on such matters as the appropriate terms of new borrowing. At 
the dis-aggregated level, the analytical function looks at borrowing 
instruments, the choice of maturities, etc., and assists in the analysis of 
new financial techniques such as conversion schemes. The output 
here of course is analysis.
The Operating Function involves a whole range of activities related to 
borrowing and other agreements or arrangements that imply some 
kind of action (interactions and transactions). This function might be 
segmented into three different phases: negotiating, utilization of loan 
proceeds, and servicing. The activities or actions involved in each 
phase will be quite different depending on the type of borrowing 
involved (bilateral and multilateral concessional loans, Euro-credits, 
etc.). It thus deals with techniques, among which must be included 
those providing some form of debt reorganization (such as restructuring 
or refinancing). In recent years, new techniques have come into 
existence that fall under the heading of debt conversion schemes 
(debt-for-nature swaps, etc.). The products of fhe operating function 
are thus debt operations: negotiation, utilization and service. (These 
terms must be understood as broad categories. The actual 
interactions and transactions taking place will depend on the type of 
borrowing).
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The Controlling Function is the function of debt management that is the 
most difficult to define separately. Indeed, control is intrinsic to a debt 
management system. While the recording, analytical, and operating 
functions are described here in their "pure form", it might be argued 
that control is em bedded in those functions. Notwithstanding this and 
at the risk of becoming too abstract, separating the controlling 
function enriches the conceptual approach undertaken here and 
emphasizes the central role of this function.
At the aggregate level, the Controlling/Coordinating function is 
essential to ensuring that operational debt management is in 
accordance with executive debt management. Strategy may, for 
instance, impose statutory limits or overall guidelines on how much 
borrowing can be done by the public sector or by the country as a 
whole. The controlling function must ensure that borrowing is kept 
within these limits.
At the transaction or dis-aggregated level, the Controlling/Monitoring 
function is more concerned with specific operations, such as 
negotiations, utilization, and service. It must ensure, among other 
things, that the terms of new borrowings fall within current guidelines, 
that the funds are being utilized in time and used appropriately, and 
those repayments are made according to schedule.
In practice, the degree of control can vary widely (according to the 
different classes or types of debt and debt operations, the different 
classes or types of debt and debt operations, the different public-or 
private-borrowing entities involved, etc.). It can range from close 
control to coordination and monitoring.
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B. Overview of CBDMS Software Packages and Suppliers
In terms of a complete, ready-to-install CBDMS (including software, 
standard data structures and definitions, training materials, and 
documentation), there are two systems which have been installed in at 
least 20 developing countries, UNCTAD'S DMFAS, and the 
commonwealth Secretariat's CS-DRMS. In addition, there are other 
CBDMS packages and components out of which a customized CBDMS 
can be constructed. Some of these systems and suppliers are given 
below as follows:
1. American M anagem ent Systems (AMS) - CDMS:
The comprehensive Debt Management System (CDMS) is a mainframe- 
based system developed for use in one Latin American developing 
country. Its supplier has indicated that the system could be customized 
for other country's requirements.
2. CEGOS - SIGNE :
This software, produced by IDET-CEGOS, a French consulting firm, is a 
microcomputer-based system. It has been constructed using a 
commercial proprietary database management system, DBase III. The 
system has been installed in several African developing countries in 
conjunction with assistance from a program, ADETEF (Technology 
Transfer in Economic and Financial Administration) supported by the 
French Government.
3. Commonwealth Secretariat - CS-DRMS6
The Commonwealth Secretariat's Debt Recording and Management 
System (CS-DRMS) is a microcomputer - based CBDMS developed by 
the secretariat's Technical Assistance Group. The system is under 
ongoing development and enhancement, and is installed (or is soon to
6 Advisory Services on External Debt Management, Technical Assistance Group 
Commonwealth Secretariat, London.
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be installed) in more than 25 countries. Data handling is provided by a 
commercial proprietary database management system, INFORMIX, 
which provides flexible access to the data for ad hoc querying, 
reporting, and potential development of new applications programs.
4. Interafricaine de Conseil et d'Assistance (ICA):
ICA, a com pany established by two Central Banks (Central Bank for 
West African States) has developed a microcomputer - based system 
based on its experience in several African developing countries.
5. M organ-G renfell:
Debt Recording System. Morgan-Grenfell developed a mainframe 
based batch system for its use in processing medium and long-term 
debt for its clients. It is currently not marketing this software, but is 
concentrating on advice to its clients on specific financial exercises 
and transactions; in the course of providing such advice, various 
computer-based tools may be used.
6. Peat Marwich Mitchell-Sovereign Debt System:
Peat Marwick Mitchell has developed microcomputer based systems 
modules, which can be tailored to a particular country's requirements. 
The main components are a trade debt system, a restructuring system, 
and a debt profile system. The software may be provided in 
conjunction with management consulting and advisory work 
undertaken by Peat Marwick Mitchell in a country.
7. Price Waterhouse-AFIXIEX:
AFIXIEX (Analyses Financiere de Dettes Interieures et Exterieures) is a 
micro-computer based package, components of which are 
operational in several African developing countries.
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8. PROGRAMATOR:
PROGRAMATOR, a Swedish consulting company, uses its Indigenous 
Business Analysis Approach to develop customized systems for debt 
management and financial analysis.
9. SINORG - National Debt M anagem ent Package:
This microcomputer-based system was developed by SINORG (Societe 
Internationale d'Etudes de Recherches et d'Organisation), and is 
composed of four management modules: loan agreements, markets, 
debt service, and debt environment processing.
10.Troika-DAMS7: -
The Debt Analysis and Management System (DAMS) was developed by 
an Advisory Group (the Troika) from Kuhn Loeb Lehman Brothers 
International Inc., Lazard Freres, and S.G. Warburg and Co. Ltd. as an 
integral part of financial advisory services provided to governments. 
This minicomputer-based system (operating on PDP-11 and VAX 
computers) was originally developed for use by Troika banks in their 
work with clients, but it was later modified to allow countries to operate 
it themselves. These banking origins are evident in the level of detail 
supported by the system, detail that may be beyond the requirements 
of sovereign developing country debtors. The system is installed in 
several countries, but there is one main operational system in a 
developing country. The software is not being actively marketed, as the 
emphasis is on advisory work, and the system would normally be 
provided only in this broader context.
7 Debt Analysis and M anagem ent Systems "DAMS", S.G. Warburg and Co. Ltd.,
London, January 1987.
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11. UNCTAD-DMFAS8:-
UNCTAD's Debt Monitoring and Financial Analysis System (DMFAS) is 
composed of 3 main components: The Debt Monitoring System (DMS), 
which operates on mainframe computers, minicomputers, or 
microcomputers; the microcomputer-based Debt Aggregation System 
(DAS), which uses a proprietary commercial database system, DBase III; 
and the microcomputer-based Debt Project System (DPS), which uses a 
commercial proprietary spreadsheet system, Lotus 123. The system is 
under ongoing development and enhancement and has been 
installed in more than 20 countries. It is worth mentioning that this 
system is one of the most widely used CBDMS available and that some 
users have added more features to allow for scenario generation and 
a policy support feature.
12. World Bank:
Although the World Bank does not currently distribute a software 
package for developing country debt management, it does provide 
technical advice on various aspects of debt management 
computerization, especially in the context of assisting countries to meet 
their reporting requirements to the World Bank. The Bank is in the 
process of developing its own microcomputer-based CBDMS, initially 
for demonstration and training purposes, and is currently developing a 
distribution strategy for it.
8 UNCTAD Debt Monitoring and Financial Analysis System, UNCTAD/MFD/45/Rev.l, 
UNCTAD, Geneva, November 1985.
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Appendix IV-A
Central Bank of Egypt’s LEDD Work Flow and Procedures9
Table IV-A-1
Statistics on the number of External Civil Debt Data Sheets and Reports 
received from Different Data Sources and Their Frequencies
Data Source
1. Commercial Banks
- Direct Loans
- Suppliers Credit 
Facilities
- Banking Credit 
Facilities
2. Ministry of Finance
3. Ministry of International 
Cooperation
4. CBE - Cairo Branch
5. CBE - General Foreign 
Affairs Dept.
6. General Financial 
Notes Dept.
7. Other Ministries and 
Authorities
8. American Embassy 
(data on US debt
9. General Audit Authority 
Report (for revision)
No. of Forms No. of Data Items
300
6 0 -7 0
6 0 -7 0
10
2 0 -3 0
30
30
200 -  250
20
200
300
600 - 700
600 - 700 
250
500 - 750 
750
300
40
2000
400
200
Data Frequency
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Quarterly
Quarterly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Quarterly
Yearly
9 Hassan, Ashraf. Case study for the CBE's workflow and Procedures, July 1993, Cairo,
Egypt. The reflects the status of CBE-LEDD workflow and proceedures prior to the 
inception of the DM&EM program.
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Table IV-A-2
Statistics on Periodic Reports Distribution by Concerned 
Agencies
Report Name
Concerned
Agency
1. The Cabinet
2. Ministry of 
Economy
3. Ministry of 
Planning
4. Ministry of 
Finance
5. Ministry of 
International 
Cooperation
6.General Audit 
Authority
7. CBE- top 
Management
8. IMF
Direct Suppliers
Loans Credit
Facilities
Banking General Foreign Resch-
Facilities Loans Deposits eduiing
Aggregated Report for the Minister 
Aggregated Report for the Minister
Distribution
Frequency
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Monthly
Aggregated Report for the Governor 
According to the Instruction of the CBE Top M anagem ent
Semi-Annual
Monthly
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Agency Name and Address:............  Form no. 1 "Loans"
To Loans and External Commitments General Department - The CBE
Request for acquiring CBE approval for committing to a direct loan or supplier's credit 
in foreign currency for more than one year according to Internal Law No. 1 Loans on 
29/8/1978.
Data on loan or facility:
• Concerned "external commitments" committee's approval date :
• Loan or facility commitment date : -----------------------------------------------------------------------
• Loan or facility duration : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• Value in foreign currency : ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• Name of borrowing a g e n c y : --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• Loan or facility purpose : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• Interest rate price : ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• Other burdens:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• Grace period :-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• Repayment period :-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• Repayment start date : ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• Number of installments: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• Installment value : -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------
• Name and address of concerned local bank : ------------------------------------------------------
Remarks:
1. This form must be prepared for each loan or facility exclusive ly on an original 
and two copies.
2. It must be clearly specified whether it is a loan or a credit facility
Date: /  /  197 Signature of responsible person and
Concerned agency stamp
The bank has no remarks on the cost of financing and terms of the above loan or 
facility data.
It was registered in our books under the following number:-----------------------------------------
It is to be fully understood that the concerned borrowing agency has to complete all 
arrangements and procedures needed for putting the loan /  facility in action.
Date: /  /  197 Loan and External Commitments
General Department - CBE
Figure IV-A-1
Data Collection Form No. 1, Loans
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Agency Nam e and Address:............  Form no. 2 "Loans"
To Loans and External Commitments General Department - The CBE
Request for registration for an assigned part of a government loan granted from --------
-------------  to the Government of Egypt represented by the Ministry of Planning and
International Cooperation
Loan Information:
• Government loan commitment date : -------------------------------------------------------------------
• Loan assignment date : ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• Loan num ber: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• Value of assigned portion : ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• Lending agency name : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• Loan purpose : ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• Interest rate price : ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• Other burdens: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• Withdrawal start date : -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• Withdrawal end date : ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• Number of installments: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• Installment value : -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• Name and address of concerned local bank : ------------------------------------------------------
Remarks:
1. This form must be prepared for each loan or facility exclusively on an original 
and three copies.
Date: /  /  197 Signature of responsible person and
concerned agency stamp
Registered a t the CBE under the following number:-------------------------
Figure IV-A-2
Data Collection Form No. 2, Loans
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Date : /  /  197 Central Bank of Egypt - CBE
Loan and External Commitments General Department
Loans /  Facilities Registration n o .:
Value : ------------------------ Commitment date : -
Purpose : ------------------------ Borrower : -
Interest rate price : -------------- Lender : -------------------
Other burdens : ---------------Local bank : -------------
Grace period : ---------------Proforma invoice no.:
Serial M a tu r ity  Date
Installm ent
Value
Interest
V alue
Rem arks
Figure IV-A-3
Sample Registration Form
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Appendix IV- B
The Egyptian Cabinet Information and Decision Support 
Center (IDSC)10
A. IDSC Organizational Structure
The organisational structure of IDSC was developed according to the 
environment of operation in which IDSC is involved. Therefore, it 
necessitated a special organisational structure together with the 
availability of managerial and technical human resources having the 
knowledge, experience and ability to cope with such a dynamic and 
turbulent environment. In this respect, its organisational structure includes:
Crisis m anagem ent11, priority assessment, and quality control
teams to prioritise strategic issues in the Cabinet agenda 
and to assure the production and delivery of quality 
information and decision support services.
The decision support services department to deal with 
information and decision support requests from various 
ministries, governorates and local organisations. Its role is the 
identification of users’ needs, issue formulation, definition of 
information and decision support requirements and the 
provision of possible sets of alternatives and solutions to 
these issues.
The project development department to respond to the 
needs of the different ministries and governorates. The 
department staff is the projects account executives whose 
role is to develop, implement and monitor various projects.
The information resource management department to
represent the technical staff of the organization. Its role is to 
respond to different users’ needs with respect to systems 
design, development, installation and maintenance.
10 El Sherif, H. and El-Sawy, O., 1988.
11 El Sherif, H., "Building a Crisis Management Strategic Support System", Advances in 
Telecommunication Management, JAI Press Inc., Vol. 3, 1990, pp 35 - 52.
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The information technology-tracking department to
continuously track and diffuse state-of-the-art information 
technology internally within IDSC and externally within 
different ministries and governorates through different 
projects.
The human resource development department to deal with 
the training of the IDSC staff as well as the staff of various 
organizations with which IDSC has joint projects. The training 
includes a set of programs and courses in management, 
information systems and computer applications. The 
objective of the training program is to diffuse the knowledge 
and use of information technology.
The international co-operation department to deal with 
IDSC's external interactions with international organizations 
and work on formulating joint informatics projects with 
various countries.
The finance and administration department to deal with 
financial, adminisfrative, and legislative issues regarding 
both internal and external operations. Moreover, it is 
responsible for the development of steps and procedures to 
be adopted during the implementation of different 
informatics projects.
The role of the IDSC differs according to its four operational levels: the 
cabinet, sectoral, national and international. At the Cabinet level, the 
IDSC provides information and decision support, crisis management 
support, modelling and analysis of various high priority issues and multi­
sectoral information and database development. At the sectoral level, 
the IDSC provides assistance in the development of decision support 
systems/centers, advisory and consultancy in the area of information 
and decision support services, sectoral databases development and 
project financing and support. At the national level, the IDSC provides 
assistance in policy formulation and drafting; legislative reform support; 
and in the human and technical infrastructure development. At the 
international level, the IDSC provides opportunities and facilities for 
technology transfer fo Egypt as well as technology re-transfer to
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developing countries. It perform this through the establishment of 
decision support systems models for socio-economic developmental 
issues12.
As an organization IDSC evolved quickly from three persons in 1985 to 
over 370 managerial, technical and administrative personnel in 1995. 
These staff members are providing information and decision support 
services to the Cabinet in socio-economic development planning. The 
number of IDSC projects has increased steadily until it reached 195 in 
1995, covering an expansive variety of economic, social, managerial 
and technological domains that are of vital importance to sustainable 
development.
B. IDSC key projects and programs13
Following is a set of decision support systems that were developed by the 
IDSC to improve the decision making process with regard to 
development planning14.
7. An Illustra tive  List o f/D S C  Projects  
Project
Debt Management Project 
National Budget Project 
National Resources Project
Customs Reform Project
Purpose
To aid debt rescheduling negotiations 
Budget execution monitoring and reporting 
Evaluate impact of government policies, options 
and decisions on use and development of natural 
resources
Evaluation of proposed tariff change opfions to 
maximize customs revenues and minimize conflict 
between different ministries
12 El Sherif, H., "Managing Institutionalization of Strategic Decision Support for the 
Egyptian Cabinet", Interfaces. 20,1, January-February 1990.
13 El Sherif, H. “ Managing Large Information and Decision Support Systems Projects," 
IFORS Conference Proceedings, Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 1987.
14 IDSC Brochure, Cairo - Egypt, 1993.
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Project 
Ministry of Tourism DSS Project To provide statistical information and budgetary 
control for tourism companies, hotel and tourism 
investment projects
Purpose
Ministry of Electricity DSS Provides statistical data about power, energy
generation and consumption
To provide information on various laws andLegislation Project
decrees enacted at various levels 
Public Sector Financial Information Monitoring performance of all public sector units 
Project
2. Profile for Key Projects15
Some key projects that are considered to be successful by IDSC are 
profiled in this section. The debt management project, which addresses 
a key area of concern, has already provided significant payoff in Egypt's 
debt negotiations with the Paris Club. The trade information system is 
expected to help in Egypt's export effort. The legislature database is to 
provide support for bureaucracy. The Governorate information system is 
to improve the administration of its social programs.
15 El Sherif, H. and El Sawy, O., 1988.
Ministry of Education A database on number of students, schools, 
teachers and classrooms for planning education 
infrastructure
A database of 45,000 research studies conducted 
by various organizations to increase utilization of 
such studies
International database on trade opportunities, 
company profiles, trade statistics collected from 
a world wide link of Egyptian trade representative 
offices
Establishing a decision support center in 26 
governorates to enhance effectiveness of 
administration and regional development
Studies Information Systems 
Project
international Trade Information 
Project
Governorates Project
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a. The TradeNet Project
The TradeNet Project was started on 1 January 1986 as a collaborative 
venture between the IDSC and ITC, a Geneva based organization 
specializing in trade-related computer systems. The original objective 
was to manage import procedures so as to achieve a ten percent 
reduction in costs through better management of logistics and sourcing. 
In 1988-89 the objectives were revised to focus on promotion of exports. 
The project is headed by an Masters of Business Administeration and has 
a staff of eight people of whom three are in marketing, three in 
operations (also responsible for identifying data sources) and one at the 
help desk. These staff are full time employees of the TradeNet Center 
which is an operational unit distinct from the IDSC. The IDSC has 
provided two professionals for software development work.
The TradeNet system allows importers, exporters, trade organizations, 
and government authorities to access databases that have been 
created on Egypt and 85 countries of the world.
Data is available on 136 socio-economic indicators for 20 years, on 
exchange rates, prices, market overviews, trade opportunities, company 
profiles, trade statistics, and international trade fairs and exhibitions. A 
variety of intelligence reports are provided. These relate to price index, 
inflation, and purchasing power of different markets. They also cover 
commodity situation in terms of production forecast and price. Access is 
provided to international databases such as Data Star, Dialog, Info-line, 
IP-Sharp, Reuters, Minitel, and ICC-Geneva.
Input for the databases is collected from several sources such as 
databases created in other IDSC applications, trade journals, 
magazines, and government reports. The updating frequency of data is 
quarterly, bi-annual and yearly. Since the basic data may be classified 
using different product classifications norms, the system implementators 
have provided a co-relation system which can handle three distinct 
product code systems (harmonized, BKN (customs code), and ITC (trade
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code). Input data is also received from sixty commercial representatives 
of Egypt located in different countries. These representatives collect 
global tender inquires and key them into a PC in their office in a 
standard format. Through a dialup modem these inquiries and other 
market intelligence data are transmitted to Cairo.
The output from the database is available in the form of online by 
subscribers through their own terminals, and queries sent through 
phone/fax. The system provides information at a glance on key social 
and economic indicators as a 10-year time series. Users can view time 
series data in a visual form as graphs over time. The software is 
multilingual supporting English, French and Arabic interfaces. It is 
possible to do comparative analysis. There is a large textual database 
on procedures of company formation, investment projects, import- 
export, custom tariff, banking and a list of useful addresses of trade 
organizations, chambers of commerce, industry association, etc. 
TradeNet also publishes a newsletter, which is circulated widely. 
Currently 200 companies and 30 trade associations subscribe to the 
database. TradeNet's service will be privatized to become an 
economically viable enterprise by forming a separate marketing 
company.
The system was developed on an IBM 9121, Model 260 mainframe 
computer. Some of the databases also reside on a Novell PC LAN. The 
software has been developed using SQL, C, C++, Pascal and Clipper.
b. Debt M anagem ent Project
The difficult balance of payments situation caused Egypt to assume a 
rapidly increasing external debt burden. It was estimated that debt 
service in 1985 was over 25 percent of total export earnings. Egypt was 
paying one million US Dollar every six hours as interest on its debt. 
Therefore an efficient debt management system which could result in 
saving of interest payments needed to be designed.
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To manage credit worthiness debt services obligation must be paid on 
time and new debt should be contracted on terms and in amounts, 
which are compatible with a nation's payment capacity. New 
borrowing proposals therefore needed to be analyzed in the light of 
existing obligations. Policy makers needed information on debt service 
profiles of existing debt, disbursement projections for committed but un­
disbursed funds, available sources of financing and their terms, and 
immediate payment obligations.
The task of debt management in Egypt is divided among several 
organizations: the Central Bank of Egypt, the Ministry of International Co­
operation, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economy and Foreign 
Trade and the Ministry of Defence.
In September 1986 a project to develop a debt management system 
was launched. The project leader was an aeronautical engineer 
trained in debt management modelling in Paris during his Ph.D work. The 
project team evaluated the existing packages available internationally. 
These included the UNCTAD package DMFAS and a Commonwealth 
Secretariat (CDRI) package, both were available in public domain. 
Since the software for the debt management project was financed by 
UNDP, the natural choice for a package was the UNCTAD package.
The package was installed in the Central Bank of Egypt, which is 
responsible for the registration and control of a very large loan stock. 
The first task was to compile the data mentioned earlier on 4,500 loans 
and nearly 15,000 payment schedules. The data compilation was done 
in a record time of one month. The data was distributed on seven 386 
PCs. Then the data was aggregated using a COBOL program on a 
Mainframe and downloaded on PCs for further analysis. The package 
was used to help Egypt in the Paris Club Negotiations of May 1991 to 
reschedule its debt.
The software provides reports on aggregated debt, e.g., reconciliation 
by creditors and actual contracted debt obligation by sectors.
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Extensive use of models can be made to evaluate different negotiations 
scenarios and their implications on repayment capacity and the overall 
economic reform program. The model can help negotiators in 
minimising future “bunching" of payments and also minimise the impact 
due to exchange rate fluctuations. The use of the package in the Paris 
Club Negotiations was considered successful. Several ministers publicly 
acknowledged the contribution of the debt management project in 
rescheduling Egypt's debt. The entire team of software developers had 
also travelled to Paris and provided back room support to the 
negotiators. The essential role of the Egyptian project team was to build 
up the database and to build interfaces and report generators, which 
could be used by Egyptian policy makers to generate additional reports 
(as were used by Poland in their negotiations). The original developers 
have designed and developed an updated version of the software 
running on a mainframe. The database administration on a routine basis 
is now being done by the Central Bank of Egypt. All transactions and 
modifications are being carried out on a daily basis.
c. The Legislative Database Project
One of the first projects that IDSC undertook was to create a legislative 
database as there existed an extremely large number of laws and 
decrees, sometimes in contradiction with one another, and the status of 
each legislation (whether amended, cancelled or still valid) was difficult 
to determine. The project was launched in November 1986 and was 
implemented over three years, involving 103 man-years. The objectives 
of fhe project were to collect all Egyptian laws and decrees starting 
from 1828, sort them and index them to facilitate searching with specific 
key words. Nearly sixfy thousand laws and decrees were entered into 
the database, and are updated on a daily basis.
The initial data collection effort was enormous. It meant gathering all 
laws, presidential decrees, the Prime Minister's decrees, all ministerial
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degrees, all governors' decrees, rulings of the Supreme Court, etc. Since 
1958 only laws and presidential decrees have been published in the 
Official Gazette, on a weekly basis, and all other decrees are published 
daily in Al-Waqa'i. Issues of both publications were sought from all 
sources that catalogued them, including private collections, libraries 
and bookstores all over the country, to create a comprehensive 
database.
One of the key features of the Legislation Information System is its ability 
to identify both backward (proceeding legislation that was amended) 
and forward (consequent amendments) relations for each law and 
decree.
As a by-product, databases on special topics have been created such 
as religious rulings (affecting personal status and inheritance), rulings of 
the Administrative Court and Court of Cassation (to help lawyers and 
judges to follow earlier precedents). As a result of the effort, the Ministry 
of Justice is launching a comprehensive plan for legislative reform.
The software was first developed on PCs, using CLIPPER and TURBO C. 
Later it was transported to a mainframe using a database package, SQL 
interface and program modules written in COBOL, ASSEMBLER and CSP. 
Two software engineers work full time on developing this system. The 
availability of an inferface card has made it possible to implement this 
system with a user interface in Arabic. The project is being extended to 
store the entire documents (not just abstracts) of laws and decrees in a 
scanned image form.
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d. Governorates Project16
A 1981 presidential decree started information centers in several of the 
26 governorates in Egypt. However, as the most distant governorate is 
1000 kilometers from Cairo, these units did not function well. The 
governorate project was designed to provide decision support to key 
departments at the governorate level and was implemented in a 
phased manner with a pilot project in one governorate, followed by 
three other governorates, three more and finally to the remaining 
twenty-one governorates. The entire whole took process five years. In 
the future all the DSS centers will be linked via a network.
The governorates decision support centers are comprised of five 
departments, namely:
• Statistics Department to collect data;
• Computer Department to input the data and write local 
software;
• DSS Department to conduct special studies and interface 
between computers and decision makers;
• Library to store documents, reports, etc; and
• Publications to publish a monthly newsletter which is distributed 
to all governorates.
Each governorate computer center has four to six PCs (386) and 1-2 
printers, staff strength varying from 15 to 50 and a director at the 
governorates' level who reports to the governor. Every year 3-4 weeks 
training is provided on database, spreadsheets and the Disk Operating 
System (DOS).to the staff of the governorate DSS, with several training 
program organized in Cairo at the IDSC headquarters.
The key sectors for which applications are being developed are 
education, population control, agriculture, housing, infrastructure
16 Kamel Sherif, "The Use of Decision Support Systems in Development Planning in
Egypt," Doctoral Dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 
London, UK, July 1994.
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development, tourism and industry. Some of the applications, which are 
popular with various governorates, are (i) local tax administration (ii) 
issuance of licenses, e.g., gun license, construction license and (iii) 
personnel management for governorates. From time to time local 
administration seeks assistance from the DSS Center in resolving a 
problem. In these cases information must be researched and analyzed 
and a proposal for action formulated. For example, data on student to 
teacher ratios was analyzed in one governorate to propose allocation of 
resources to schools. Proactive units identify problems and propose 
solutions on their own.
The project team at the IDSC headquarters consists of 22 members and 
is currently lead by a former army officer. There are five accounts 
executives who are individually responsible for 1-2 governorates. These 
accounts executives visit their charges once every month to provide 
assistance and support in software-hard ware maintenance and other 
problem areas. There are 15 technical staff who develop program and 
also provide technical support to the field units. The central team has 
produced a booklet, which defines data that can be collected at the 
governorate level.
Various kinds of incentive systems have been implement to promote 
sharing of experiences, including a prize for best DSS applications. Four 
applications developed at the governorate level, which have been 
adopted by other governorates, have been handsomely rewarded. 
These applications are fully documented and are available in the form 
of a book and a floppy in the jacket. There is also an award for the best 
newsletter. The award value general ranges from 200-300% of the 
monthly salary.
Each governorate submits a report of its activities to the IDSC. From June 
1988 to October 1992 there were 200 information requests and 466 DSS 
case studies. About 50 of the DSS case studies represent complete DSS.
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e. Custom's reform program
The Cabinet, through one of its reform programs, planned to issue a new 
custom tariff, which caused stagnation in the business sector until its was 
finally issued. This waiting period lasted for four months where multi­
sectoral conflicts arose between six different ministries. Hence, a need for 
a decision support system became of vital importance. It was needed 
for solving the conflict and supporting the issuance of needed tariffs that 
could help minimize the burden on low-income groups, increase the 
revenue of the government and achieve a homogeneous and 
consistent new tariff structure. Therefore, a team was formulated from 
the Ministry of finance and the IDSC to interact with the different parties, 
obtain feedback and generate various scenarios to be assessed. The 
impact of the project was that in a month’s time the conflict was 
resolved and a tariff structure had been formulated based on the various 
scenarios and alternatives that represented the outcome of the decision 
support system. Consequently, the government endorsed the new tariff 
model and the business sector accepted it.
f. Ministry of Electricity DSS
The increasing cost and subsidies on electricity were continuously 
enlarging the balance of payment and adding to the burden on the 
economy. Thus, the IDSC developed the Ministry of Electricity DSS to 
assess the im pact of tariff changes on different income groups, provide 
statistical data on power and energy generation, the distribution and 
consumption of electricity and to aid in pricing and managing the 
loans of the electricity sector. A joint team was formed from the IDSC 
and the Ministry for Electricity. The Ministry staff collected data from 
different sources while the IDSC staff focused on issue structuring, 
systems and human resources development and more importantly, on 
managing the process of developing and delivering the decision 
support system. During the implementation process, a strategic issue
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emerged that related to drought in the sources of the river Nil. This 
caused a dramatic drop in the hydroelectric power generated by the 
Aswan dam and necessitated the provision of US$ 5,000,000 to instantly 
build 3 power-generating stations. Thus, the Ministry of Water Resources 
becam e an active participant in the project since it becam e a 
stakeholder in the decision support system design process. This third 
group from the Ministry of Water Resources, covered the issues that 
related water resources to electricity. The im pact of the Ministry of 
Electricity decision support system becam e evident in the 
implementation phase. It included the incorporation of the Ministry of 
Water Resources as a stakeholder in energy generation related issues, 
the issuance of a new tariff after assessing the possible alternatives 
generated by the decision support model and the evaluation of their 
impacts on different income groups. This case showed that 
implementation and design processes are inseparable and 
evolutionary throughout all phases.
C. Key Human Resource Development Practices
The dominant impression about the staff of the IDSC that one carries 
away is their high degree of pride and enthusiasm for their work. They 
are confidence and believe that they are a part of a crusading 
organization. The office layout, nature of interaction among colleagues 
and the dress code convey an image of a relaxed and informal 
organization culture, an image quite contrary to the usual bureaucratic 
and traditional ways of a government office.
The IDSC has consciously hired staff with various backgrounds and skills. 
It has among its staff government administrators, computer science 
graduates and management graduates. The staff is also well qualified. 
Of the 277 employees there are 28 Ph.D.s, 54 Masters degree holders 
and 195 Bachelors degree holders. Interestingly the initial recruitment of 
staff was done in a flexible manner. It was not uncommon to recruit
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close relatives and friends of staff already working with the Center 
provided that their qualifications were otherwise appropriate. Existing 
staff did the scouting for new talent members which meant that the 
members recruited in the initial team were quite homogeneous in their 
outlook and attitudes. The IDSC staff work on a contract basis and their 
salaries are not much higher than their counterparts in government 
organizations. Salaries in Egypt are low which results in a considerable 
brain drain of computer professionals from Egypt. In spite of low salaries, 
the IDSC continues to attract new talent even from the private sector. 
For example, 1200 professionals applied in a recent recruitment for four 
posts.
The IDSC human resource profile can be described with the usual mix 
of job titles typically found in IS organizations such as: system 
programmers, database administrators, application developers, 
systems analysts, end user consultants, trainers, DSS builders, network 
specialists, technical group leaders, and project managers. However 
the IDSC likes to characterize its human resources as three groups: 
technical, non-technical, and hybrids. Non-technical encompass 
interpersonal, negotiation, intervention, and "business" roles. Hybrids are 
individuals who have acquired a combination of technical and non­
technical skills. Staff are encouraged to pursue graduate studies 
abroad. A total of 30 out of 150 professional staff have completed 
graduate studies abroad during the last five years. IDSC also 
encourages its staff to teach in the local universities and invites the 
local university staff to participate in IDSC activities. In addition to its 
permanent staff, the IDSC, particularly in early phases of evolution, 
used sizable numbers of experts from outside as part-timers, 
subcontractors, and consultants. To foster strong links between the 
individual and the IDSC, a weekly staff meeting, to include part time 
staff, is held to share experiences and problems. A monthly newsletter is 
also published for the same purpose.
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Appendix V-A
Debt Management and Financial Analysis System (DMFAS)
A. System Principle Functions
nm
Loan monitoring
Data entry
Reporting
System
administration
Control
Amortization schedules
Projections
Ledger
Reference files
General information
Loan terms
Disbursements
Debt service
Arrears
Utilities
Loan reports_______
Update reference files
Maintenance of 
amortization file 
Roll forward estimated 
disbursements 
Backup/restore indexed 
files
Reporting to the world 
bank's DRS 
Export debt data  to the 
DSM
Maintenance of hard disk 
Entry of ledger historical 
data
End of period processing
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Reorganization
Data entry
Apply
reorganization
Reporting
System
administration
Control
Amortization
Schedules
Projections
Control
Amounts to be rescheduled
Agreed minutes 
Bilateral agreements 
Relate new loans to reorganized 
old loans
Create reorganized transactions for 
validation 
Eliminate matching ledger 
transactions.
Batch update of ledger___________
On full amortization schedule 
On Outstanding at a given date  
On Disbursements after a given 
date
Detailed debt service or 
disbursements _____
Full schedule
1) on Outstanding at a given 
date
2) on Disbursements after a  given 
date
Amortization schedule file control 
Printout ____
Backup of indexed files 
Restore indexed files 
Undo batch update of ledger 
Initialize bilateral agreements files 
Loan agreements 
Loan agreement summary 
loans by loan identification 
Remaining estimated 
disbursements 
Disbursements in derail 
Comparison between scheduled 
and ledger amounts 
Comparison of theoretical and 
ledger stock 
Maturity and interest structure 
group values_________________
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Reporting
Ledger
Reference
files
Accounts
Transactions
Balances
Debt status
Control
Loan statement 
Historical ledger 
data  
Loan standing by 
Loan id
By date  
By currency 
Arrears created by 
date
Outstanding debt 
and debt service 
Outstanding debt 
Principal flows 
Interest and fees 
flows
Global debt
service 
Arrears of principal 
stock and flows 
Arrears of
interest/fees 
Stock and arrears 
of interest /flows 
Total arrears stock 
and total arrears 
flows
Status of
disbursements and 
disbursements flows 
Penalty interest 
stock and penalty 
interest flows 
Stock of arrears 
and estimation of 
penalty interest to 
be paid 
Effect of exchange 
rate variations on 
total debt and net
flows______________
Client data  
Clients by client 
number 
Clients in
alphabetical order 
Variable interest 
rates 
Exchange rates 
Data dictionary 
Screen texts
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B. DM FAS Reports
Menu Option Code
LOAN MONITORING 
Data Entry
Loan reports
certificate
Reporting
Control
El
E2
E3
E4
E5
E6
E7
C l
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
C7
C8
Amortization Schedules
A1
A2 
A3
A4
Report Description
Registration
Schedule as entered 
Loan/client relations 
Loan by loan ID 
Loan statement 
Historical ledger data 
Loan standing
Loan agreements 
Loan agreement 
Summary 
Loan by loan 
identification 
Remaining estimated 
disbursements 
Disbursements in 
detail
Comparison 
between scheduled 
and ledger amounts 
Comparison of 
Theoretical and 
ledger stock 
Maturity and interest 
structure group 
values
Full schedule 
on Outstanding at a 
given date 
on Disbursements 
After a given date 
Amortization 
schedule file control 
printout
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Projections
PI
P2
P3
P4
Ledger
Loan accounts 
LAI 
LA2 
LA3
Ledger Transactions 
LT1 
LT2 
LT3
Debt Status
LSI
LS2
LS3
LS4
LS5
LS6
LS7
LS8
LS9
LS10
LSI!
on Full amortization 
schedule
on Outstanding at a 
given date
on Disbursements 
after a given date 
Detailed debt service 
or disbursements
Loan statement 
Historical ledger data 
Loan standing by 
loan ID.
by Date 
by Currency 
Arrears created by 
date
Outstanding debt 
and global debt 
service
Outstanding debt 
Principal flows 
Interest and fees 
flows
Global debt service 
Arrears of principal 
stock and flows 
Arrears of interest/fees 
stock and arrears of 
interest/fees flows 
Total arrears stock 
And total arrears 
flows 
Status of
disbursements and 
disbursements flows 
Penalty interest stock 
and penalty interest 
flows
Stock of arrears and 
estimation of penalty 
interest to be paid
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LSI 2
Reference
Control
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
R7
System Administration
Reporting to the world Bank DRS 
W1
W2
Effect of exchange 
rate variations on 
total debt and net 
flows
Client data 
Client by client 
number
Print variable Interest 
Rate
Exchange rate 
Print data dictionary 
Print screen texts 
Client in
alphabetical order
Description of 
individual external 
public debts & 
private
debts publicly 
guaranteed
Individual external 
public debts &
Private debts publicly 
guaranteed.
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C. System M aintenance and Support
All DMFAS source programs are handed over to the users of the system. 
UNCTAD will continue to bear responsibility for the maintenance of the 
DMFAS. Due to the open architecture of the system, users are free to 
add their own routines to the system, e.g., in the form of additional 
report preparation programs and /  or scenario generation routines. 
However, from the point of view of maintenance, UNCTAD does not 
advice programming staff of a given country to modify existing 
programs.
UNCTAD has a well-established group who are continually improving 
the DMFAS and training staff in its use. When enhanced versions of the 
system are prepared, the new program is prepared in the appropriate 
machine-readable form for each user with instructions for its installation.
D. System Hardware Requirements
The DMFAS is transportable to many different hardware environments. 
Examples of four possible configurations are as follows: (i) one 
microcomputer with 256 KB memory (but preferably 640 KB) a disk 
drive, a 10-20 MG hard disk and a printer; (ii) two or more 
microcomputers, each with two diskette drives linked together under a 
local area network, sharing a 20 MB hard disk and a printer; (iii) one 
special purpose, personal computer with one diskette and a hard disk, 
serving both as a mainframe terminal and as a personal 
microcomputer; and (iv) a mainframe computer with a time-sharing 
option.
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Appendix Vl-A
Debt Management Decision Support Examples
Egyptian debt indicators adjustment process17:
As discussed in Chapter ll# debt comparative analysis for a country is 
usually performed through measuring of several debt indictors. There 
are four major indictors that classify countries into high /  low indebted 
in relation to high /  low income18.
These four indicators and their critical values are as follows:
Indicator Critical Value Egypt 1991
(%) (%)
Total External Debt/ Export of 165 280
Goods & Services [EDT /  XGS]
Total External Debt /  GNP 30 130
[EDT /  GNP]
Total Debt Service /  Export of Goods & 18 16
Services [TDS /  XGS]
Total Interest Payments /  Export of 12 6
Goods & Services [INT/ XGS]
Before the second Paris Club negotiation round, the GOE intensified its 
effort to improve Egypt’s debt situation, and to this end; examined the 
requirements necessary for Egypt to shift its position (from a severely 
indebted low-income country (SILIC) to a moderately indebted low- 
income country - MILIC). To reach this objective, the (DM&EM) team 
began manipulating the figures to determine the amount of change 
needed in Egypt’s total external debt, exports of goods and services 
and it's GNP to attain this goal.
17 In part from some exercise of the DM&EM program 1995
18. Debtor countries classification :-
1 .Severely indebted low-income countries. (SILIC);
2. Severely indebted middle-income countries. (SIMIC);
3. Moderately indebted low-income countries. (MILIC); and
4. Moderately indebted middle-income countries. (MIMIC)
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This study was supplemented with several explanatory charts of the four 
key ratios (indicators) in order to assist top polices makers to view the 
different scenarios graphically. An additional, the objective of this chart 
was to show where Egypt stood with regard to other indebted 
countries. Examples of some cases are as follows:
Case # 1: 
Assumption A :
According to the previous table Egypt's EDT/XGS is 280% while the 
critical value set by the World Bank is 165% . Assuming that Egypt's EDT 
should remain constant, what is the minimum value that Egypt’s. XGS 
could reach in order to achieve the World Bank’s critical value for the 
EDT /  XGS ratio. To put it in other words, how much of an increase 
should take place in Egypt’s XGS to reach this objective?
It is given that the EDT of Egypt = U$ 40,600 million and XGS = U$ 14,500 
million. After a series of calculations, it was found that Egypt’s XGS 
should increase from U$ 14,500 million to U$ 24,606 million, if it was to 
reach an EDT /  XGS ratio of 165%.
Assumption B :
Assuming that Egypt’s XGS remains constant, what is the maximum 
amount Egypt’s EDT should not exceed. In other words, what is the 
amount of decrease in EDT required to reach an EDT /  XGS ratio of 
165%.
After implementing the same steps adopted in the previous 
assumption, it was decided that Egypt’s EDT should decrease from U$ *
40,600 Million to U$ 23,925 Million. But attaining an EDT /  XGS ratio of 
165% or lower was not sufficient to entitle Egypt to be included in the 
Moderately Indebted Low-income Countries, which was the original 
target. Egypt needed also to attain an EDT /  GNP ratio of 30% instead of 
the 130% it actually had.
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Case # 2 
Assumption A :
According to data given, Egypt’s GNP = U$ 31,200 million, its EDT = U$
40,600 million and it’s EDT /  GNP 130%. Assuming that Egypt’s GNP 
remains constant, what was minimum value that Egypt’s EDT could 
reach in order to achieve the World Bank’s critical value of 30%.
The result of our calculations was that Egypt's EDT should decrease 
form U$ 9,360 million if we were to reach the 30% target.
Assumption B :
Assuming that Egypt’s EDT remains constant, what is the minimum value 
allowed Egypt’s GNP or how much increase in Egypt’s GNP should take 
place in order to achieve the 30% target.
The result reached after the calculations was that Egypt’s GNP needed 
to grow from its current GNP of U$ 31,200 million to targeted U$ 135,333 
million, which is economically impossible.
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Appendix Vl-B
Egyptian Debt Management Unit Focus
DMU’s in general may employ the following debt management 
fuctions:
I. Executive Debt M anagem ent Direction and Organizations
• Policy Function Strategy
• Regulatory Function Structure
• Resourcing Function Staffing and Means
II. Operational Debt Managem ent Debt Dynamics and Practice
Passive M anagem ent
• Recording Function Information
• Analytical Function Analysis
Active M anagem ent
• Operating Function Operations
• Controlling Functions Control
Coordinating
Monitoring
(See appendix lll-B for an explanation of each of the above functions)
The management of the Egyptian Debt Management Unit successfully 
to focused on the executive level of Debt Management (that is, it was 
mainly concerned with leveraging and supporting the decision making 
process of top policy and decision makers constituting the Egyptian 
High Level Economic Committee which has driven the economy of 
Egypt in general and its debt management in particular since 1986).
The executive level of the Egyptian debt management program was 
constructed as an establishment dictating the “ rules of the gam e" by 
the highest levels of government. It thus gives direction and 
organization to the whole debt management constitution.
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Graphically, the Egyptian debt management components, functions 
and work processes could be viewed as follows:
Macro-economic Environment
Debt Management Unit
Policy Function
“Strategy”
Analytical Function
“Analysis”
Controlling /  Coordinating 
Function
“Control” >
DEBT
Operational
Active
Operating Function
“Operations”
^  Operational Recording Function
Passive “Information”
* Regulatory/ Function Resourcing Function
“Structure” “Staffing & means”
V j
Debt ManagementUnit
Macro-economic Environment 
Figure Vl-B-I
Egyptian Debt Management Components, Functions & Work Process
Figure VI-B-1 should be interpreted as representing the DMU functions 
and their products as building blocks for an effective debt 
management system. The lines link the functions or blocks at two 
levels: the executive and the operational level.
At the executive management level, the policy, regulatory, and 
resourcing functions give direction and organization to the entire debt 
management system. Macro-economic environment and the 
analytical, and human environment are both affecting and being
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affected by these functions. The evolving strategy, structure, staffing, 
and means determine the way debt management should be 
performed at the operational level.
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